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ABSTRACT 
Rationale: Financial incentives are amongst the most widely used strategies to improve health 
worker motivation and retention. There is also growing evidence to suggest that non-financial 
strategies are just as important as financial incentives. However, evidence on the effectiveness 
of these strategies in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) or in rural and remote areas is 
still limited. Available studies reported that the effectiveness of good incentive strategies with 
laudable intentions may be diminished as a result of negative consequences caused by 
weaknesses in their design processes and implementation. Yet, the process of the 
implementation of human resource for health strategies is less studied in low- and middle- 
income countries. There has also been limited policy analysis of human resource for health 
strategies to help explain policy outcomes.   
 
Objectives: This thesis sought to conduct a process evaluation of the design and 
implementation of four incentive strategies and their influence on the motivation and retention 
of health workers. These were: the rural allowance, the scarce skills allowance, the 
occupational specific dispensations for nurses, and the hospital revitalisation programme. 
 
Methods: Using a multiple-case study design comprising of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, we conducted a retrospective review and analysis of the relevant government 
documents, press releases and newspaper articles. In-depth interviews were also conducted 
with 35 key informants, eight hospital managers, five human resource managers and 118 
health workers. A health worker survey was carried out with 588 participants. The study was 
conducted in 10 hospitals and 55 community health centres and clinics in North West and 
Gauteng provinces in South Africa. For qualitative data, thematic content analysis of 
documents and interview transcripts was done using the Atlas.ti software. Quantitative data 
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were analysed using Stata (Version 10). The descriptive statistics that were employed 
included frequencies, percentages, measures of central tendency such as mean and median 
and distribution of data (standard deviations and IQR). Inferential statistics that were 
conducted included Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Regression analysis. 
 
Results: A notable finding of this study is that all the financial incentive strategies of interest 
(rural allowance, scarce skills allowance, and occupation-specific dispensation) were fully 
implemented at the time when the study was conducted while hospital revitalisation 
programme, the only non-financial incentive, was implemented to a certain degree. The 
finding that central level policymakers were the key actors driving the overall policy design 
processes across all the four incentive strategies of interest, suggests a top-down approach in 
the formulation of these retention strategies. The power of the different actors during the 
design stages varied across the four incentive strategies of interest; with the National Treasury 
consistently being an influential actor across all the four incentive strategies of interest 
because of their role of controlling the government budget. 
 
In general, the qualitative findings with different groups of respondents in this study showed 
that all the four incentive strategies of interest were in principle, regarded as good policies for 
incentivising the motivation and retention of health workers. This study found that all four 
incentive strategies were partially effective in the motivation and retention of nurses and 
doctors. A notable effect of the three financial incentive strategies derived from the qualitative 
data in this study was that they boosted salaries of the health workers. These findings were 
contrary to the results of the aJDI scale which demonstrated that the participants were 
generally dissatisfied with pay and promotion; with the mean scores of 3.8 (SD=3.6) and 6.1 
(SD=4.6) respectively. There were no significant differences between groups with regards to 
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the promotion subscale. However, with regard to the pay subscale, there were significant 
differences for health worker category (p=0.045). Significant differences were also observed 
for province (p=0.001), with Gauteng respondents reporting lower satisfaction with pay (M = 
3.3, SD = 0.34) than North West respondents (M = 4.6, SD = 3.8). The pay subscale in 
hospitals also reflected significant differences between locations (p=0.02).  
 
Two-sample t-tests revealed that respondents who benefitted from the interventions 
investigated in this study did not have significantly higher overall job satisfaction in either 
hospitals or clinic. However, the rural allowance, scarce skills allowance and OSD all 
increased satisfaction with pay for both hospital and clinic respondents. However, the 
differences were only statistically significant for the rural allowance (t=3.3, p=0.001) and for 
OSD (t=2.8, p=0.005) among health professionals in hospitals. In hospitals, rural allowance 
(t=-0.1, p=0.967) and scarce skills allowance (t=-0.2, p=0.840) increased the respondent’s 
intention to quit, although the differences were not statistically significant. However, the 
occupation specific dispensation significantly decreased the intention to quit of hospital health 
professionals (t=-2.2, p<0.05). In clinics, all the financial incentive strategies decreased the 
respondents’ intention to quit; however, there were no significant differences. The results also 
illustrates that all interventions under investigation in this study moderately increased the 
organisational commitment of hospital and clinic respondents.  
 
Despite the popularity of financial incentives, this study found that the impact of their 
admirable intentions can be reduced because of process and implementation weaknesses. The 
process issues that are raised in this thesis that affected the design and implementation of 
financial and non-financial incentive strategies are weak coordination, lack of uniformity, 
sub-optimal communication, lack of training of implementers, and weak monitoring and 
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information systems. In order to avoid loss of morale and staff grievances, careful planning 
and management of the process of the implementation of financial incentives in particular, is 
essential. Based on the data, this study developed an integrated conceptual framework that 
converge ideas from motivation theories and policy analysis to improve knowledge on health 
worker incentives, motivation and retention.  
 
Conclusions: The data presented in this thesis has demonstrated that as opposed to the 
assumption that financial incentives are easy solutions to addressing problems of health 
workforce motivation and retention, their implementation is complex. The results also showed 
that although motivation theories and policy analysis frameworks are often presented in 
isolation to explain human behaviour and policy processes respectively, these fields are quite 
complementary in studying the implementation of financial and non-financial incentives in 
the health sector.      
 
Implications: Based on the results of this PhD research, a new integrated approach for 
understanding the implementation of financial and non-financial incentives is proposed. These 
results are critical in light of the accelerated pressure towards achieving the health MDGs as 
well as the recent drive towards re-engineering the South African primary health care (PHC) 
system, and the implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI). The success of all 
these initiatives depends heavily on the availability, competence, motivation and retention of 
health workers. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
In many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
significant progress has been made in describing the human resources for health (HRH) 
challenges including insufficient numbers of health workers, skill imbalances, mal-
distribution, migration, poor working conditions and inadequate human resource planning and 
management [1-3]. Inadequate human resources are also a major constraint to the scaling up 
of priority health interventions and in achieving the health Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) [4, 5]. Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, has 25% of the world’s disease burden but it 
has only 1.3% of the world’s health workforce [6]. Although the majority of the poor and 
disadvantaged patients live in rural areas, a number of cross-sectional studies have 
documented the geographical imbalances of the health workforce between rural and urban 
areas as a key challenge. Yet, attracting, motivating and retaining skilled health workers, 
especially in rural health facilities, has proven difficult [7]. 
 
South Africa, like other African countries, faces a variety of health personnel problems and 
these are exacerbated by the unique quadruple disease burden that the country is experiencing. 
The heavier burden of disease requires well-planned health interventions and proper 
structuring of the entire health system including human resources for health. Although South 
Africa is a middle-income country with more health professionals than neighbouring African 
countries, it has a severe mal-distribution of personnel between the public and private sectors 
and between rural and urban areas [8]. For instance, in 2004, 46% of the South African 
population lived in rural areas, yet they were served by only 12% of the doctors and 19% of 
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the nurses [9]. In addition, the under-resourced public health sector is over-burdened; taking 
responsibility for the health and wellbeing of 80% of the population while the private sector 
deals with the remaining 20% [9].  
 
The international migration of health care workers, especially nurses, is also a major 
challenge facing the South African health system. A recent review on the extent of migration 
from sub-Saharan Africa reported that the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
remain key destinations while the major sources are South Africa and Nigeria [10]. For 
instance, immigration of doctors from South Africa increased from 239 in 2003 to a peak of 
427 in 2006; however in 2013 there was a rapid decline with only 10 registrations recorded 
[11]. This was attributed to the stringent registration requirements introduced by the Health 
Profession Council of South Africa [12]. Similarly, nurse migration from South Africa to the 
UK rose from 599 in 1998/1999 to a striking 2114 in 2001/2002 [10]. However it has since 
dropped to 933 in 2004/2005 [10].   
 
Various authors have documented factors contributing to the decision to migrate and these 
include poor remuneration, job dissatisfaction, limited opportunities for career advancement, 
poor working conditions, lack of future prospects, high levels of crime and violence and a 
decline in the quality of the school education system amongst others [13-16]. Specifically, 
when doctors and nurses migrate, this results in increased pressure on the remaining health 
workforce and contributes to low morale and productivity as well as high turnover [13-17]. 
Other enduring consequences include loss of experienced personnel, resulting in lack of 
continuity and institutional memory; thus negatively impacting on future production of the 
nurses in particular and on the mentoring of those remaining [18].   
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This reported HRH crisis, has prompted the South African government to introduce several 
strategies to attract, motivate and retain health workers where they are needed most [19] as 
summarised in Table 1. This table illustrates that there has been an incremental development 
of HRH policies and interventions in South Africa since the late 1990s. These can broadly be 
grouped under those intended to enhance the training and experience of new graduates, those 
intended to address disparities in rural areas, those aimed at improving the motivation and 
retention of health workers and those intended to improve the working conditions of health 
workers. In addition, the governments’ commitment to addressing the HRH crisis is 
demonstrated by launching the Nursing Strategy in 2008 [20], the National Human Resources 
for Health Strategy 2011-2017 [21] and further emphasised in key official documents such as 
National Development Plan (NDP) [22] and the Health Sector Strategic Framework, the 10-
Point Plan. 
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Table 1: HRH Policy Initiatives and Key Milestones for South Africa 
Year HRH Policy Initiatives and Key Milestones 
1997 Government released White Paper for the transformation of the health system 
containing recommendations on equitable health professional distribution 
1999 Government made a decision to close nursing colleges 
2000 Publication of the Pick report on Human Resources for Health 
2004 
 
 
Government introduced a: 
 Rural allowance to attract and retain certain health professionals in rural facilities 
 Scarce skills allowance to attract and retain scarce categories of health professionals 
in the public health sector 
2005 Commonwealth Ministers of Health, of which South Africa is signatory, signed an 
agreement regarding the ethical recruitment of health workers 
2006 
 
Government released a National Human Resources for Health Framework to address 
the critical shortage of health professionals 
2008 Government released a National Nursing Strategy for South Africa 
2008-2010 Government introduced the occupation specific dispensation for nurses, a financial 
incentive strategy intended to attract, motivate, and retain health professionals in the 
public sector 
2011 Government released the 2012-2017 Human Resources for Health Strategy 
 
While these efforts are commendable, an evaluation of these interventions to determine their 
effectiveness is still lacking. It is against this backdrop that the current thesis sought to 
conduct a process evaluation of the design and implementation of four incentive strategies and 
their influence on the motivation and retention of health workers in two provinces in South 
Africa. This information is critical in light of the accelerated pressure towards achieving the 
health MDGs by 2015 [23], as well as the recent drive towards re-engineering the South 
African primary health care (PHC) system [24] and the implementation of the National Health 
Insurance (NHI) [25]. The success of all these initiatives depends heavily on the knowledge, 
competence, motivation and retention of health workers. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
Given the often extreme wage differentials across countries, a recent paper noted that salaries 
and benefits appear to be obvious pull factors towards foreign countries [26]. For instance, in 
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the UK, a family doctor gets paid more than US$200,000 per year which is more than 13 
times the estimated Ghanaian doctor’s salary of US$14,600, although when cost of living is 
taken into consideration, the real disparity is smaller [27]. Also, the monthly salaries of 
physicians range from US$50 in Sierra Leone to US$1,242 in South Africa [27]; while wages 
in Canada and Australia are approximately four times those in South Africa [28]. Other 
authors have described pay and income as affecting the motivation, performance, morale and 
the ability of employers to attract and retain staff [27]. Available evidence further suggests 
that the size of the pay differential between different cadres of health workers (e.g. doctors 
and nurses) can affect morale, working relationships and the available mix of cadres [27]. 
This in turn can have repercussions for retention both within and outside countries and on the 
distribution of health worker in general. It, therefore, comes as no surprise that financial 
incentives are amongst the most widely used strategies to improve health worker motivation 
and retention [29, 30]. However, evidence on their effectiveness in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMIC) [31-33] or in rural and remote areas is still limited [29, 31].  
 
There are a number of other limitations of the available literature on HRH interventions. 
Although existing studies provide some insights into factors contributing to motivation, few 
studies have evaluated the effect of real-life interventions or programs [33, 34]. Linking these 
real-life interventions to motivation theories has also been limited [33]. Moreover, the 
majority of available studies on financial incentives have examined programs for doctors [35]. 
However, a few recent studies have drawn attention to strategies for other cadres such as 
nurses, pharmacists and dentists [36, 37]. Furthermore, while primary health care facilities are 
key health gatekeepers to the community, most of the existing health worker incentive studies 
were carried out in hospitals, with very few in primary care or community care settings [38, 
39].  
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According to McDonald and Roland [40], the design of incentive programmes should 
consider the manner in which these strategies are implemented and the context within which 
they are implemented. For example, with regard to financial incentives, some researchers 
have noted that inequities or perceived inequities in the manner in which these incentives are 
designed and implemented could contribute to problems of demotivation [32]. However, 
Rigoli and Dussault [41] have cautioned that many incentive schemes fail to achieve expected 
results due to poor design. This is because policymakers in most countries have limited 
guidance on how to design incentive strategies to ensure that they can achieve the intended 
policy objectives [42].  
 
Although some have highlighted the importance of investigating the implementation 
challenges that contribute to policy failure [43], there is still a paucity of research on the 
process of implementation of HRH strategies in LMICs [33, 44-46]. There is also limited 
policy analysis of HRH strategies in LMICs to help explain policy outcomes [45-47]. Other 
scholars have reported on the lack of more detailed documentation describing promising 
practices that would be useful to HRH leaders and practitioners [48]. 
 
There is also growing evidence to suggest that non-financial strategies are just as important as 
financial incentives. Some researchers have even argued that non-financial incentives are 
more important than financial incentives in motivating health workers [49, 50]. Although a 
number of service-linked scholarships, loans and loan repayment programmes are described 
in the literature [51], the effect of these and other non-financial incentives on the motivation 
and retention of the health workforce also remains limited [34, 51, 52]. The process of the 
implementation of these strategies is also unknown.  
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Against the backdrop of these gaps identified in the existing literature, in this thesis, I make 
an argument that the effectiveness of good policies with laudable intentions may be 
diminished as a result of negative consequences caused by weaknesses in their design 
processes and implementation [42, 53]. Therefore, this study investigates the process of the 
design and implementation of four HRH interventions and their influence on the motivation 
and retention of doctors and nurses in hospitals and clinics in two South African Provinces. 
These interventions include three that relate to financial incentives (rural allowance, scarce 
skills allowance, occupation-specific dispensation (OSD) for nurses), and one that relates to 
non-financial incentives (the hospital revitalisation programme).  
 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
Over the years, South Africa has introduced numerous reforms in an effort to improve the 
performance of its health system so as to meet the health needs of all its population. In line 
with the global policy directions on universal health coverage [54, 55], the South African 
government has placed renewed emphasis on strengthening primary health care (PHC) and 
district health systems (DHS) [25, 56]. As with other countries, South Africa is also under 
immense pressure to achieve the health Millennium Development Goals before the 2015 
deadline. The success of these reforms depends heavily on the knowledge, competence, 
motivation and retention of the health workforce.  
 
My research has both international and national relevance because human resources for health 
has been identified globally as one of the key elements for health systems strengthening [2, 
57]. Internationally, this is evidenced by the Kampala Declaration of the Global Health 
Workforce Alliance (GHWA) in 2008 which called for global and national leaders to increase 
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funding for research on human resources for health [58]. The WHO policy recommendations 
for improving the retention of health workers in rural areas also signified global attention on 
the distribution of health workers in rural and underserved areas [59]. In South Africa, the 
government has identified the development, planning and management of the health 
workforce as one of the 10 strategic priorities of the National Department of Health for the 
period 2009 to 2014 [60]. As part of strengthening the health systems in the country, the 
Minister of Health also committed himself to a programme of key deliverables which includes 
improving human resources for health [56].  
 
In addition, in October 2011, the new Human Resources for Health Strategy for the health 
sector covering the period from 2012 to 2017 was released by the National Department of 
Health [21]. This policy document lists 8 HRH priorities with stipulated objectives and 
activities, a number of which are relevant for this research. For example, Objective 1.4 of 
Strategic Priority 1 makes mention of the establishment of a National Recruitment and 
Retention Unit which will be tasked with overseeing the recruitment, retention and equitable 
distribution of health workers [21]. Objective 6.5 of Strategic Priority 6 calls for the review 
and implementation of the revised OSD, a financial incentive strategy to attract, motivate and 
retain health professionals in the public health sector [21]. In addition, Objective 8.4 of 
Strategic Priority 8 focuses on the development of financial incentives to attract health 
professionals to work in rural areas [21].  
 
In light of this context, my study is important because it intends to investigate how the design 
and implementation of HRH policy processes may influence the motivation and retention of 
health workers, drawing on the perspectives of different stakeholders and relevant theoretical 
9 
 
approaches. This information is critical to inform and strengthen the implementation of 
identified HRH reforms and priorities.  
 
1.4 Study Aims and Objectives 
The overall goal of this study was to enhance knowledge on the complexity of implementing 
financial and non-financial incentives to improve health worker motivation and retention by 
providing a detailed account of the process factors that may influence the ultimate outcomes 
of these strategies. In particular, the study intended to examine whether the manner in which 
the four HRH interventions of interest in this study were designed and implemented affected 
the motivation and retention of doctors and nurses in two provinces in South Africa. This 
information is critical in order to inform and strengthen the implementation of current and 
future HRH policy reforms in South Africa. The specific study objectives were:  
1. To describe the process of the design and implementation of the selected HRH 
interventions (rural allowance, scarce skills allowance, occupation-specific 
dispensation for nurses, and the hospital revitalisation programme). 
2. To assess perceptions on whether the selected HRH interventions (rural allowance, 
scarce skills allowance, occupation-specific dispensation for nurses, and the hospital 
revitalisation programme) influenced health workers’ motivation and retention.  
3. To evaluate the influence of the selected HRH interventions (rural allowance, scarce 
skills allowance, occupation-specific dispensation for nurses, and the hospital 
revitalisation programme) on health workers’ job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment and intention to leave. 
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This study was part of a larger multi-country project investigating health worker motivation 
and retention in South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi which had three components [61] as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Three Components of the Motivation Project 
 
 
The first component involved a systematic review of evidence on the critical factors 
influencing human resource capacity to deliver equitable effective health care efficiently at 
the district level [30]. The second component aimed to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of HRH strategies which had intended to improve the motivation and retention of health staff 
through natural case studies in each of the three countries. The third component conducted a 
discrete choice experiment to determine the relative importance of different financial and 
other incentives on the motivation of different categories of health professionals. This PhD is 
based on the second component from South Africa. I was the principal investigator of this 
component and was responsible for all the research stages including proposal writing, ethics 
approval, gathering the data, data analysis, report writing and dissemination of the key 
findings through presentation at local and international conferences.  
 
Component 1: Explore Capacity and Context 
Component 2: Evaluate the Incentive Strategies  
Component 3: Discreet Choice Experiment (DCE) 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is divided into 11 chapters (including the present chapter) which are described as 
follows:  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on factors influencing motivation and retention, and the 
effectiveness of financial and non-financial incentives on job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment and intention to leave a job. Studies on the design and implementation of 
incentive strategies will also be explored. The chapter concludes with an outline of the initial 
conceptual framework used for the study, drawing from motivation and policy analysis 
theoretical approaches. In Chapter 3, the methodology of the study is described, including an 
overview of the case studies, the sampling strategy and the study setting.  
In total, there are six different chapters reporting on the results (Chapters 4-9). Chapter 4 is 
the first results chapter and will start off by describing the demographic characteristics of the 
participants in both the qualitative and quantitative components of the study. Thereafter, it 
will provide an overview of the human resource context at the study sites in order to 
contextualise the motivation and retention of health workers in this study. In Chapters 5 to 7, 
findings of the incentive strategies of interest in this study (rural allowance, scarce skills 
allowance, occupational specific dispensation and hospital revitalisation programme) are 
divided into two sections. The first section will provide a description of the design and 
implementation processes of each of these interventions. The second part will discuss the 
perceived influence of these interventions on the motivation and retention of health workers.  
 
In Chapter 8, descriptive, bivariate and multiple regression analysis of health worker job 
satisfaction, organisational commitment and intention to leave will be presented. Chapter 9 is 
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the last results chapter and it will provide a critical analysis of the cross-cutting findings 
where the commonalities and differences in the incentive strategies under investigation in this 
study will be discussed, as well as commenting on their influence on job satisfaction, 
organisational commitment and health workers’ intention to leave. The chapter will conclude 
by proposing an integrated framework combining motivation theories and policy analysis as a 
new approach for understanding the implementation of financial and non-financial incentives. 
Chapter 10, which is the final chapter of the thesis, will synthesise the key findings of this 
study in relation to existing literature and conclude by discussing the strengths and limitations 
of the study, the implications of this study and recommendations for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 set the scene for this thesis by justifying the need for this study. In this chapter, I 
explore in detail literature to determine the relationship between incentives and motivation of 
health workers by discussing theoretical and empirical evidence on incentives, motivation and 
retention. In addition to this, I review the job satisfaction and organisational commitment 
literature in recognition of the belief that motivated workers are likely to be satisfied with 
their jobs, committed and retained to their organisations. Literature on policy analysis in 
relation to human resources for health (HRH) will also be investigated. Based on the literature 
reviewed, the study’s conceptual frameworks will be derived with the intention of relating the 
study to relevant theory and to emphasise the contribution of this study to the existing 
literature.  
 
2.2 Definition of Concepts  
In this section, I briefly review the key concepts related to this study as a way of mapping the 
terrain. In doing this, I will unpack the varied meanings of the concepts and consider their 
analytical usefulness. These concepts include: incentives, motivation, retention, job 
satisfaction and organisational commitment.  
 
Incentives: 
Incentives are defined as “all the rewards & punishments that providers face as a consequence 
of the organisations in which they work, the institutions under which they operate and the 
specific interventions they provide” [62] (p61). Buchan and McCaffery [48] added another 
dimension by defining an incentive in terms of its objective. According to them, an incentive 
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refers to “one particular form of payment that is intended to achieve some specific change in 
behaviour”. Incentives serve as a motivation for a health worker to perform better and stay in 
their job through better job satisfaction [63]. Incentives can be positive or negative, financial 
or non-financial, tangible or intangible [32]. Financial incentives involve “direct monetary 
payment from employer to employee”, (p3) [64] such as wages, bonuses and loans. Non-
financial incentives include provision of work autonomy, flexibility in working time and 
recognition of work [64-66]. 
 
Motivation: 
Franco et al [67] defined motivation in the work context as “an individual’s degree of 
willingness to exert different levels of efforts towards achieving organizational goals”. 
Gredler, Broussard and Garrison [68] on the other hand defined motivation as “the attribute 
that moves us to do or not to do something” (p. 106). To be motivated means to be moved to 
do something [69]. While there are many definitions proposed for motivation, there seems to 
be consensus in the literature that motivation is about the process that energises, directs and 
sustains individual behaviour [70]. Deci and Ryan [71] constructed two concepts to assist in 
understanding motivation and these are intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation 
refers to motivation to engage in an activity because it is enjoyable and satisfying to do that 
activity whereas extrinsic motivation refers to actions carried out to achieve a reward or to 
avoid punishment.  
 
Job Satisfaction: 
A number of definitions have been proposed in the literature for job satisfaction. For instance, 
Spector [72] defines job satisfaction as “simply how people feel about their jobs and the 
different aspects of their job. It is the extent to which people like (satisfaction) or dislike 
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(dissatisfaction) their jobs.” Job satisfaction has also been defined as an “affective response to 
specific aspects of the job” [73], and as a worker’s “overall feelings about the job” [74]. A 
commonly acceptable definition of job satisfaction referred to this concept as “a pleasurable 
or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job and job experience” [75] 
(p.1304).  
 
Organisational Commitment: 
Organisational commitment has been defined “as an acceptance of the goal and values of the 
organisation, a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organisation, and a 
desire to maintain membership in the organisation” [76]. Jans [77] broadly referred to 
organisational commitment as the degree that an individual in an organisation accepts, 
internalises, and views his or her role. The process of becoming committed to an organisation 
involves internalising the values and goals of the organisation, a willingness to help the 
organisation achieve its goals, and the desire to remain part of the organisation [77-79]. 
 
Meyer and Allen [80] discussed three independent types of commitment experienced at 
different levels by all individuals of an organisation and these are affective, continuance, and 
normative commitments. With the affective approach, an individual may stay with an 
organisation because the organisation’s values, mission, and goals align with their own. 
Continuance commitment argues that an individual may stay with the same organisation 
because leaving may influence their prestige, benefits, or social networks; while normative 
commitment is when the values of the organisation produce a feeling of obligation. 
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Retention: 
Workforce retention has been referred to in the literature as “the length of time between 
commencement and termination of employment” [81]. Polit and Hungler [82] defined nurse 
retention as the extent to which nurses stay in their present jobs. Although retention refers to 
some minimum length of stay [83, 84], it is unclear as to what constitutes the minimum and 
this is likely to vary between professions, positions or health services [81].  
 
Waldman [83] makes a distinction between ‘retention’ and ‘turnover’ where retention is a 
measure of length of stay and refers to the time between engagement to a service and 
separation or departure from the service. Turnover on the other hand refers to the number of 
terminations in a specified time period divided by the number of active workers in the same 
category [83, 84]. While retention points to who is leaving, who is staying and for how long, 
turnover indicates the movement of individuals coming into or leaving a service [81]. 
Workforce retention is important to study considering that it has been linked to improved 
health outcomes mainly because longer duration of employment is associated with increased 
experience, local knowledge and skills as well as continuity of service and care [81]. On the 
other hand, low retention implies that personnel are not staying long enough to achieve job 
mastery [81].   
 
Policy and Health Policy  
Several scholars have commented that there is lack of agreement about what policy means 
and the context within which this concept is used [85]. Therefore, several definitions of a 
policy have since been proposed in the literature. For example, Anderson [86] defined policy 
as “a proposed course of action of a person, group or government within a given environment 
providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilise and overcome 
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in an effort to reach a goal or realise an objective” (p3). According to Fox and Meyer [87], 
policy is “authoritative statements made by legitimate public institutions about the way in 
which they propose to deal with policy problems” (p107). A more acceptable definition for 
the purpose of this study is that proposed by Walt [85] which defined policy as “a series of 
more or less related activities and their intended and unintended consequences for those 
concerned” (p.41). This definition is considered because it resonates better with the aims and 
objectives of the current study. Health policy on the other hand, has been defined as “an 
agreement of consensus on the health issues, goals and objectives to be addressed, the 
priorities among those objectives and the main directions for achieving them” [88].  
 
Policy Analysis 
In understanding public policies better, some scholars proposed the use of policy analysis. Pal 
[89] defined policy analysis as “the disciplined application of intellect to public problems” 
(p2). Hanekom’s [90] definition is that policy analysis is “an attempt to measure the costs and 
benefits of various policy alternatives or to evaluate the efficacy of existing policies; in other 
words to produce and transform information relevant to particular policies into a form that 
could be used to resolve problems pertaining to those policies” (p.65).  
 
Policy analysis is diverse and draws from a wide range of skills and methodologies from 
disciplines such as history, sociology, political science and legislative studies. Many writers 
on policy analysis recognised the complexity and messiness of policy analysis given its broad 
scope which may include the analysis of policy process and the analysis of policy content 
[91].  
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2.3 A Review of Theoretical Approaches on Motivation and Incentives  
Motivation is a complex and multidimensional concept and several theories have been 
proposed in the literature to explain it [70, 92-94]. Motivation theorists mainly intended to 
answer questions about what drives people to initiate action, what influences their choice of 
action, and why do they persist on their action over time [70]. As such, key concepts used in 
theories in this area of work include “needs”, “values”, “attitudes”, “goals”, “effort”, 
“rewards” and “expectations” [70]. With regards to incentive theoretical approaches, 
traditional economics theories made assumptions that monetary incentives improved 
performance. The reasoning put forward was that individuals modify behaviours based on 
changes in incentives [95, 96]. Public sector employees for example, were assumed to 
respond to standard financial incentives by working harder if their pay increased with their 
work effort [96].  
 
However, an alternative view in the psychology literature argues that money may not be the 
main driver of public sector employees work effort [97, 98]. This viewpoint suggests that 
since most public sector employees are highly skilled professionals with high professional 
standards, financial incentives may be less relevant for their work effort if these incentives 
conflict with their standards [97]. Given these theoretical arguments, this section will explore 
some of the incentive and motivation theories that may be useful to understand the influence 
of financial and non-financial incentives in the motivation and retention of health workers. 
The scale of this thesis does not permit a comprehensive presentation of the abundance of 
often overlapping theories explaining incentives and motivation. Therefore, only a synthesis 
of theoretical approaches in these fields which may be relevant in the health sector will be 
discussed. These are: two incentive theories (intrinsic vs extrinsic motivation, and motivation 
crowding theory), five theories of motivation (Maslow’s theory, Hertzberg two-factor theory, 
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expectancy theory, equity theory and goal-setting theory). In the following sections, I will 
explain the key constructs of these theories, and highlight some of their key strengths and 
weaknesses.  
 
2.3.1 Incentive Theories 
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Deci and Ryan [71], in their Self-Determination Theory 
made a distinction between the different types of motivation based on the different reasons or 
goals that give rise to an action and these are referred to as intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 
These authors argues that in order to be effective and to satisfy the full range of their needs, 
human beings will act on their internal and external environments [71]. Intrinsic motivation is 
explained as doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable [71, 99]. An 
individual’s choices are made on the basis of his or her own values and desires. However, 
aspects of the situation in which the behaviour is performed, such as the reward system or the 
feedback system, may lead the individual to question the true causes of his or her behaviour 
[100]. If for instance individuals attribute their behaviour to the situational factors, the shift 
from internal to external causes results in a decrease in intrinsic motivation [71]. Assumptions 
are made that high levels of pre-reward behaviour imply high intrinsic motivation [101].  
 
In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to a situation where the reason for doing a task is based 
on behavioural choices that are determined by control, pressures or rewards [71, 99]. Rewards 
such as money and job promotion are good example of extrinsic motivation. Similarly, social 
and emotional incentives such as praise, feedback and attention are also extrinsic motivators 
since they are bestowed on an individual by another person. However, it is noted that the 
effectiveness of extrinsic motivators varies depending on a number of other factors such as 
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self-esteem, locus of control and self-efficacy. For example, for people with high self-esteem, 
praise might have less effect on behaviour because they would not have the same need for 
approval that would make the external praise reinforcing. On the other hand, someone who 
lacks confidence may work diligently for the sole purpose of seeking a small amount of 
recognition.  
 
 
Motivation Crowding Theory: In the late sixties, the reinforcing effect of rewards on 
behaviour was firmly established in the learning theory literature [101]. This was until Deci 
[99] and Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett [102] investigated a possible exception to this effect, 
which is whether rewards could have a detrimental effect if they were offered for an activity 
that the individual enjoyed. Their hypothesis was that rewards might undermine intrinsic 
motivation [99, 102]. Subsequently, a plethora of studies examined the prevalence of the 
undermining effect of rewards, a process referred to as “motivation crowding out”. This 
concept was coined in the economic literature to suggest that external interventions via 
monetary rewards or punishments may undermine, and under different identifiable conditions 
strengthen intrinsic motivation [103].     
 
For example, physical reinforcement such as money has been shown to have more negative 
effects on the intrinsic motivation than do verbal reinforcements such as praise. This can lead 
to extinguishing the intrinsic motivation and creating dependence on extrinsic rewards for 
continued performance [104]. However, alternative viewpoints suggested that intrinsic 
motivation may not be so vulnerable to the effects of extrinsic reinforcements and in fact 
reinforcement such as verbal praise might actually increase intrinsic motivation [105]. 
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Cameron and Pierce [105] have however observed that of particular relevance to the question 
of crowding out in the health context, the rewards have no undermining or even a positive 
effect on “dull”, “boring”, “uninteresting” tasks, that is tasks for which initial intrinsic is low. 
In their counter argument of this, Deci and colleagues [104] maintained that the research field 
of external rewards on intrinsic motivation has always been defined in terms of reward effect 
on intrinsic motivation for interesting activities.  
 
The concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have thus raised controversies, with some 
questioning that if extrinsic incentives are used to stimulate behaviours that an individual 
already finds motivating, intrinsic motivation for that behaviour may decrease over time 
[106]. In such cases, extrinsic motivators may backfire instead of serving as an incentive for 
the desired behaviour.  
 
2.3.2 Motivation Theories 
In their review of theories and empirical evidence of motivation of health workers in 
developing countries, Dolea and Adams [70] stated that there are two main lines of theories 
on motivation that focus on individual factors affecting motivation and these are a) the needs 
theories, and b) the process theories. The needs theories argue that people make an effort at 
work in order to satisfy some needs [70] and that different factors contribute to either 
encouraging or halting a behaviour within an individual [107]. The most influential needs 
theories are Maslow’s theory of needs and Hertzberg two-factor theory [70, 107] which are 
discussed below.  
 
22 
 
The Needs Theories of Motivation 
 
Maslow’s theory proposes a hierarchy of five levels of needs starting from a basic level 
which is essential for survival through to higher levels related to individual growth and self-
fulfilment [70, 108]. These needs are basic physiological needs, safety / security, 
belongingness, self-esteem, and self-actualisation [108]. According to this theory, once a level 
of needs have been met, it is no longer motivating as such, individuals strive to meet the next 
level [70, 108]. Although this theory is essentially about individual’s motivation in life, a 
number of scholars attempted to apply these hierarchy of needs in the work setting [70].  
 
For example, in relation to work, once salaries are considered to be sufficient to assure 
minimum survival requirements such as food, clothes and housing, employees will move on 
to secure these needs through a stable job. Once job stability has been achieved, they will 
move up the needs’ pyramid to satisfy the need to be part of a social group, and once this is 
achieved they will seek self-esteem and recognition from their peers, supervisors and patients 
[70]. This will ultimately lead to improved self-confidence, self-fulfilment and personal 
growth through work.  
 
While Maslow’s theory is still widely used in the fields of management, marketing, education 
and the health sector, subsequent research on this theory failed to support his hierarchy of 
needs [109-111]. For instance, there was evidence that items which were clearly satisfied 
remained to be considered as important, and the theory ignored the often-observed behaviour 
of individuals who tolerate low-pay for the promise of future benefits [109, 110]. In addition, 
there was no agreements amongst scholars about the number or sets of needs required and the 
hierarchal arrangements of such needs [94]. Another criticism noted is that the theory fails to 
23 
 
take into account the individual’s cultural and social differences [112]. In spite of these 
weaknesses, the hierarchy of needs are still popular in workplace motivation mainly due to the 
simplicity of their core elements and their perceptive insights into human nature [113].   
 
Hertzberg’s two factor-theory [70, 114-116] takes the concept of personnel motivation 
beyond Maslow’s traditional hierarchy on needs by identifying two sets of factors that can 
influence work motivation and job satisfaction. In doing so, Hertzberg and colleagues used 
the “critical incident technique” to  ask participants to describe a time at their work when they 
felt exceptionally good or bad about their job [116, 117].  After describing the incident in 
detail, the participants were then asked to rate the impact of the incident on their job attitude 
[116, 117]. This theory argues that job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are affected by two 
factors namely ‘motivators’ and ‘hygiene factors’ [114, 115].  
 
‘Motivators’, also referred to as ‘satisfiers’, are a group of ‘job content’ needs which if 
satisfied, will encourage employees to work harder and this will lead to higher motivation and 
superior performance [114, 115]. Examples of these needs include achievement, work itself, 
recognition, responsibility, and advancement [114, 115]. These ‘motivators’ also contributes 
to “intrinsic” motivation [70]. Hertzberg also referred to ‘hygiene factors’ which are a group 
of ‘job context’ needs which if not met, cause individuals to become dissatisfied [70, 114, 
115]. These needs are organisation policy and administration, supervision, interpersonal 
relationships, working conditions, salary, and job security [114, 115]. The hygiene factors are 
considered to be “extrinsic” to the job and their absence is associated with decreased 
motivation [70].  
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Although this theory was considered highly controversial as it challenged conventional job 
satisfaction debates in the 1950s [117], Hertzberg claimed that this theory provided the 
foundation for numerous other theories and frameworks in human resource development 
[118]. Some of the strengths of Hertzberg two-factor theory identified in the literature are that 
it is simple, it leads to clear-cut advocacy of job enrichment as a way to motivate staff, it 
reinforces managerial values, and it emphasises individuality, growth and centrality of work 
[70]. However, like any other theory, Hertzberg theory also has limitations. The primary 
criticism of this theory is that it is method-bound [70]. For instance, available studies that 
have applied this theory have invariably used the same method of critical incident technique 
and when a different method was used, the results were contradictory [70]. The theory was 
also criticised for ignoring the role of individual differences amongst employees [70, 119]. 
Other critiques noted that the two-factors overlap as sources of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction, arguing that a single factor may be a satisfier for one person, but cause job 
dissatisfaction for another person [117].  
Process Theories of Motivation  
In their review of theories and empirical evidence of motivation of health workers in 
developing countries, Dolea and Adams [70] stated that the process theories of focuses deeply 
on the thinking process of individuals in order to understand why employees behave in certain 
ways and how they determine their choice of behaviours [107]. The most common process 
theories documented in the literature are expectancy theory, equity theory and goal setting 
theory [70, 107]. These are discussed in detail below. 
 
Goal-setting theory’s primary proposition is that an individual’s performance will increase if 
difficult goals that are fair, specific and attractive are clearly set and defined [92, 94, 120]. 
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These goals may be self-set or accepted from those set by others [94]. The theory further 
argues that difficult goals are more likely to result in higher performance than easy goals [92, 
94, 120]. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with performance will depend on whether the 
individuals reached difficult but fair goals [70]. Money, other concrete rewards or 
participation of individuals in setting the work goals may increase their commitment to 
achieve the set goals particularly if the goals are made more attractive [70, 94, 120]. Once 
individuals commit themselves to goals, more effort is exerted to achieve these goals [70, 
120]. In addition, the theory asserts that intention to work towards a goal is a major source of 
job motivation.  
 
In order to continue performing at high levels, employees will require feedback from 
employers on how they are progressing towards attaining their goals [92, 94, 120]. However, 
other researchers have demonstrated that not all feedback is effective arguing that self-
generated feedback, where the employee is able to monitor his or her own progress, was 
shown to be more powerful motivator than externally generated feedback [92]. Addition to 
feedback, another factor found to influence the goal-performance relationship is self-efficacy 
which refers to an individuals’ belief of their capabilities of performing a task [92, 120]. The 
key argument that this theory is making in relation to the latter is that higher self-efficacy may 
lead to increased confidence in one’s ability to succeed in a task while low self-efficacy does 
the opposite [92, 120]. Similarly, individuals with high self-efficacy appeared to respond 
better to negative feedback by increasing effort in their work as opposed to those with low 
self-efficacy who are likely to lessen their effort when given negative feedback [92, 120].     
 
A notable caveat of the goal-setting theory is that in circumstances where two separate goals 
are set at the same time, exerting too much effort on one may make it challenging to achieve 
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another [121]. However, prioritisation or finding a balance between goals may assist in 
dealing with this limitation. Another limitation of this theory is in relation to what is termed 
“tunnel vision”, which in this context refers to when employees focus so intently on their 
goals to the extent that they would ignore other aspects of their job [122]. On the 
advantageous side, the strength of setting goals increased individual’s awareness of their 
strengths and weaknesses. Other scholars have however indicated that it would be crucial to 
understand the way individuals and organisations choose goals and the factors that determine 
commitment to the goals [120, 123]. The other advantage is that goal-setting theory can be 
applied not only in work tasks, but also in a number of other settings such as in sports and 
rehabilitation [122].    
 
Vroom’s Expectancy Theory [70, 124] emphasises the existence of a relationship between 
the effort people put in work and the results they expect to get from that effort. According to 
this theory, people are motivated by the expectation that their work will be instrumental in 
receiving a certain valued outcome, regardless of whether their perceptions of the outcome is 
accurate or not [70]. This theory proposes three interrelated constructs for understanding 
motivation and these are referred to as “expectancy or effort-performance” linkage, 
“instrumentality or performance” linkage, and “valence or attractiveness of rewards” linkage 
[70, 92, 124]. The expectancy or effort-performance linkage is an individual’s perceived 
belief that exerting a certain amount of effort will result in certain level of performance [70, 
92]. The instrumentality or performance linkage is the extent to which an individual believes 
that a certain level of performance will lead to achievement of desired outcomes [70, 92]. The 
valence or attractiveness of rewards linkage on the other hand refers to a situation when an 
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individual places significant importance on the potential outcome or rewards that can be 
achieved on the job; while taking into cognisance individual goals and needs [70, 92].  
 
This theory is based on the assumption that in choosing alternative courses of action, people 
calculate the costs and benefits of such actions [125, 126] and that individuals perceive 
outcomes or rewards positively, negatively or neutrally [124]. Positive outcomes or rewards 
may include aspects such as pay, job security, trust, fringe benefits, and opportunities created 
for an individual to use their talents or skills [92]. Negative outcomes on the other hand 
include issues such as job fatigue, boredom, frustration, harsh supervision, or threat of 
dismissal [92]. Therefore, the critical issue with this theory is that no universal principle exist 
for explaining each person’s motivation [124]. As such, it is a self-interest driven theory 
because each individual maximises on his or her expected satisfaction of needs.  
 
Critiques of this theory have noted that the constructs of expectancy and valence requires 
theoretical clarification [127, 128] while the concept of instrumentality was found to be 
ambiguous and difficult to operationalise [127, 128]. In spite of its limits, this theory has 
generated substantial interest among scholars over years, with some noting its usefulness and 
influence in organisational research for understanding occupational preference, job 
satisfaction and work motivation [127, 129]. In addition, some evidence supported its 
inference that expectancies cause reaction in behaviour [129].    
 
Adams’ Equity Theory [70, 92, 130] predominantly focuses on the issues of justice, fairness 
and equal treatment of employees compared with others who behave in similar ways. The 
theory refers to the concept of a referent, which is explained as ‘the other’, ‘systems’ or 
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‘selves’ against which individuals compare themselves to assess equity [92, 130]. In relation 
to the ‘other’, individuals compare themselves with other individuals with similar jobs in the 
same organisation and or professional association. The ‘system’ includes organisational pay 
policies, procedures and the administration of the system while the ‘self’ relates to inputs-
outcomes ratios that are unique to the individual and are primarily based on past personal 
experiences [92, 130]. An individual’s choice of referent is mainly dependent on the 
information available to them about the referent including their perceived relevance.  
 
This theory argues that people are motivated when they believe that they are treated fairly or 
equitably relative to others [70, 130, 131]. The theory also proposes that employees expect a 
balance between what they get from a job situation (outcomes) in relation to what they put 
into it (inputs) [70, 92, 131]. Thereafter, they compare their input-outcome ratio to that of 
relevant others and if an employee perceive his or her ratio to be equal to those of relevant 
others, a state of equity exist whereby these individuals perceive their situation as fair and just 
[130, 131]. However, if the ratio is perceived to be unequal, inequity prevails and such 
individuals perceive themselves as under-rewarded or over-rewarded [130, 131].  
 
When inequities occur, employees may display certain behavioural responses [92]. They may 
distort either their own or others’ inputs or outcomes; they may behave in some way to induce 
others to change their input or outcomes; they may behave in some way to change their own 
inputs or outcomes; they may choose a different comparison person; or they may quit their 
job [92]. Adams [131] also proposes that in circumstances where it is pay that is specifically 
perceived as inequitable, employees who are under-rewarded or over-rewarded will react in 
certain ways depending on whether their wages are based on time factors or quantity of 
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output. Consequent to this, these employees might display lower or higher productivity, 
improved or reduced quality of output, increased absenteeism, or voluntary resignation [70].  
 
In terms of its strengths, equity theory’s behaviour predictions on the effects of under-
compensation were confirmed by empirical studies as robust [100, 132]. However, a notable 
limitation of this theory is that evidence on over-compensation inequity and its effects has 
been ambiguous than that on under-compensation [133, 134]. Other critiques also noted that 
the theory fell short in relation to which behavioural option (i.e. lowering inputs, raising 
outcomes, leaving the situation) is most likely to be observed and in which context [134].  
  
2.3.3 Summary  
 
With regards to motivation theories, this review have demonstrated that theories presented 
here used a set of concepts and constructs in order to link reasons why people work with the 
outcomes of their effort to work [70]. In essence, these theories suggest that provided the 
organisational policies and conditions meet individual’s expectations, the desire to put effort 
at work will be triggered [70]. While most theories on motivation recognises that needs vary 
from one individual to another, very few theories attempted to address other factors that 
influence human behaviour at work such as organisational culture, social, cultural, economic 
and contextual factors [70]. Managers in the health sector are thus faced with the challenge of 
identifying all these factors in order to specify the desired outcome expected from their 
employees as well as to propose and implement strategies that link the various motivational 
sources with the expected outcomes [70].  
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Dolea and Adams [70] further noted that while theories on motivation and tools for assessing 
or measuring it have been developed in high-income countries; their applicability in low- and 
middle-income countries is still limited. In addition, not all of these theories have been 
supported by empirical evidence, particularly in the health sector. Nonetheless, they are still 
appealing for managers because of the possibilities that they offer for designing effective 
workplace strategies. The following section will present empirical evidence on incentives, 
motivation and retention in the health sector.   
 
2.4 Empirical Evidence on Incentives, Motivation and Retention of Health 
Workers 
 
2.4.1 Incentives, Motivation and Retention  
Initial responses to the shortage of skilled health workers in developing countries focussed on 
increasing training capacity, but it has become increasingly clear that the issues of incentives, 
motivation and retention of existing health workers are as important [135]. There is, therefore, 
some evidence on the incentives that can be used to motivate and retain health workers which 
shows that both financial and other incentives are important in motivating and retaining health 
workers [136]. For example, several studies have identified important motivational factors as: 
better salary [137-140]; a stable job; recognition or appreciation by managers, colleagues and 
community [138, 141, 142]; training [138, 142]; supportive supervision, performance 
appraisal and career development [38]. Other major motivational themes identified in the 
literature include continuing education, hospital infrastructure, resource availability, hospital 
management and recognition/appreciation [30]. De-motivating factors such as low salaries 
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[142, 143]; difficult working conditions [142]; lack of essential equipment and delayed 
promotions [143] are also mentioned in the literature.  
 
In South Africa, the improved working environment, better fringe benefits, a more reasonable 
workload, improved facilities and resources, better quality education and training in the 
professional field as well as more accessible education and training facilities have been 
mentioned as motivational factors [139]. In the study by Penn-Kekana et al [144], inadequate 
pay, poor promotion, feeling unsupported by management and having bad relationships at 
work were all associated with lack of organisational commitment. Motivational factors for 
doctors working in rural public hospitals in South Africa were cited as improved rural hospital 
accommodation; physical hospital infrastructure and rural referral systems, opportunities for 
career progression, availability of essential medical equipment and medicines; strengthened 
rural hospital management and availability of recreational facilities [140]. A study by Gilson 
et al [145] looking at how trust in the workplace affected health worker motivation and 
performance in South Africa found that salary was not the main influence affecting 
motivation of nurses. In this study, lack of trust was identified as de-motivating and was 
linked to uncaring behaviour towards patients. Nurses who were motivated derived intrinsic 
motivation from the nature of their work and were often supported by positive relationships 
with their managers.  
 
A range of methodologies and tools have been used in different low- and middle- income 
countries (LMICs) to investigate the determinants of health worker motivation. For instance, 
in Dieleman et al [142], semi-structured interviews and group discussions were used to 
identify the most important motivating and de-motivating factors for rural health workers in 
Vietnam. A cross-sectional study using structured interviews was also conducted to identify 
factors associated with low motivation in Tanzania [146]. In Pakistan, Malik et al [147] used 
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semi-structured self-administered questionnaires to conclude that serving people, respect and 
career growth were important motivators for physicians while the de-motivators were largely 
organisational. A survey of public and private health workers in India concluded that the 
working environment and skill development opportunities were important motivational 
determinants in that context [148].  
 
The body of qualitative studies looking at the motivation of health workers in LMICs also 
highlighted the limitations of financial incentives on motivation and also revealed the 
importance of non-financial incentives [142, 149-151]. For instance, Vujicic et al [152] 
analysed the role of wages in health worker migration and concluded that non-financial 
initiatives may be more effective in reducing migration flows. Studies which used quantitative 
data for comparisons suggested that certain motivational determinants may vary between 
health worker cadres. For instance, in Malawi, poor working relationships were more of a 
problem for clinical officers than enrolled nurses [153] while an increase in salary was 
significantly more motivating for nurses and midwives than for doctors in Mali [138].  
 
As noted, there was some consistency in the broader motivational factors for health 
professionals, but there were variations noted in these studies with regard to the categories of 
health workers that participated, conceptual definitions, study design and methodology as 
well as country context [30]. The implications of these variations are that it is vital to explore 
the local context, cadres and the specifics of any intervention.  
 
2.4.2 Job Satisfaction, Organisational Commitment and Intention to Quit  
Job satisfaction research has been carried out for decades by several disciplines as many 
experts believe that job satisfaction trends can affect labour market behaviour and influence 
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work productivity, work effort, employee absenteeism and staff turnover [154, 155] . Job 
satisfaction is also considered a good predictor of intentions or decisions of employees to 
leave the job [156]. Available literature has also shown some linkages between job 
satisfaction, motivation and retention; suggesting that enhanced motivation leads to improved 
performance, while increased job satisfaction leads to reduced turnover (greater retention) 
[63]. A number of scholars further agree that there is evidence of a causal link between 
satisfaction and organisational commitment [157, 158]. Several researchers have however, 
concluded that satisfaction leads to commitment [73, 159, 160]. Curry and associates [161]  
have thus suggested that studies in this field should attempt to investigate both variables 
(satisfaction and commitment) to avoid erroneous inferences from the findings.  
 
In their study, Hasselhorn et al [162] found a relationship between job satisfaction and the 
intention to leave amongst nurses; the lower the job satisfaction, the more likely nurses were 
to leave. Zurn et al [63] also pointed out that facilities that are able to attract and retain staff 
tend to be those that offer the health workers high levels of satisfaction. It is therefore 
worthwhile monitoring changes in workforce satisfaction with a view to identifying adverse 
trends and their possible causes [163]. In the health sector setting, conditions of employment 
are likely to become varied and so too is job satisfaction.  
 
The scales that are used to measure job satisfaction also vary considerably. A systematic 
review of numerous instruments used to measure job satisfaction in hospitals concluded that 
only a few of these instruments have shown high reliability and validity [164]. In assessing 
internal consistency, construct validity, and responsiveness of these instruments, these 
researchers concluded that from the 29 instruments analysed, only seven of them were reliable 
and valid enough to assess job satisfaction in hospital environments. These included: the Job 
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in General Scale, the Andrew and Withney Job Satisfaction Questionnaire, the Job 
Satisfaction Survey, the McClosky-/Mueller Satisfaction Scale, the Measure of Job 
Satisfaction and the Nurse Satisfaction Scale.  
 
2.4.3 The Impact of HRH Interventions on the Motivation and Retention of Health 
Workers  
In general, the most commonly implemented retention strategies comprised financial 
incentives [29] despite data showing that financial interventions might not be the only or most 
important factor in the decision of a health worker to stay of leave an organisation [165]. 
However when confronted with shortages of health workers in rural and remote areas policy 
makers are inclined to adopt financial incentives as solution to the problem [31]. Yet only a 
few studies have evaluated the impact of financial incentives and support programmes. These 
studies demonstrate that the use of financial incentives brought mixed reactions among health 
workers. For instance, evidence in a recent review suggested that financial incentives had a 
beneficial but limited effect on recruitment and short-term retention (mainly for the duration 
of any obligation attached to the payment), but did not necessarily improve longer term 
retention in the same area [166, 167].  
 
In Cameroon, incentives and allowances were perceived as unequally distributed between 
health workers [168]. Call or on-duty allowances to compensate hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
have also resulted in conflict between health workers due to urban-rural discrepancies [168]. 
In examining the influence of rural allowances on the retention of health workers in South 
Africa, Reid [169] found that the allowance only had limited influence on encouraging 
workers to remain in rural areas and that equally important motivators were career 
development, job satisfaction and educational opportunities.  
 
35 
 
Existing evidence on interventions has also focused on educational programmes, with a few 
on regulatory interventions such as compulsory service or bonding schemes. Strategies 
incorporating some form of health worker obligation such as visa conditions, restricting area 
of practice or loan repayment were also reported in earlier studies as having potential of 
retaining individuals [170, 171]. However, some of these strategies did not seem to have an 
impact. For example, the Ghana Health Service implemented bonding schemes which 
required the health professionals to pay back the costs of education including interest should 
they decide to depart prematurely [172]. The report by the International Organisation on 
Migration [172] found that due to relatively low tuition amounts, the system failed to retain 
physicians and pharmacists as the money owed could be earned back quickly when abroad. 
As a results, there was higher repayment rates in 2007 instead of increased retention of these 
health workers [172].  
 
The Moroccan government on the other hand, required its graduates to work for seven years 
in unfavourable areas when paid by the state. However, this intervention had unintended 
consequences as it drove many of the health professionals to refrain from working for the 
state [172]. Several studies have thus suggested that causes of retention are likely to be rooted 
in both personal and work-related factors, implying that strategies must address these multiple 
causes simultaneously.  
 
There is some evidence that non-financial incentives related to working and housing 
conditions have greater potential to influence retention [173-175]. In Norway, professional 
development interventions and primary care internship were found to be effective in retention. 
Of the 267 medical graduates in the internship programme, almost twice as many medical 
interns accepted their first fully licenced job in the Finnmark region [175]. A study exploring 
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the perspectives of health workers and managers on factors influencing working conditions 
for providing maternal health care services in Tanzania found that difficult working and living 
environment affected health workers’ ability to provide these services [176]. These authors  
reported problems of bureaucratic and irresponsible administrative system, lack of 
transparency and fairness in dealing with health workers’ financial claims, lack of clear 
strategic plan for staff career advancement as well as lack of provision for health workers to 
voice their concerns [176]. 
 
In another study, Steinmetz and colleagues investigated the influence of working-time on an 
employee intention to stay [177]. This study revealed that working-time hours, overtime and a 
long commuting time decreased the intention to stay with the same employer [177]; thus 
proposing that when designing wage increase policies, attention to the issues of working-time 
should be considered as suitable strategies in managing health workforce retention. A recent 
contingent valuation study in Tanzania analysed how financial (salary top-ups) and non-
financial incentives (housing and education) affected nurses willingness to work in remote 
areas [178]. This study also investigated how the magnitude of the incentives needed to attract 
health workers varied with the nurses geographic origin and their intrinsic motivation [178]. 
The findings reported that without any interventions, 19% of the nurses were willing to work 
in remote areas. With the provision of free housing, this increased by 15% point [178]. Better 
education on the other hand, increased the share by 28% points. However, for salary top-up to 
have the same effect, the top-up had to be between 80% and 100% of the base salary [178].   
 
Several methodologies, tools and study designs were adopted to evaluate the effect of 
retention strategies. Examples of these included a longitudinal cohort studies which reported 
on the effects of multifaceted education programmes [179, 180]. A number of retrospective 
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cohort studies on the effects of a medical education programme [181], a loan repayment 
scheme [182], and a compulsory service programme [183]. Before and after studies have also 
been carried out to evaluate clinical rural placements [184], compulsory service [185], 
financial incentives as well as personal and professional support programmes. Several studies 
used cross sectional surveys although they did not report any baseline against which to 
compare the observed changes and only one study used a control group to compare the results 
of financial incentives programme between rural physicians enrolled in the scheme and those 
who were not [170].  
 
2.4.4 Limitations of Incentive, Motivation and Retention Studies Reviewed 
The majority of existing studies on motivation and retention in LMIC focused on the factors 
or determinants of health worker motivation and de-motivation [50, 140, 142, 143, 151] rather 
than the actual implementation of interventions to improve motivation and retention. Another 
shortcoming of the existing literature is that the motivational determinants of the different 
cadres of health workers in LMICs have received insufficient attention. Most of the available 
studies combined analyses of doctors, nurses and or other categories in one study [50, 138, 
143, 148, 186-188] while others focused on only one health worker category [144, 147, 153, 
189, 190]. A significant limitation in the motivation and retention literature is that only a few 
studies have examined the influence or effectiveness of the HR interventions on the 
motivation and retention health workers in LMICs [31] as well as in rural and remote areas 
[29, 31].  
 
In some instances, published documents on retention interventions lacked essential details 
such as timeframes for the application of the incentives, the design of the incentives and even 
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the categories of workers who benefit from the incentives [34]. Another significant gap in the 
literature is that almost all the interventions that have been evaluated have been targeted at 
physicians [29, 31], with only few looking at pharmacists, pharmacy and nursing students, 
and dental surgeons [31]. It is also observed that studies on motivational factors and those 
investigating the impact of interventions on the motivation and retention of health workers are 
mainly hospital focused; very few studies have been conducted in primary health care 
settings.  
 
Although available studies have shown the link between motivation and job satisfaction, Zurn 
et al. [65] recognises that most of the research on increasing motivation and job satisfaction of 
health workers has been undertaken in developed countries, where the resources for such 
activities are available. With regard to organisational commitment, most recent studies in this 
area have concentrated on the outcome without an understanding of the causes. For instance, 
research by Meyer and Allen [80] has shown that organisational commitment is a multi-
dimensional construct, and ignoring the many possible reasons why individuals become 
committed to an organisation leads to an incomplete and unclear picture. Using this new 
conceptualisation of commitment opens the door to new insights and possibilities for research 
on commitment among nurses and doctors. Again, although there have been a number of 
studies on job satisfaction among nurses and doctors, few of these studies attempted to 
connect job satisfaction to organisational commitment. Furthermore, the few studies that have 
addressed organisational commitment among health workers have also not examined job 
satisfaction. In particular, few studies in LMIC have examined the influence of incentives 
(financial and non-financial) on organisational commitment.  
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2.5 Conceptual Framework for Motivation, Incentives and Retention  
This framework, developed from existing literature, draws from the Hertzberg’s Theory of 
Motivation [70, 116] which emphasises the importance of extrinsic and intrinsic factors of 
motivation (Figure 2). Hertzberg’s theory was chosen because it is supported by studies of 
motivation and its effects in nursing [65]. Furthermore, studies in the health sector that have 
used Hertzberg theory as an underlying framework seem to be in support of this theory [142, 
188]. Because of having both the “job content” and “job context” elements, the Hertzberg 
theory of motivation is quite relevant for the current study because it considers both financial 
and non-financial incentives.  
 
In this study, financial incentives are represented by the rural allowance, scarce skills 
allowance and the occupation specific dispensation (Figure 2). The hospital revitalisation 
programme is the only non-financial incentive being investigated in this study. This 
conceptual framework proposes that financial incentives influence extrinsic motivation or 
hygiene factors of Hertzberg theory while non-financial incentives influences intrinsic 
motivation or motivators. This framework further depicts that individual (such as age, marital 
status, length of service) and contextual factors are also important determinants of the 
motivation, intention to quit and organisational commitment of health workers. It is also noted 
in this framework that job satisfaction influences the motivation to perform [117], although 
the actual links and causality chains are reported as complex [70]. However, job 
dissatisfaction may lead to intention to leave. The framework also suggests that motivation is 
clearly linked to intention to quit the workplace [70]. Organisational commitment on the other 
hand, may lead to retention of health workers (Figure 2) 
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Figure 2: Adapted Hertzberg Two-Factor Theory of Motivation [114, 116] 
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2.6 Studies on Health Policy Design and Implementation 
 
2.6.1 A Review of Theoretical Approaches on Implementation 
A number of theories and frameworks have been developed for the analysis of policies in the 
health sector [42-45] and used in an attempt to understand the complexities of health policy 
process [45, 191]. Numerous implementation theories have also been proposed in the policy 
and decision making literature and these have been dominated by a discourse as to whether 
decision making is top-down or bottom-up or a synthesis of the two [192] as well as 
complexities and challenges facing implementation [193, 194]. Almost three-decades ago, 
Grindle and Thomas [195] argued that the characteristics of policy that affect its acceptability 
include its implications for vested interests, the level of public participation it involves, the 
resources required for implementation, and the length of time needed for its influence. Lipsky 
[196], on the other hand, described implementation of policy as highly influenced by street-
level bureaucrats who are front-line staff who can change policies significantly [196]. Related 
implementation literature in high income countries focused on the gap between policy 
objectives and the actual implementation [197].  
 
Another widely used framework in health policy research is the Walt and Gilson framework 
[46,47] which has been applied to analyse a number of health issues including mental health, 
health sector reform, tuberculosis, reproductive health and antenatal syphilis control [47]. 
This framework is grounded in a political economy perspective, and focused on four related 
factors (actors, policy content, contextual factors and process) critical to understanding public 
and health policymaking [198].  
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The four related factors are represented in Figure 3 and explained in more detail below:  
a) Factors of context include: 
 Situational factors (the specific conditions of a moment in history that influence on 
the policy change intended); 
 Structural factors (the relatively unchanged circumstances of the society and the 
polity such as the structure of the economy and the political system); 
 Cultural factors (the values and commitments of society and groups); 
 Exogenous factors (the events and values outside of any one country or system). 
b) Factors of content relate to: 
 The specific nature and design of reforms; 
 The interaction between specific policies of interest and between these policies and 
parallel institutional changes as well as implementation guidelines 
c) Factors concerning actors are about: 
 Who the actors are as well as their power, interests, values and roles in relation to 
developing and implementing the reforms of interest. 
d) Factors of process are concerned with: 
 The way in which policies are identified, formulated and implemented, their timing, 
the strategies used with each stage of the policy process, for example, building 
legitimacy, consensus or capacity, as well as the specific mechanisms or bodies 
established to take forward any of the steps. 
 
Through their model, Hogwood and Gunn [199, 200] makes a distinction between ‘non-
implementation’ and ‘unsuccessful implementation’ to help identify areas which may 
constrain policy success. With ‘non-implementation’, policies are not put into effect as 
intended because those involved in the implementation are inefficient or because it was not 
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possible to overcome obstacles despite their best efforts. ‘Unsuccessful implementation’ 
refers to a situation where the policy is fully implemented but fails to produce the intended 
outcomes [199, 200].  
 
Hogwood and Gunn [199] proposes 10 preconditions for ‘perfect implementation’ that would 
need to be satisfied if policy failures were to be addressed (Table 2). However, these authors 
emphasised that the use of the word ‘perfect’ should not be misinterpreted to mean ‘ideal’; but 
rather, it is used in this context as an analytical concept. Although the model is idealistic in 
that it suggests the notion of ‘perfect’ implementation, it is useful to consider the 
preconditions and key features necessary for the successful policy implementation of complex 
financial and non-financial incentives. 
 
With regards to the first precondition, the model proposes that there must not be 
overwhelming external constraints [200]. Some obstacles to implementation are outside the 
control of the administrators and could be political in that the policy may be unacceptable to 
key interest groups (e.g. trade unions) who have the power to veto them [199, 200]. The 
second precondition on adequate time and resources suggests that policy may be appropriate 
but may fail because implementation took longer or was more expensive than anticipated 
[199, 200]. In the third precondition on combination of resources, these authors note that 
implementing agencies often do not have the means to ensure that guidelines and standard are 
enforced [199, 200]. The other remaining preconditions are self-explanatory.  
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Table 2: Hogwood and Gunn 10 Preconditions for Implementation 
Stage Description of the practice 
Precondition 1: External 
constraints 
 Circumstances external to the implementing 
agency should not impose crippling constraints 
Precondition 2: Time and 
resources 
 Adequate time and sufficient resources should be 
made available for the programme 
Precondition 3: Resource 
combination 
 Ensure that the required combination of 
resources are available  
Precondition 4: Theory based 
policy 
 The policy to be implemented should be based 
upon a valid theory of cause and effect 
Precondition 5: Cause / effect 
relations 
 The relationship between cause and effect should 
be direct  
Precondition 6: Dependency 
relationships 
 The dependency relationships should be kept to a 
minimum in both number and importance 
Precondition 7: Agreements 
of objectives  
 There should be understanding and agreement of 
objectives to be achieved 
Precondition 8: Events 
sequencing 
 The tasks to be achieved need to be fully 
specified in a correct sequence  
Precondition 9: 
Communication / coordination 
 There needs to be perfect  communication and 
coordination  
Precondition 10: Total 
compliance 
 There must be perfect compliance for those 
involved with implementing the policy  
 
2.6.2 Empirical Studies on Implementation related to Human Resources for Health 
Interventions    
Health policy analysis is an important area of work because it can identify the unintended 
consequences of policy decisions as well as the obstacles that undermine policy 
implementation and thus jeopardise national and global goals for improved health [201]. Early 
investigations on health policy work noted that the assessment of health policy had mainly 
focused on technical content and design, disregarding the actors and processes involved in 
developing and implementing policies as well as paying little attention on the context within 
which related decisions are made [198].  
 
Rigoli and Dussault [41] have cautioned that the failure of many incentive schemes to achieve 
their expected results is due to poor design [41]. The problems of inappropriate or poorly 
designed policies are exacerbated by policy implementation challenges, which in turn may 
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determine the influence of incentive policies [199, 202]. In most countries for instance, policy 
makers have limited guidance on how to implement financial incentive strategies so that they 
can achieve their intended policy objectives. For example, inequities, or perceived inequities 
in the manner in which incentive strategies are designed and implemented have been 
documented as a source of demotivation [32]. Increasing attention has thus been paid to 
understanding the problems of policy implementation in order to identify the key factors 
contributing to policy failure [43].  
 
In South Africa, several authors have analysed the disjuncture between policies or plans on 
the one hand, and implementation on the other hand. These have included studies on mental 
health [203-205], HIV and AIDS [206-209], hospital rationalisation and restructuring [206, 
208], municipal health services [210], social inclusion [211], and user fees [212]. A few 
studies have looked at policies on remuneration or incentives [213-215]. Several problems 
have been identified. Stack and Hlela [206] and Khosa [208] found that the challenges 
included hurried policy implementation; limited consultation with the implementing actors; 
lack of prioritisation, insufficient time and a lack of co-ordination between different 
government departments [206, 208]. Rispel et al [211] found that inadequate administrative 
and implementation capacity; insufficient resources; corruption; and lack of involvement of 
civil servants beset the implementation of various social policies while challenges of varying 
technical capacity at different government levels influenced the implementation of mental 
health policy [205].  
 
Although these studies provide important insights into the factors that plague policy 
implementation, there is a dearth of studies that analyse the implementation of policies on 
remuneration or financial incentives [213-215]. In light of the global human resource crisis, 
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analysis of policy implementation of financial incentives is important to guide policy makers, 
as these are the most commonly used staff retention strategies.  
 
A review of literature analysing health policy processes revealed that there was paucity of 
research on health policy analysis in low- and middle-income countries [47]. Some of the 
gaps and weaknesses in the field of health policy analysis that were identified by this review 
include limited details on research design and methodology and the predominance of single 
case studies on particular issues. Of the studies that at least provided some methodological 
details, a combination of in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussions, document review, media analysis and participant observation were largely used. 
Only a few studies used quantitative data. A significant gap in the policy analysis literature 
was that very few studies collected data as part of an evaluation of an intervention.  
 
The absence of explicit conceptual frameworks was also noted as one of the limitations of 
health policy analysis research [47]. Among those studies that referred to a theory, the 
theories of Kingdon on agenda setting [216] and Lipsky on street-level bureaucracy [196] 
were the most commonly used while a vast majority of implementation theories available to 
policy analysts in LMICs is largely neglected. According to the authors of this review, 
existing health policy analysis studies often focussed on ‘what happened’ and failed to answer 
the question on ‘what explains what happened’ [47].  
 
Some of the methodological challenges identified by Walt et al. [45] in conducting health 
policy analysis were that ‘policy’ can itself be defined in variety of ways and that “the 
processes of policy making are not necessarily overt or clearly bounded” (p310). Furthermore, 
on the practical side, there are often numerous hurdles to accessing the many different and 
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geographically widespread actors, individuals, groups and networks that were involved in the 
policy process. Additionally, decision making processes are often ambiguous and obtaining 
relevant documents and papers can be difficult or, on the contrary, where documents are 
available an excess of information with large volumes of email exchanges can be laborious 
and problematic to analyse. Participant observation can also be difficult in practice.  
 
Other methodological concerns were related to retrospective versus prospective analysis of 
the policy process. It was noted that policy evaluation requires a longer timeframe than 
political pressures often allow. While there is no simple way of knowing when the best time 
to initiate health policy analysis work is; some scholars proposed that a decade or more is the 
minimum duration of most policy cycles from problem identification through implementation, 
to render a reasonable fair evaluation influence [217]. Longer span studies of policy process 
to identify unintended and unexpected consequences of policy are proposed. But it is 
recognised that the main challenge with longer-time retrospective studies is tracing the key 
people involved to interview them as well as the respondents’ recall bias. In this regard, 
multiple complementary sources using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
become particularly fundamental. 
 
2.6.3 Policy Analysis Studies on Human Resources for Health Interventions 
Although the World Health Report has described approaches that can be taken to improve the 
HRH situation at the country level [2], detailed documentation of promising practices is still 
insufficient. Gilson and Erasmus [218] argued that policies that address the retention of health 
professionals should also address poor motivation, low productivity, poor health worker 
behaviour and attitudes towards patients. However, the link between policy development and 
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personal motivation of health workers is complex and requires recognition of the importance 
of individual, organisational and societal factors of motivation [65]. According to Buchan and 
McCaffery [48], the challenges in implementing effective HR policies and practices in health 
systems in Africa and elsewhere is to develop an understanding of the context in which these 
policies and practices are to be applied, and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
different realistic options.  
 
Generally, in health sector reform, the reform processes and problems in implementing 
reforms have been neglected while discussions have mainly focused on its content [198]. 
Likewise, most of the attention in HRH reform has been given to content of HRH plans with 
less concern for the process of change [219]. Several HRH policy analytic frameworks 
suggest that in addition to the content, various aspects of the process are critical to the 
adoption and implementation of HRH policies [198, 219]. For instance, Egger et al. [219] 
identified four influential components of the policy-making process and these were:  
a) Consultation with key stakeholders – where effort is made to involve and 
accommodate the interests of all affected stakeholders;  
b) Ownership by the country determined by national interests and reflecting national 
priorities rather than being donor-driven to ensure sustainability;  
c) Based on sound data – whereby information about needs and feasible solutions is 
used; and  
d) Supported by adequate human and financial resources – backed by adequate funds 
and led by capable people. 
 
Drawing on the WHO analytical framework [219], Hamdan and Defever [44] conducted a 
policy analysis study of the process of formulation and implementation of HRH policies in 
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Palestine. The methods they used included literature review, synthesis and interpretation of 
available documents including formal and informal literature, secondary data analysis as well 
as key informants interviews using semi-structured schedules. The findings of this study were 
that like other health policies, HRH policy is a complex process but that the effects of the 
unstable and ambiguous political environment, as well as violent conflict in Palestine, made it 
even more challenging. In such a conflict and transitional context, the strategy of priority 
setting and long-term planning is difficult, implying that ad hoc decisions are more prevalent. 
Other gaps between policy and practice that were identified by Hamdan and Defever [44] 
include: the structure and the distribution of power among the different stakeholders; and poor 
communication and coordination.  
 
Pong [220] examined strategies to overcome physician shortages in northern Ontario by 
exploring policy implementation over a 35 year period. A programme analysis approach was 
used to document in a chronological manner a broad range of programmes intended to address 
physician shortages by determining the types of strategies used, changes in the strategies, year 
of introduction, time frame, complexity of strategies and expected outcomes from 1964 to 
2004. In general, this study demonstrated that the first two-and-a-half decades were 
characterised by the initiation of new programmes at a relatively slow pace, at a rate of one or 
two at year. Then there were two to four years spanning periods during which no new 
programme was initiated. However, the programme initiated speed gained momentum after 
1995, at times with three to five programmes introduced in a year. The most notable changes 
over the years were the nature and perceptions regarding physician workforce issues. For 
instance, in the mid-1960s, the Royal Commission on Health Services considered Canada as 
having doctor shortages. But, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the belief was that Canada 
had an oversupply of physicians and subsequent to this a number of measures were taken to 
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control physician supply such as instructing Canadian medical schools to curb enrolment. 
However, by the late 1990s, physician shortage was again considered to be a challenge. This 
according to Pong [220] may explain the rapid increase of new programmes in the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s. Although the move to build a new medical school in the north may have 
been unimaginable in the early 1990s, this decision was most likely made after the realisation 
that in the long run the north would need to grow its own doctors rather than relying on 
imports.  
 
By examining the strategies introduced over a 35-year period, Pong’s [220] study further 
demonstrated that strategies introduced more recently tended to be more complex, are more 
likely to take a longer term perspective, and that they pay more attention to physician 
retention than just recruitment. An interesting trend according to Pong [220] was that once 
introduced, most programmes were rarely terminated. Instead, they would rather be modified, 
enriched, or rolled into new or bigger programmes while some strategies were used repeatedly 
in programmes with different names but of a similar nature. Pong [220] further suggested that 
in 1992, there was a realisation that policy and programme development should be more 
evidence-based and that some strategies introduced were partly influenced by research such as 
the rural training strategy and the building of a medical school in northern Ontario.  
 
Pong’s [220] study only looked at the initiation of HRH strategies but did not investigate the 
changes following programme introduction. It also appeared to consider all strategies as 
equally important yet some were clearly more complex and costly than others and they 
differed greatly in their impact. In conclusion, Pong [220] noted that studies on policy 
implementation and evaluation usually focus on a single policy strategy over a relatively short 
period, thus failing to uncover the trajectories of policy implementation. He argued that a 
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longer-term perspective is needed because policy strategies and implementation may evolve 
over time in response to changing circumstances.  
 
2.7 Policy Analysis Conceptual Framework   
In this study, I draw from a combination of Walt and Gilson [198] triangular framework as 
well as the Hogwood and Gunn [199] implementation theory to enable me to respond 
effectively to Objective 1 which intended to describe the process of the design and 
implementation of the selected HRH interventions being evaluated in this thesis (Figure 3). 
The Walt and Gilson framework was used to inform the interview guide for key informants, 
data collection as well as to explain the findings in Chapters 5 to 7. The strength of Walt and 
Gilson [198] framework is that it was able to identify in more depth the design issues related 
to the content of the incentive policies, the contextual factors that led to the design of these 
policies, the process of the design as well as the key actors that were involved, their roles, 
including those actors that were excluded. However, this framework was limited with regards 
to exploring the reasons for weaknesses in implementation.  
 
Therefore, Hogwood and Gunn [200] was used to complement the latter. Through its 10 
preconditions for “perfect” implementation, Hogwood and Gunn [200] model was useful in 
Chapter 9 to provide a critical comparative analysis of the design and implementation of the 
four incentive strategies of interest. Although idealistic, through its concepts of “non-
implementation” and “unsuccessful implementation”, this model assisted in distinguishing 
whether policy failures are a result of poorly conceived policies or poorly implemented 
policies. Simply put, Hogwood and Gunn [199] categorised policy implementation barriers 
resulting from either bad execution, bad luck, or bad policy. Bad execution was explained as 
non-cooperation or ineffectiveness of those implementing policy; bad luck as the external 
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factors intervening to prevent implementation (such as funding withdrawn); and lastly bad 
policy is described as those based on faulty information, poor reasoning and unrealistic 
assumptions [199].         
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Figure 3: Adapted Policy Analysis Conceptual Framework [198, 200]  
CONTEXT 
ACTORS 
PROCESS CONTENT 
 Objectives 
 Policy design 
 Specific mechanisms 
 Implementation plan 
 Situational 
 Structural 
 Cultural 
 Exogenous 
 Stages 
 Strategies 
 Dealing with actors 
 Stakeholders 
(Individuals / groups) 
 Interests & concerns 
 Influence and power 
“Non-implementation” & 
“Unsuccessful 
Implementation” 
 
External constraints 
Time & resources 
Resource combination 
Theory based policy 
Cause / effect 
Dependency relationships 
Agreements of objectives 
Events sequencing 
Communication / 
coordination  
Total compliance  
POLITICAL / HRH ENVIRONMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
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2.8 Research Questions 
In the context of the HRH crisis and the challenges of retaining health workers in the public 
health sector and in rural and underserved areas, it becomes important to investigate better 
ways to motivate and retain the remaining health workforce. Drawing from the existing 
evidence presented above, financial incentives are still the most commonly used strategies to 
retain health workers [29-31]. However, evidence of their impact is still inconclusive [29, 31, 
33]. Although some studies have noted that failure of incentive strategies to achieve expected 
results is due to poor design [41], others have reported that the process of the implementation 
of human resource strategies is less studied in LMIC [44, 45]. There has also been limited 
policy analysis of HRH interventions in these countries to explain policy outcomes [45, 47]. 
A recent review have also noted that a number of policy implementation studies in LMIC fail 
to use theory to strengthen analysis of the findings [221]. Similarly, Dolea and Adams [70] 
indicated that while theories for assessing motivation have been developed in western 
countries, their applicability in LMIC is still limited. It is against this backdrop that the 
current study aimed to investigate the following research questions:     
 
1. What was the process of the design and implementation of the four HRH interventions 
of interest (rural allowance, scarce skills allowance, occupation-specific dispensation, 
and the hospital revitalisation programme)? 
2. What was the perceived influence of financial (rural allowance, scarce skills 
allowance, occupation-specific dispensation) and non-financial (hospital revitalisation 
programme) interventions on the motivation and retention of health workers? 
3. Was there any link between the process of formulation and implementation of HRH 
interventions and their influence on the motivation and retention of health workers? 
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4. Were there differences in the motivation and retention of health workers in rural and 
urban as well as in hospital and primary health care settings?  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter started off by discussing existing local and international literature, with an 
emphasis on motivation theories and the studies investigating incentives and their 
effectiveness in the motivation and retention of health professionals. The linkages between 
job satisfaction and motivation and retention are also discussed. This was followed by studies 
on HRH policy processes and implementation. Theoretical approaches on policy analysis are 
explained, and lastly the conceptual framework for the current study is then provided. In 
general, the review suggests that there is still a need to investigate the influence of HRH 
interventions on the motivation and retention of health workers, particularly in low- and 
middle- income countries including South Africa. More specific, the review alludes to the gap 
in information on how to implement incentive strategies in an effective and sustainable 
manner.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the conceptual framework and the theoretical underpinnings guiding this study 
were discussed. This chapter describes the specific methods that were used to investigate how 
the process of the design and implementation of incentive strategies may have influenced the 
motivation and retention of health workers. The chapter commences with discussing the study 
design, and the study settings and context which are followed by a brief description of the 
HRH interventions of interest in this study. Thereafter, the research participants, the research 
instruments, the sampling procedures as well as the data collection strategies are described. 
Details on the data management and quality control, data analysis and ethical considerations 
are also presented.  
 
3.2  Study Design 
In order to get a richer understanding on how the process of the design and implementation of 
the incentive strategies influenced the motivation and retention of health workers, an in-depth 
analysis and description of the events is required. To achieve this, an exploratory multiple-
case study design was used to examine how the selected HRH interventions performed in 
different environments. According to Yin [222] case study methodologies are desirable 
methods in understanding “how” and “why” a programme have worked or not worked. Mixed 
methods, comprising both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, were used. The 
justification for using mixed methods was based on the recognition that the HRH 
interventions of interest in this study may operate differently in practice from the original 
intention. Therefore, mixed methods were appropriate for deriving the richness of different 
data sources for each case study. Social science research has noted that one of the strengths of 
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qualitative research is its ability to assess processes [223]. Therefore, qualitative research was 
beneficial in understanding the process of the design and implementation of these 
interventions and reasons for the implementation successes and failures. In contrast, 
quantitative research is more useful in evaluating outcomes [224]. Both together contribute an 
understanding of what happened, how it happend and why. 
 
3.3 Selecting Cases  
The concepts of human resources for health (HRH) interventions, intervention strategies, or 
incentive strategies will be used interchangeably to refer to the cases for this thesis. Four case 
studies were selected representing three financial and one non-financial incentive and these 
are listed in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Human Resources for Health (HRH) Interventions  
 
In Chapter 1, it was noted that this PhD is part of a larger multi-country project investigating 
health worker motivation and retention in South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi. The selection 
of financial and non-financial incentives of interest in this study were informed by a 
Multiple case studies 
Intervention Type 
Financial 
 Rural allowance 
 Scarce skills allowance 
 Occupational specific dispensation for 
nurses (OSD)  
Non-financial 
 Hospital revitalisation 
programme 
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systematic review [30] undertaken by the research team which consolidated existing evidence 
on the impact of financial and non-financial incentives on motivation and retention of health 
workers in developing countries. At the time the study was conceptualised most of the 
identifiable HRH interventions in South Africa related to financial incentives. The three 
financial incentives were chosen because they provided an opportunity to compare and 
contrast between targeted incentives which were intended to certain cadres of health workers 
(rural and scarce skills allowances) and non-targeted incentives which benefited all categories 
of nurses (occupation-specific dispensation). The hospital revitalisation programme was 
selected as one of very few non-financial HRH strategies identifiable at the time.  
 
The rural and scarce skills allowances as well as hospital revitalisation were longstanding 
interventions while the OSD was a recent intervention. 
 
3.4 Study Sites  
The study was conducted in North West and Gauteng provinces between 2008 and 2010. 
North West is a predominantly rural province with a population of 3.3 million (6.4 per cent of 
the total South African population) while Gauteng, the smallest and most populous of all the 
nine provinces, is an urban province with a population of 11.3 million (22.4 per cent of the 
total population) [225]. Taking into account the rural-urban inequalities in the country, these 
provinces were chosen to provide geographical comparisons. With regard to the HRH context, 
in 2008, the North West province was reported to have critical shortage of doctors and 
professional nurses (95.2:100,000) as opposed to 143.1:100,000 in Gauteng [9]. Another 
reason for choosing these provinces was because it was anticipated that there might be some 
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variations in the interpretation, implementation and influence of the HRH interventions within 
these provinces.  
Table 3 summarises the setting and context within which the case study interventions were 
studied, as described below: 
 The rural allowance was only studied in hospitals, CHCs and clinics in the North West 
province. 
 Hospital revitalisation programme was only explored in hospitals that were revitalised 
in the North West and Gauteng provinces. 
 The scarce skills allowance was studied in hospitals in North West and Gauteng 
provinces. 
 OSD was investigated in both provinces and in clinics, CHCs and hospital settings. 
 
Table 3: The Setting within which Interventions were studied 
HRH  
Intervention 
Setting 
Gauteng North West 
  Hospital CHC Clinics Hospital CHC Clinics 
Rural Allowance        
Scarce Skills Allowance       
Occupation Specific Dispensation        
Hospital Revitalisation Programme       
A tick () indicates that an intervention was studied in a particular setting. 
 
 
A total of 10 hospitals (5 in North West out of 30, and 5 in Gauteng out of 29) were selected 
for the study. Because the hospital revitalisation programme was one of the interventions 
being investigated in this study, four of the hospitals were purposively chosen because of their 
participation on the national hospital revitalisation programme and six others were randomly 
selected. Prior to data collection, provincial health representatives responsible for the 
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revitalisation in Gauteng and North West provinces were contacted to share and confirm a list 
of hospitals that have benefitted from the revitalisation programme and are already functional 
(implying that staff are already located in these revitalised hospitals). During data collection 
in hospitals between November 2008 and mid-2009, it was found that the lists from both 
provinces were inaccurate. For instance, although three revitalised hospitals appeared on the 
Gauteng list as revitalised, in reality only one hospital (Tembisa) in this province was 
revitalised and it was only certain departments that were revamped, not the entire hospital. In 
Natalspruit hospital, nothing had happened as yet and Mamelodi hospital had just been 
completed but staff were still located in the old hospital [226]. In the North West province, 
only one revitalised hospital appeared in the list, when we got to two other hospitals that did 
not appear in the list, we found that certain Departments in these hospitals were also 
revitalised. Due to these unanticipated challenges in data collection, the perceptions around 
the influence of the hospital revitalisation programme may not be well covered in this thesis.   
 
The community health centres (CHCs) and clinics in the catchment area of the hospitals that 
participated were also randomly selected from a list obtained from the two provincial 
departments of health. In total, 55 CHCs and clinics participated in the study in the two 
provinces, of these 25 were from North West while 30 were Gauteng province facilities. Due 
to challenges in obtaining approval from the Ventersdorp catchment area, we did not manage 
to conduct any interviews in clinics and community health centres in this district. A 
breakdown of the facilities that were selected for the study is shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Characteristics of Facilities that Participated in the Study 
 
Province 
Type of Facility 
Hospitals CHCs & Clinics 
Name Hospital Area Revitalised 
Number around 
Hospital 
North 
West 
Taung District Rural Yes 
15 Swaartruggens District Rural Yes 
Ganyesa District Rural Yes 
Job Shimankana Tabane  Provincial Urban No 10 
Ventersdorp District Urban No 0 
Gauteng Mamelodi District Urban No 
10 
Pretoria West Provincial Urban No 
Natalspruit District Urban No 
20 Germiston District Urban No 
Tembisa Regional Urban Yes 
 
3.5 Study Fieldworkers 
Two research assistants were recruited to assist with data collection. One of them, Simangele 
Kwinda, had a Diploma qualification and the other one, Lebohang Mokgele, had Matric and 
data collection experience from having had worked at a number of research organisations as a 
fieldworker. These assistants were trained for three days on: 
 The purpose of the study and the planned methodology. 
 Conducting in-depth interviews (reading material was also provided to the research 
assistant for further reference). 
 Sampling participants for in-depth interviews and for the survey. 
 Question-by-question review of the in-depth interview guide for health workers. 
 Role play of conducting in-depth interview with health workers.  
 Question-by-question review of the health worker survey.  
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 Ethical issues of the study including explanation of the information sheet to the 
respondents as well as completion of the consent forms.  
 Steps to ensure data quality and management. 
 
During the data collection phase and with my supervision, Simangele Kwinda helped with the 
administrative roles such as sending out request letters (which I had prepared) to the sampled 
hospitals and clinics asking the management of such facilities to grant us permission to 
conduct research. She also played a critical role of setting-up appointments, organising 
transport and booking accommodation. In terms of research activities, Simangele Kwinda was 
primarily involved in administering the health worker questionnaire and assisted with 
carrying out in-depth interviews with the nurses. She also transcribed the interviews with the 
key informants, hospital and human resource managers, and health workers from hospitals in 
Gauteng and North West provinces.  
 
Midway data collection, Simangele Kwinda fell pregnant and was unable to continue assisting 
with the remaining fieldwork activities. At that time, I was only left with conducting in-depth 
interviews with the nurses in Gauteng clinics and community health centres. I recruited 
Lebohang Mokgele to assist with finalisation of the data collection and transcription of these 
interviews. To ensure consistency across interviews, both Simangele Kwinda and Lebohang 
Mokgele observed me conducting about five in-depth interviews with the nurses prior to them 
assisting me with this. Subsequently, I also supervised their first five interviews to ensure that 
they were capable of obtaining the required information.    
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3.6 Piloting 
All research instruments were pre-tested during a pilot at a district hospital that was not part 
of the study and which was undergoing revitalisation. In three days at the site, a total of 6 in-
depth interviews and 12 questionnaires were completed with the different nursing categories 
(professional nurse, staff nurse and assistant nurse). Based on the outcome of the pilot, we 
identified that the survey questionnaire was too long and this was adapted accordingly. In 
addition, a few questions were rephrased and some sections reorganised in the survey 
questionnaire.  
 
We also learned that the in-depth interview guide for health workers took about 45 minutes to 
1-hour to complete so these were not changed. Furthermore, the pilot experiences suggested 
that the in-depth interview tools were suited for capturing information on the issues of 
interest. Based on the experiences of the pilot, we also identified workable solutions for 
seeking permission from the selected facilities and decided on a time-period of 1-full week for 
data collection per hospital.  
 
3.7  Study Participants and Data Collection 
“The details of life that the researcher is unable to see for him- or herself are found 
by interviewing people who did see it or by finding documents recording it” [227] 
(p.29)  
 
This quotation captures the rationale for the methodologies used to investigate the different 
components of this study. The main components of the study as listed below, summarised in 
Table 5, and will be discussed in more detail in the sections that follow:  
a) Document review of the selected HRH interventions  
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b) In-depth interviews with key informants 
c) In-depth interviews with human resource managers  
d) In-depth interviews with hospital managers (CEOs of the hospitals)  
e) In-depth interviews with health workers (nurses and doctors) 
f) Health worker survey (nurses and doctors) 
 
Recognising that researchers in social situations deal with impressions of their own and those 
of others, it becomes important for these researchers to seek assurance of what they are seeing 
or hearing, whether they are not oversimplifying or reading too much into the situation as well 
as whether the meaning gained by the reader from the interpretations is what they intended to 
convey [227]. This process of gaining these assurances is referred to as triangulation and it is 
defined as a “process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, but is also verifying 
the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” [227]. As a way of ensuring rigour, 
simultaneous methodological triangulation was used in this study whereby both qualitative 
and quantitative methods were carried out at the same time to complement each other [228]. 
 
The primary drivers for using methodological triangulation were because of the need to 
achieve complementarity and comprehensiveness. Regarding comprehensiveness, the 
justification was that using combination of methods would address a wider range of questions 
that one methodology alone would not allow [229]. With regards complementarity, it was 
believed that this would strengthen the research results and contribute to theory and 
knowledge development [228]. 
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Table 5: Summary of the Methodology  
Research Objectives Methods Data Collected 
1. To describe the process of policy 
design and implementation in 
relation to selected human 
resource (HR) policies.  
 
 Document Review 
 Media review and  
analysis 
 In-depth interviews 
with key informants 
 
 Aims of the policies, policy design/ content (rural and scarce skills 
allowance, OSD, hospital revitalisation) 
 How were these policies determined / initiated? (events, context, timing) 
 Who were the actors / champions in policy formulation & implementation? 
 What were the steps or key elements in the policy development process? 
 Implementation constraints / issues? 
 Perceptions regarding the effectiveness / ineffectiveness of the selected 
policies on motivation and retention of health workers 
 Suggestions on how best to improve the implementation of the selected HR 
interventions  
2. To assess perceptions on whether 
HRH interventions influenced 
health worker motivation and 
retention.  
 In-depth interviews 
with key informants  
 In-depth interviews 
with HR managers 
 In-depth interviews 
with hospital managers 
 In-depth interviews 
with health workers 
 Health worker survey 
 Perceptions of human resources challenges at their hospitals 
 Insights regarding absenteeism of doctors and nurses 
 Insights about the HR invention strategies (other than the ones under study) 
used at the hospital level to motivate and retain health workers 
 Perceptions about the process of implementation of incentive strategies on 
the motivation and retention of health workers at hospital level 
 Perceptions about the effectiveness of the selected strategies on the 
motivation and retention of health workers 
 Participants’ suggestions on improving the motivation and retention of 
health workers 
3. To determine the relative 
importance of HRH interventions 
on health workers’ job satisfaction, 
organisational commitment and 
intention to leave. 
 Health worker survey  Job satisfaction using Abridged Job Satisfaction Scale 
 Organisational Commitment Scale 
 Intention to Quit Scale  
 Perceptions about the effectiveness of the selected strategies on the 
motivation and retention of health workers 
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To ensure validity, I obtained views of the different respondents (policy makers, key 
informants, hospital managers, human resources managers and health workers) and relied on 
more than one research strategy (document review, in-depth interviews and survey). I also 
kept a field journal to enable me to reflect on my thoughts and experiences during fieldwork. 
The use of these multiple methods enabled me to gain multiple viewpoints of the phenomena 
being studied. The same methods of data collection were used for all HRH interventions. I 
was responsible for the document review and analysis, as well as conducting all in-depth 
interviews with key informants, hospital managers and HR managers. A trained fieldworker 
assisted me with conducting in-depth interviews and the survey with health workers.  
 
3.7.1 Document Review of the Selected Human Resources Policies 
This phase of the study involved a retrospective review and analysis of the relevant 
government documents including policy directives, minutes of the meetings and media 
releases in order to understand the context and content of the HRH interventions of interest in 
this study. The documents reviewed were from the years 1999-2011. The National 
Department of Health (NDOH) and the National Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) are the key government departments related to the selected HRH 
policies. Therefore, the websites of these departments were used as the source for the 
documents and a Google search of other related documents was also conducted. The 
provincial Department of Health websites (North West and Gauteng) were also searched to 
extract annual reports for the different years as well as any other relevant documents related to 
the selected interventions. In addition, media analysis of newspaper articles relevant to the 
respective incentive strategies of interest in this study was conducted. Table 6 shows a list of 
documents that were reviewed.  
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Table 6: List of Policies and Related Documents Reviewed  
Case Study Policy Document Source 
Rural Allowance 1. Revised Non-Pensionable Recruitment Allowance referred to as Rural Allowance 
2. More Cash for Health Workers in Rural Areas (2004) 
3. Creative Solution Needed: Assistants and Allowances may help Address Staff Shortages (2005) 
4. A Draft Rural Health Strategy for South Africa (2006) 
 DPSA 
 Press Release, HST 
 Press Release, HST 
 Unknown 
 Newspaper articles  
Scarce Skills 
Allowance 
5. Implementation of Scarce Skills Framework 
6. Recruitment and Retention Allowances  
7. Salary Review for Health Workers  
 DPSA 
 DPSA 
 Press Release, HST 
 Newspaper articles 
Occupation Specific 
Dispensation for 
Nurses (OSD) 
8. Introduction to CORES and the Occupation Specific Dispensation (2003) 
9. Bill may send bitter pill to nurses abroad (2006)  
10. Nurses Strike Action highlighting Human Resources Crisis within Public Health  
11. Implementation of the Occupation Specific Dispensation for the Occupations Professional Nurse, Staff 
Nurse & Nursing Assistant in the Public Service (2007) 
12. Occupation Specific Dispensation - Professional Nurse, Staff Nurse & Nursing Assistant Annexures 
(2007) 
13. Statement by the Minister of Health on Progress in the Implementation of OSD for Nurses 
14. OSD a nightmare for nurses – Nurses have been betrayed  
15. Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) Resolution No 2 (2009) 
16. All Nurses to Benefit from Agreement with the Unions 
 DPSA 
 Press Release, HST 
 Opinion Piece, HST  
 DPSA 
 
 DPSA 
 
 Press Release, DOH 
 DENOSA 
 PSCBC 
 Press Release, DOH  
 Newspaper articles 
Hospital 
Revitalisation 
Programme 
17. Service Delivery Review 
18. Revitalisation of Hospitals 
19. Hospital Revitalisation (2005)  
 DPSA 
 National DOH 
 Unknown  
 Press Releases 
 Newspaper articles 
Cross Cutting 
Documents 
20. Human Resources Management Annual Report (2001-2002) 
21. Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Health Professionals in the Republic of South Africa (2004) 
22. A National Human Resources for Health Planning Framework (2006) 
23. Strategic Priorities for the National Health System (2004-2009) 
24. Human Resources for Health: A Needs and Gaps Analysis of HRH in South Africa (2009) 
 DPSA 
 National DOH 
 National DOH 
 National DOH 
 HEARD 
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Case Study Policy Document Source 
25. Gauteng DOH Annual Performance Plan 2007-2010) 
26. Human Resources for Health South Africa: HRH Strategy for the Health Sector 2012/13 – 2016/17  
27. Gauteng DOH Annual Report 2006/07 
28. HR Input for the National Consultative Health Forum 
 Gauteng DOH 
 National DOH 
 Gauteng DOH 
 Unknown 
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A document review was undertaken to uncover how these HRH interventions came about; 
their intention; the actual content of these policies; the actors that were involved in the 
development phase of these strategies and where information was available, the processes in 
the development of these strategies. After identifying all the relevant documents, I 
systematically read each document line by line to extract relevant dominant and sub-themes 
aligned to Walt and Gilson [85] policy analysis framework. However, in the case of other 
documents such as the strategic plans and annual reports, I only read sections that were 
pertinent to the selected HRH policies under study and not the entire document. These were 
then coded using Atlas.ti software. 
 
3.7.2 In-depth Interviews with Key Informants 
Thirty-five key informants were selected purposively on the basis of their influence or 
knowledge about the HRH interventions of interest in this study or their involvement in the 
implementation of these interventions. Table 7 provides a list of the key informants that 
participated.  
 
Table 7: List of Key Informants 
Category Number 
National Government  7 
Provincial Government 12 
Academics 7 
Statutory Body 1 
Professional Body 1 
Nursing Organisations 4 
Nursing Unions 3 
Total  35 
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A snowballing sampling approach, during which each key informant was asked to identify 
others to interview, was used. The selected key informants were interviewed for 1-hour using 
a semi-structured interview guide (Appendix 1). These face-to-face interviews were all pre-
arranged through setting appointments with the relevant participants and interviews were 
carried out in the offices of the participants at their convenience. These interviews were tape 
recorded with the permission of the participants and transcribed verbatim. Key informants 
interviews explored respondents’ perceptions of the aims of the relevant incentive strategies, 
the process of their design, actors involved and perceptions on the effectiveness of these 
incentive strategies (Table 5). 
 
3.7.3 In-depth Interviews with Hospital Managers (Hospital CEOs) 
Using a semi-structured interview guide (Appendix 2), face-to-face in-depth interviews were 
further conducted with eight hospital managers who were available at their facilities on the 
week of data collection. These interviews, each about an hour, were carried out at the offices 
of the respondents and taped-recorded with the permission of the participants. The interview 
guide focused on similar issues like those covered on the key informants schedule, the only 
difference was that the questions were directed at experiences at facility level rather than 
more broadly. In addition, one question asked hospital managers about absenteeism of doctors 
and nurses at the facilities that participated in the study.  
 
3.7.4 In-depth Interviews with Human Resource (HR) Managers  
A total of five face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with the facility HR managers 
who were available at their facilities on the week of data collection using a semi-structured 
interview guide (Appendix 3). The participants were purposefully selected on the basis of 
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their knowledge regarding how the selected HRH interventions were implemented in their 
respective hospitals and the interviews took about 45 minutes to complete. The same issues as 
with the hospital managers’ interview schedule were explored. 
 
3.7.5 In-depth Interviews with Health Workers 
A total of 112 one-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted with the different categories of 
nurses (professional nurse, staff nurse and assistant nurse) as well as with six doctors using a 
semi-structured interview guide (Appendix 4). A multi-stage sampling strategy was used to 
select nurses from a weekly duty list. This strategy involved random selection of the different 
departments (e.g. medical, surgical, psychiatry, theatre etc.) depending on the level of care 
provided in the study hospitals. This was followed by a random selection of the different 
categories of nurses to participate in order to maximise variations within the sample. If a 
selected nurse refused to participate or was unavailable, we replaced them with the same 
category in the same ward. In several hospitals in Gauteng province, there were a 
considerable number of agency nurses as well as student nurses and these nurses were 
excluded. In CHCs and clinics, only nurses that were available on the day of fieldwork were 
interviewed because on average there were three nurses per clinic. Convenience sampling was 
used to select doctors for participation. These interviews took approximately 1-hour to 
complete and they were also recorded. A trained fieldworker assisted with conducting some 
of these interviews.  
 
3.7.6 Health Worker Survey 
A self-administered semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 5), which was informed by the 
literature review and the conceptual framework, was used to collect information from nurses 
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of all categories (professional nurses, staff nurses and assistant nurses) as well as doctors. The 
questionnaire included: 
 General socio-demographic questions; 
 Health worker absenteeism 
 Feelings about and satisfaction with incentive strategies 
 The Abridged Job in General (aJIG) scale; 
 The Abridged Job Descriptive Index (aJDI) scale;  
 The Intention to Quit Scale;  
 The Organisational Commitment Questionnaire; and 
 Recommendations on improving motivation and retention. 
 
The Abridged Job in General (aJIG) scale measures job satisfaction and was developed by the 
Bowling Green University [230]. The aJIG is an 8-item scale and the range of possible scores 
is from 0 to 24; with a neutral point being 12. Scores well above 12 indicate “satisfaction” 
with the overall job while scores well below 12 indicate “dissatisfaction”. The aJIG scale was 
chosen to determine its applicability in a middle income context and because it has 
demonstrated satisfactory levels of reliability and validity [164]. According to Ironson et al 
[74], the aJIG was the only instrument to provide information on responsiveness.  
 
Another Bowling Green University tool that was used in this study was the 15-item Abridged 
Job Descriptive Index (aJDI) scale which determined overall job satisfaction by measuring 
participants’ satisfaction with five job elements which are work itself, pay, promotion, 
colleagues and supervisors [230]. For aJDI, a range of possible scale scores was from 0 to 15, 
with the neutral point at a score of 7.5. Therefore, scores well above 7.5 (i.e. 10 and above) 
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indicated “satisfaction” while scores well below 7.5 (i.e. 5 or below) indicated 
“dissatisfaction” [231].  
 
The 4-item “intention to quit” (ITQ) scale, also from Bowling Green University, measured the 
participants’ intention to leave their current jobs. The response format for this scale was a 7-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 for “strongly disagree” and 7 for “strongly agree”. The 
scoring for this scale was determined by summing up the responses to the four items, leading 
to a minimum score of 4 and a maximum score of 28. Prior to using all these scales, 
permission was sought from Bowling Green University.  
 
The survey also included the 15-item Organisational Commitment Questionnaire which 
measured participants’ commitment to their work environments [78]. This questionnaire had 
six negatively phrased items and the scoring used a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
“strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree” [78]. In order to obtain the overall Organisational 
Commitment score, the scores of individual items ranging from 1 to 7 were added and divided 
by 15; with reverse scoring applied appropriately for the negatively worded items [78]. A 
midpoint of 4 was considered in this scale, with a score of ≤ 4 indicating “lower commitment” 
while a score of ≥ 4 indicated “greater commitment”. In this study, item 9 was removed from 
the scale because it yielded negative correlation with the other items. 
 
In determining the sample size required for the survey we focused on the size of the 95% 
confidence interval for the aJIG scale. Assuming a population mean of 18 and a standard 
deviation of 5, we calculated that at a sample size of 492 respondents would be required (246 
per province) to detect a 5% difference on either side at a power of 80%. Our sampling was 
proportional to size for the different categories of health workers in each facility. In total, 588 
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questionnaires were completed, 441 of these were from hospitals while 147 were from 
community health centres and clinics combined. 
 
The research assistant and I undertook the health worker survey. The questionnaire took 15-
30 minutes to complete and was completed in the presence of the research assistant or myself 
to allow participants to ask questions if they needed to.  
 
3.8 Data Management and Quality Assurance 
3.8.1 Qualitative Data 
Since tape recorders were used during in-depth interviews, the researchers ensured that all 
cassettes were labelled correctly after each interview and that cassettes were stored in a 
safe and secure place prior to being transcribed and translated. The researchers also 
ensured that all consent forms were signed and stored in a secured place. Transcription 
was done verbatim by research assistants. For quality assurance of the transcripts, I 
conducted post-transcription checks by listening to all the tape recordings while reading 
the printed transcription of each interview to check that the research assistant had 
correctly captured the responses on the tape recordings. In some instances, quotations 
used in the findings were edited to improve readability and to retain the confidentiality of 
the respondents.  
 
3.9 Analytical Questions Explored 
Chapter 5 describes the HRH context in the facilities that participated in the study in order to 
contextualise the findings in the other results chapters. The analysis in Chapter 5 will be done 
to depict provincial differences (urban versus rural), differences between respondents 
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(hospital and human resource managers, all categories of nurses and doctors), as well as 
differences by level of care (hospital versus primary health care, revitalised versus non-
revitalised). 
 
For better clarity and coherence, Chapters 6 to 8 reports findings of the incentive strategies of 
interest in this study and each of these chapters is divided into two sections. The first section 
of each of these chapters draws from Walt and Gilson policy analysis framework to provide a 
description of the policy design and implementation processes where issues of context, 
content, actors and process are discussed as well as a detailed description and analysis of the 
strengths and failures of these HRH interventions. This section relies on the document 
analysis and key informants interviews as well as hospital and human resource manager’s 
interviews to understand what happened, why it happened and how activities happened.  
 
The overall argument in this thesis is that the manner in which HRH interventions of interest 
were designed and implemented might have led to positive and or negative influence of these 
interventions on the motivation and retention of health workers. In demonstrating this 
argument, the second section of Chapter 6 to Chapter 8 draws on equity and expectancy 
motivation theories to explain perceptions on the motivation and retention of health workers. 
In this section, emphasis will be on whether the HRH interventions achieved their intended 
purpose or not. Likewise, the analysis will provide provincial differences (urban versus rural), 
differences between respondents (key informants, hospital and human resource managers, all 
categories of nurses and doctors), as well as differences by level of care (hospital versus 
primary health care, revitalised versus non-revitalised).  
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Available literature has shown some linkages between job satisfaction and motivation and 
retention. Organisational commitment and intention to leave have also been associated with 
health workers’ retention. In Chapter 9, findings on the job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment and health workers’ intention to leave will be discussed. The aim of Chapter 9 is 
to quantitatively complement some of the findings in Chapters 6 to 8. The analysis will 
provide provincial differences (urban versus rural), differences between respondents (all 
categories of nurses and doctors), as well as differences by level of care (hospital versus 
primary health care, revitalised versus non-revitalised).  
 
Chapter 10, the final results chapter, will draw from Chapters 5 to Chapter 9 to critically 
report on the commonalities and differences between the four incentive strategies in relation 
to the manner in which these strategies were designed and implemented as well as 
respondents’ perceptions on the influence of these strategies on the motivation and retention 
of health workers. These findings will further be reported in light of the revised integrated 
framework derived from the analytical thinking of the previous results chapters. Chapter 10 
will further set the scene for the major analytical ideas to be discussed in the final chapter, 
Chapter 11 covering the study discussion, conclusion and recommendation.  
  
3.9.1 Quantitative Data 
During data collection phase, thorough tracking of the questionnaires was done to ensure 
that no questionnaires were lost. The research assistant and I verified that all questions 
were completed correctly while still in field and in the presence of the respondents. Data 
capturing was outsourced to a reputable service provider and it was captured using 
STATA. Cleaning of data was done by myself, with close supervision of the primary 
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supervisor and it involved the identification of missing data as well as ensuring that skip 
patterns were adhered to.  
 
3.10  Data Analysis 
3.10.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Data collection and analysis occurred concurrently and since data was first collected at the 
North West hospitals, analysis begun with this data in 2009. Cleaned and verified transcripts 
were downloaded to Atlas.ti for coding and identification of themes while themes that came 
from the document review were electronically recorded in a table following the Walt and 
Gilson framework. Thematic content analysis [232] of all the transcripts and documents 
reviewed was then performed using both inductive and deductive approaches. Regarding the 
document review, I systematically read each document identified line by line in order to 
extricate relevant dominant and sub-themes aligning with the Walt and Gilson framework 
[198]. With regard to the transcripts, the process followed was to initially read each transcript 
line by line to develop meaning and create basic interpretations following the conceptual 
framework in Chapter 2. Thereafter, a detailed reading of the transcripts was done during 
which dominant and sub-themes were generated.  
 
During analysis, two researchers, the author of this thesis and another researcher who was 
involved in the larger project first independently read six transcripts from different groups of 
participants and then discussed coding discrepancies until agreement was reached in order to 
ensure consistency and dependability of the data. In conducting thematic analysis, we made 
an assumption that the number of individuals independently expressing the same idea 
signified thematic importance rather than the absolute number of times a theme is expressed 
by one talkative participant [233]. We therefore identified a theme in one transcript, checked 
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for its presence in other transcripts and noted similarities and dissimilarities in the manner in 
which each participant expressed each theme. Based on the latter processes, I then developed 
a comprehensive codebook.  
 
Once coding was completed and themes identified, a written account of the interpretation of 
the themes was then compiled. Extracts or quotes from interviews are included in the write up 
of the findings to enable the readers of this thesis to detect the patterns identified in the 
analysis [234] and to make their own judgements. The interpretation of the findings was 
validated by sharing them with a team that was involved in the larger project to ensure 
accuracy. In addition, the preliminary findings were shared during two feedback meetings 
with representatives from the two provinces that participated in the study, the National 
Department of Health and the National Department of Public Service and Administration. 
Some of the representatives that attended these meetings participated in the study; therefore 
interactions with these participants assisted greatly in clarifying the interpretation of the 
results. The one meeting took place in Pretoria for an audience of 40 participants mainly from 
Gauteng Province while another one took place in Mafikeng, North West Province with an 
audience of 35 participants.  
 
On reflecting on my position in this study, I consider myself as a “relative outsider” [235] 
for a number of reasons. Both the research assistant and I were not brought up in the areas 
around the actual sites where data were collected and thus were not familiar with the 
health workers and other staff in such facilities. I was also not familiar with the key 
informants interviewed. The advantage of this “relative outsider” position was that the 
participants were not reluctant to reveal certain information during the interviews because 
they did not consider us as having close ties to their facilities or departments. The other 
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advantage of this “relative outsider” status enabled us to establish the kind of interpersonal 
distance that led to objectivity [236].  
 
3.10.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
Quantitative data were analysed using Stata (Version 10). In analysing the data, the statistical 
techniques that were employed included descriptive and inferential statistics. The descriptive 
statistics consisted of frequencies, percentages, measures of central tendency such as mean 
and median and distribution of data (standard deviations and IQR). Inferential statistics that 
were conducted included Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Regression analysis. 
Cronbach’s alpha [237, 238] was used to measure the reliability of the items on the 
questionnaire scales and the alpha value of 0.70 or higher was generally considered as an 
acceptable degree of internal consistency.  
 
3.11 Ethical Considerations 
This research was approved by the University of the Witwatersrand’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee (M080729). Permission to conduct the study was further sought from the Gauteng 
and North West Departments of Health. Once the facilities were identified, permission was 
also obtained from the hospital managers in the case of hospitals and district managers and 
sisters-in-charge of CHCs and clinics. At the hospital level, permission to access the wards 
was further requested from the nursing managers, clinical managers and or ward managers. 
Consent was further attained from the individual participants themselves. All the participants 
(key informants, hospital managers, human resources managers, nurses and doctors) were 
provided with the study information sheet which explained the purpose of the study and the 
terms of the respondent’s consent.  
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It was further explained in the information sheet and verbally prior to the interview that 
participation in the study was voluntary and that participants can withdraw their participation 
at any stage should they wish to do so without any consequences. Participants were also told 
that there were no incentives provided and no direct benefits to them. However, the 
information collected in the study will be used to make recommendations to inform effective 
design and implementation of the HRH interventions. Information sheets also provided my 
contact details and those of one of my supervisors.  
 
Permission was also sought from the participants to use a tape recorder during the interview 
so that no information would be missed. The respondents were assured that the recorded 
information would be kept anonymous and confidential and that it would not be shared with 
their managers. It was explained to the participants that the recordings would only be listened 
to by the researchers from the Centre for Health Policy who were working on the project. It 
was further explained to the participants that the tapes would then be destroyed two years 
after publication of the research findings. To ensure anonymity, transcripts of interviews only 
indicated the category of the participants that participated and not the name of the individuals 
interviewed.  
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CHAPTER 4: OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE 
CONTEXT AT THE STUDY SITES  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter begins with providing a description of the demographic characteristics of the 
participants in both the qualitative and quantitative components of the study. The chapter will 
then report the findings of the context of the working environment as viewed by the different 
categories of respondents across the study sites. Human resource challenges of the hospital 
managers are also discussed.  
 
4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Participants 
4.2.1 Respondents for the Qualitative Component 
In total, 160 in-depth interviews were conducted in the two provinces representing the 
following respondents: key informants (n=35), hospital managers (n=8), human resource 
managers (n=5), nurses of all categories (n=112), and doctors (n=6). Of the nurses that 
participated in the study, a total of 55 were from North West province while 57 were from 
Gauteng. In addition, 54 of these nurses were from hospitals while 58 were from CHCs and 
clinics. The majority of these nurses were South Africans, females and married.  
 
4.2.2 Respondents for the Quantitative Component 
A total of 588 interviews were conducted with doctors and nurses of all categories (Table 8). 
441 of these were from hospitals while 147 were from community health centres and clinics 
combined. Of these, 354 were from Gauteng while 234 were from North West Provinces. 
Overall, the respondents were predominantly females (90% in Gauteng and 83% in North 
West), and professional nurses and this was statistically significant in Gauteng (p<0.005) and 
in the North West (p<0.05). This is due to the fact that professional nurses make up a bigger 
82 
 
proportion in clinics and as a result more of them were sampled in clinics than in hospitals. 
The mean age in Gauteng was slightly higher (41.7 years) than in North West province (39.2 
years), with clinic respondents slightly older than the hospital respondent in North West 
province (p<0.05). A largest group of the respondents were married and provinces were 
similar in their marital status with 46.3% married in Gauteng province and 42.7% in North 
West province. However, there was a significant difference in North West province, with 
slightly higher proportions of the respondents married in clinics (45.3%) than in hospitals 
(41.9%), p<0.05.  
 
A large proportion of the respondents, from both provinces and from both hospitals and 
clinics, had children. The mean length of service for Gauteng participants was 10.4 years and 
7.3 years in North West province. Only 20.6% and 19.5% respondents reported changing jobs 
in the past year in Gauteng and North West provinces respectively. A large proportion of the 
clinic respondents in North West province were working in rural areas than urban areas and 
this was significant (p<0.001). In addition, 71% of the health workers in North West province 
were from revitalised facilities as opposed to only 29% in Gauteng province.  
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Table 8: Demographic Characteristics of Participants  
Variables  Gauteng  North West 
  Hospitals  Clinics P-value  Hospitals  Clinics  P-value 
N=588  (N=265) (N=89)   (N=179) (N=55)  
Gender % Male  11.3% 4.5% 
0.059 
 17.4% 16.7% 
0.898 
% Female  88.7% 95.5%  82.6% 83.3% 
          
Health worker 
category 
Doctor  9.8% 1.1% 
0.004 
 7.8% 1.8% 
0.023 
Professional Nurse  36.2% 53.9%  39.7% 61.8% 
Staff Nurse  26.4% 19.1%  13.9% 7.3% 
Assistant Nurse  27.6% 25.8%  38.6% 29.1% 
          
Age Mean ± SD  41.4yrs 42.5yrs 0.374  38.4yrs 42.1yrs 0.010 
          
Marital status Single  39.6% 39.3% 
0.674 
47.5% 32.1% 
0.034 
Married  47.2% 43.8% 41.9% 45.3% 
Divorced / Widowed 
/ Separated 
 13.2% 16.9% 10.6% 22.6% 
          
Any children % Yes  87.1% 93.0% 
0.135 
 85.9% 86.5% 
0.904 
% No  12.9% 6.9%  14.1% 13.5% 
          
Length of service Mean ± SD  10.4yrs 10.4yrs 0.982  7.1yrs 8.5yrs 0.470 
Changed jobs in 
past year 
% Yes  20.7% 20.5% 0.962  20.3% 16.7% 0.551 
% No  79.3% 79.6%   79.7% 83.3%  
          
Facility location % Gauteng urban  74.9% 25.1%     0.001 
% North West urban      40.2% 9.1% 
0.001 
 % North West rural      59.8% 90.9% 
          
Facility status Revitalised  29.1%  0%   70.9%  0%  
Non-revitalised  75.4%  100%   24.6%  100%  
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4.3  HRH Context at the Study Sites 
Several themes were identified that captured the day to day experiences of hospital managers, 
doctors and nurses in their working environment, including aspects of the health workers’ 
motivation and de-motivation. These are discussed thematically as illustrated in Table 9.    
 
Table 9: Major Themes to Explain the HRH Context 
 
Themes Sub-themes 
Factors of attraction, motivation and 
retention 
 Love for nursing  
 Opportunities for internal migration  
 Facility closer to home 
 Love for community  
 Conducive working hours 
De-motivational factors   Shortage of staff and its impact 
 High disease burden 
 Recruitment and retention challenges 
 Inadequate salaries  
  Limited opportunities for growth 
 Lack of accommodation 
 Weak supervision, interpersonal 
relationships and communication 
Other motivational and retention strategies  
 
 
4.3.1 Factors of Attraction, Motivation and Retention 
When nurses of all categories and doctors were asked about what factors attracted, motivated 
and retained them in their current facilities, several themes came up. Factors that seemed to 
attract nurses in particular to the profession included their love for nursing and opportunities 
for internal migration. Factors related to attraction to specific facilities were working closer to 
home, love for the community; as well as conducive working hours.  
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Love for Nursing:  
When nurses were asked about what attracted them to their profession, a considerable number 
of the nurses from different health facilities (hospital and primary health care setting) in the 
two provinces indicated that they were attracted to the profession mainly because of their love 
for nursing which enabled them to save lives.  
“Nursing has always been my childhood desire. What attracted me was the ability to 
save lives. At least as a nurse I am able to do that.” (Professional Nurse 13, North 
West CHC) 
 
“I’m dedicated to being a professional nurse because I like being a nurse.” 
(Professional Nurse 16, North West Clinic) 
 
 
This perception of the love for nursing was in sharp contrast to a comment made by one male 
nurse from a district hospital in Gauteng province who remarked about the perceived decline 
in the image of nursing, equating it to that of a security guard and taxi driver. As a result, he 
claimed that he was ashamed to tell his friends that he is a nurse as he wanted to still uphold 
his social status amongst his peers: 
“But what I’m trying to say is that people’s perceptions about nurses have changed. 
There used to be this thing back then that when a nurse walks down the street and as a 
man you are interested in her, you will be told that you are taking chances if you try to 
pursue her. They had that status but now…have you seen how security guards and taxi 
drivers are being undermined? I could say we are on that rank now. And as a human 
being I wouldn’t like to be perceived in that manner that’s why most of my friends 
don’t know that I’m a nurse.”(Male Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
 
This nurse further implied that the health department took advantage of nurses because it was 
easier for them to recruit ‘anyone from the streets’ to be trained as a nurse. This suggests that 
people ultimately recruited for enrolment in nursing might not entirely have the love for the 
profession: 
“The other thing, our government knows that even if 50% of the nurses in a hospital 
decide to resign, they could take anyone from the streets and say ‘come we’ll teach 
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you nursing’. So they take advantage...” (Male Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, 
Gauteng Province) 
 
 
One policymaker concurred that the image of the nurses in the community was of great 
concern considering that in recent times, increasing number of patients are complaining about 
the negative treatment received from nurses. This policymaker added that similarly, the image 
of the doctors have also deteriorated reflected by negative views held by patients.  
“If you look at where we come from and where we are now, when you look at the 
media, the complaints from the community used to be about the nurses. But now, I am 
sure you are aware that the community also complain about doctors and how they are 
treating them. And it is a worrying factor you know, because we nurses used to be 
advocates for patients. And again, right now you also get patients complaining that 
this doctor treated me this way and that way, which used to be very rare.” (Policy 
Maker 3, Gauteng Department of Health) 
 
Opportunities for Internal Migration:  
Interestingly, a key factor of attraction for nurses was their ability to move around from one 
facility to the other and from one sector to another which according to them provided an 
opportunity for change and growth. This was in relation to nurses wanting experience of both 
the public and private sectors; nurses who worked in a public hospital wanting to experience a 
primary health care setting or vice versa; nurses who worked in a clinic wanting to experience 
a community health care centre; or nurses who worked for many years doing the same 
activities without any challenge wanting change and challenges from the move. These views 
were expressed by nurses of all categories particularly those currently working in primary 
health care settings in Gauteng and North West Provinces. Of interest to note was how some 
nurses viewed clinics to be their preferred work setting rather than hospitals, as clinics were 
considered by these nurses to be challenging yet providing opportunities to growth. As might 
be expected, there were some clinics that were regarded as offering better opportunities for 
growth than others, while a hospital setting was considered by some nurses as strenuous:  
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“I worked at Kalafong [hospital] in 1989 till 1999. At Kalafong [hospital], I was 
bored because if you worked in a medical ward, you would stay there for more than 
10 years without any change. For 10 years, you do the same thing during day duty and 
night duty. I then saw an advert in the nursing news for a clinic post. I had never 
worked at a clinic before, but I felt that maybe if I can go to work in one, I can relieve 
myself from being a hospital slave. When I got here, I felt very happy; I no longer 
have hospital stress.” (Professional Nurse 1, Gauteng Clinic) 
 
 “Before coming here, I used to work in Marikana clinic and I used to work within my 
scope of practice and not learning anything. But since being here at this clinic, I now 
have challenges in my work because there is not that thing of saying I am working 
according to my job description. Here, I find that I have learned a lot of things more 
than what I was doing where I previously worked; now my knowledge has grown.” 
(Staff Nurse 1, North West CHC)  
“I worked in the private sector most of my life. I needed some change. I changed 
from the private sector to the public.” (Assistant Nurse 13, Gauteng Clinic) 
 
Although not a dominant theme, one of the nurses indicated that she was attracted to a 
primary health care setting because of health reasons. This nurse, who appears to be close to 
retirement, indicated that she used to work for a private hospital which according to her was 
physically strenuous thus compromising her health as she had arthritis.  
“I was working in a private hospital. It was strenuous for my age and health. You 
are running around the whole day. I have arthritis, as you grow old there are 
complications. I just prayed to God since I am a born again Christian to say ‘Lord 
please give me a clinic-based job’. I am now settled doing my count down till I go on 
pension.” (Staff Nurse 4, Gauteng Province Clinic) 
 
In contrast to what some nurses from clinics reported as hospital ‘stress’, being ‘hospital 
slaves’ and limited change in activities at hospitals, one of the professional nurses from a 
Gauteng hospital highlighted the benefits of being based in an urban hospital which includes 
exposure to dealing with acute clinical cases as opposed to what rural health workers would 
experience: 
“The rural hospitals are not exposed like the city ones because we are exposed to 
seeing variety of patients; car accidents, gun shots, stabbings so many things.” 
(Professional Nurse, Regional Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
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However, a rural foreign doctor contradicted this indicating that working in a rural facility has 
its own advantages, such as first-hand experience of working in a resource-scarce 
environment and learning to find alternatives for dealing with such challenges.  
“Look, when I applied for the job I didn’t really know the place. I just asked the 
department to just send me in a rural area in South Africa. I just wanted the 
experience of the rural area. I asked them to send me wherever they can. So they sent 
me here and I am really happy working in the rural area.” (Medical Officer, District 
Hospital, North West Province) 
 
A lower cadre nurse, also from a rural facility, reported that she was enticed and motivated by 
having knowledgeable colleagues; whom she reported as possessing a specialty in primary 
health care and have thus continuously shared their knowledge and skills unselfishly:  
“In this clinic, what motivates me is that the sisters [professional nurses] that I am 
working with have primary health care [qualification]. So what motivates me is the 
way we work here and I can see that they have more knowledge so in future if I go to 
school, I can see that there is nothing that will be difficult for me.” (Staff Nurse 1, 
North West CHC) 
 
A primary health care nurse is a comprehensively trained registered nurse possessing a post 
basic qualification in community health [17]. 
 
Facility being closer to Home: 
Nurses of all categories in the two provinces and from hospitals and primary health care 
setting reported that the main reason that attracted them to their current facilities was that it 
was closer to their homes.  
“For me to apply for a job in this facility it was because it was nearer to where I was 
staying. I didn’t have much information about the facility, but I was only looking for 
something that can be near home.” (Professional Nurse 10, Gauteng CHC)  
“When I came here it was because it is close to the location where I live, near my 
home. For the first time in 15 years of working in town, this was an opportunity to 
work around here.”(Staff Nurse 3, Gauteng Province Clinic) 
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Love for the Community:  
Similarly, a number of nurses of all categories reported having been attracted to the facilities 
where they worked because of their love for the community. The need to assist poverty-
stricken communities where affordability of doctors’ fees was a challenge, and rural 
communities which are often resided by illiterate members, was expressed by these nurses.  
“I am motivated because when you work in such a place and surrounded by so much 
poverty, you want to help people who can’t afford going to the doctor.” 
(Professional Nurse 16, North West Clinic) 
“What brought me here are the challenges that are facing people in the rural areas 
because most of them they don’t know much, so we are here to help and teach 
them.” (Professional Nurse 20, North West Clinic) 
 
Contrary to these nurses who loved their communities, other nurses have had bad experiences 
with some members of the community. Amongst these are perceptions that some community 
members were disrespectful of nurses and other patients; that some community members are 
uncooperative and accused nurses of dragging their feet and not doing enough to help them; 
being unsupportive and disrespectful of nurses not originally from rural areas; and that some 
community members were quick to involve the media to report nurses. This pressure from the 
community appeared to be causing a lot of strain on some nurses and reflects views by nurses 
of all categories from the different health facilities in the two provinces as shown in the 
comments below:  
“People that come here are uncontrollable. Some [patients] normally go to 
newspapers to report [nurses]. A nurse once went away for a month, she said she 
couldn't cope with such patients; it was her first time of seeing such uncontrollable 
patients. One of the doctors that we have been loaned to come and help us had a 
situation whereby while she was preparing a patient; others just flocked in. They 
don't respect other patients. (Staff Nurse 3, Gauteng Clinic) 
“The other issue is the community issue, the bad treatment that we get from the 
community here because we are not born in this area. You find that they call us names 
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that are not pleasant and they do not speak to us appropriately.” (Professional Nurse, 
District Hospital, North West) 
 
“The patients fight with us telling us that we are not working, we are busy going up and 
down and passing them by.” (Staff Nurse 1, North West CHC) 
 
 
According to one of these nurses, in one facility, a doctor was once held hostage. This raises 
concerns of the safety of health professionals in their working environment.  
“The people here once held a doctor hostage. They refused to let the doctor go. So 
you can see this is an uncooperative community.” (Staff Nurse 3, Gauteng Clinic) 
 
Another concern reported by some nurses was that family members often delay seeking care 
and wait until a patient is critically ill before they act and then expect the nurses to perform a 
miracle. This was said to be the case particularly for the pensioners. Though said in a 
colloquial manner, nurses believed that family members keep the sick elderly patients at home 
so that they can benefit from their pension money. Once they are tired of providing care and 
spent their pension for their own use, they send these critically ill patients to the hospital to 
die.  
 
Conducive Working Hours:  
A recurrent theme amongst nurses of all categories, especially those from Gauteng province, 
was that they were attracted to work in a primary health setting because of the conducive 
working hours; particularly the opportunity of not working night duties and on weekends.  
“Actually I wanted to work ordinary hours. I worked odd hours in a hospital; I was 
working night duty. I wanted to work in a primary health care setting because you 
don't work abnormal hours; I knock off in the afternoons. I am very happy about it.” 
(Professional Nurse 6, Gauteng Clinic) 
“I just don’t like working late shifts, like working 7am to 7pm. I love the clinic for not 
working night duty.” (Assistant Nurse 12, Gauteng Clinic) 
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“Here on Saturdays and Sundays I am at home, I work from 7am to 4pm. That is another 
reason I prefer to stay here.” (Staff Nurse 6, Gauteng Clinic) 
 
 
A major advantage of working conducive hours as reported by these nurses is that this created 
opportunities for them to start a family, raise children as well as maximising time spent with 
family.  
“I was from the hospital and at the hospital the shifts were 7am to 7pm. I was 
planning on having a family and I asked myself who is going to mind my children. 
Then I decided to rather come here because it was going to be convenient. I would 
be able to knock off early; and I wouldn't work on weekends.” (Professional Nurse 
4, Gauteng Clinic) 
“I just wanted to work at a clinic because at the time when I qualified I had a small baby 
who was two months old and I was breast feeding.” (Professional Nurse 8, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
 
4.3.2 De-motivational Factors 
Shortage of Staff and its Impact 
A shortage of nurses and medical personnel was a recurring theme amongst almost all groups 
of respondents in different health facilities in the two provinces. Diverse views expressed 
regarding staff shortages were in relation to insufficient numbers of health personnel for the 
needs of the facility as well as inappropriate utilisation of the existing health professionals, 
especially in a hospital setting where nurses in particular performed non-nursing duties such 
as porter services. One respondent remarked as follows:  
“The biggest challenge that we are experiencing now in the district hospitals is 
shortage of doctors, the shortage of medical personnel. Yes, it’s really our biggest 
challenge for now, I think we are having four doctors only for this institution which 
has 290 beds and we cover a population of about 200,000 people.” (Medical Officer, 
District Hospital, North West Province) 
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One hospital manager in North West Province reported that the problem of shortage of 
doctors in particular was further complicated by what he referred to as ‘power play’ whereby 
existing doctors arrived late to work, took long lunch breaks and threatened to resign when 
reprimanded about their behaviours:  
“I think the other issue that we have seen is the fact that clinicians have noted that 
they are scarce skills in this country. And they always want to draw the management 
and the employer to a point where we are sort of begging them to provide a service. 
That kind of a power play is also complicating the situation because I mean a doctor 
will come here late or they will go for lunch for too long and when you talk to them, 
they threaten you that they will resign.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District 
Hospital 1, North West Province) 
 
In psychiatry wards, shortage of specialised nurses, especially male nurses, was reported as a 
hindrance since dealing with psychiatric patients may at times require physical strength to 
handle these patients:  
“The challenge that we face is shortage of staff. A unit like this needs man power. Did 
you see men here? There’s shortage, especially males, even at night there must be a 
male nurse.” (Professional Nurse, Regional Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
 
 
Shortage of nurses was reported to be most palpable when some health workers were absent 
or when those available on duty were expected to escort a patient to another facility. The 
consequences of staff shortage were also mentioned by several respondents. These included 
increased workload for existing staff, negative health consequences for nurses, inability to 
take annual or sick leave, inability to study further, working beyond one’s scope of practice as 
well as compromised quality of care. The workload burden in hospitals was most apparent 
when several services were offered in one ward and fewer health workers were responsible 
for managing a ward with full bed occupancy. The situation was reported to be equally 
problematic in primary health centres as illustrated by the following quotations:  
“The medical ward, antenatal, and paeds [paediatrics] is one unit. They’ve got ten 
beds each side. When it is night duty, it’s one sister [professional nurse] that is 
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working there and two nurses. And they must do all the bed washes, all the bed 
making; it’s a lot of work. And there is no other staff to help them.” (Staff Nurse, 
District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
“Sometimes you will find after twelve hours you did not even cover the job, you will be 
busy checking the urine, blood glucoses and on the other hand the doctor might be 
fighting you. But due to the workload, you sometimes forget to do some of the things. 
Say you are busy with something and then a new admission comes in, sometimes when 
one is dying, you have to resuscitate just to save the one dying.” (Staff Nurse, District 
Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
 
One young male nurse reported the impact of the workload as contributing to his backache 
problem:  
 “And it really strains because you sign in at seven in the morning and knock off at 
seven in the evening whereas you are only two nurses lifting up the patients. I’m only 
22 years of age, but I already have a backache and it’s not on. By the time I knock off, 
I feel the backache. If I had a wife and I get home and I’m tired like this, she would 
leave me.” (Assistant Male Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
 
 
With regard to working beyond one’s scope of practice, professional nurses reported doing 
duties in the scope of practice of doctors while the lower cadre of nurses performed duties in 
the scope of practice of professional nurses:  
“The workload is too much. Sometimes you end up doing doctors’ procedures. When 
you ask the doctor ‘why didn’t you perform these procedures because it’s your 
scope’? And he will tell you that: ‘you know what, I’ve got a lot of patients to see, so 
do it’. They don’t do their job; they leave everything on the nurse’s shoulder. I don’t 
know whether they are lazy or they do it purposely because they tell themselves that 
most of the time the patients are with nurses, so the patients mustn’t suffer. The nurses 
must do everything.” (Professional Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
“For an example here in ward 5, as an Assistant Nurse, you might be left alone to run 
the ward relying on the assistance of a Professional Nurse who is working in the 
opposite ward and who also has her own duties that side of which it’s a huge risk 
because if anything is to happen you will be responsible as an Assistant Nurse.” 
(Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
 
 
According to other respondents, another consequence of staff shortages and increased 
workload was that the quality of patient care was in some way compromised:  
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“Sometimes, especially in the afternoon we will have one professional nurse, one staff 
nurse and maybe three assistant nurses out of 44 patients. Can you really do total 
nursing care? These patients are very ill!” (Staff Nurse, Regional Hospital, Gauteng 
Province)  
 
“In this ward we are only three, it’s the professional nurse, the staff nurse and me, an 
assistant nurse. We have 34 patients. In honest facts, we really cannot afford to attend 
to each patient accordingly in a right way.” (Assistant Nurse, Regional Hospital, 
Gauteng Province) 
 
One hospital manager admitted that even when they are aware that quality of care is 
compromised, it is almost impossible to implement quality assurance measures due to huge 
numbers of patients waiting to be seen and fewer health workers available to deal with the 
workload:  
“You are not able to have meetings with them [health workers] to raise issues of 
concern. So now quality assurance programmes are not easily facilitated because 
there are a huge number of people waiting for doctors and nurses. Whilst at the same 
time you know that there are clinical errors that you need to respond to, but you are 
not able to respond. So it’s a risky environment for clinicians knowing that in cases 
where they did faults, the Health Professional Council is likely to take away their 
qualifications.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North West) 
 
 
Interestingly, in addition to shortage of clinical staff, some hospital managers also raised 
concerns about the competence and skills of the Finance and HR managers at hospital level; 
stating challenges of having managers that have lengthy experience but lacking professional 
qualifications for their respective management roles. One hospital manager commented as 
follows:  
“And as it is now, I don’t have managers with qualifications; I would like a human 
resource manager with qualifications. The human resource people that are working 
here are here just because of their experience, he is experienced but with no 
qualifications. When coming to finance also, I don’t have a person with qualifications. 
I have people working with experience because they have been working for a long 
period here” (Hospital Manager 2, District Hospital, GP)  
 
95 
 
High Disease Burden:  
The respondents further stated that these human resource challenges are exacerbated by the 
complex disease burden, notably the double burden of HIV and TB. There was great concern 
from the clinic staff specifically that the district management expected them to see an average 
of 60 patients per day; neglecting to take into cognisance the complexity of the patients that 
they see as well as the practicality of dealing with certain chronic diseases such as HIV and 
TB.  
“You have to do TB or HIV for mother and child and you will be forced to reach a 
certain target in time. We only have one assistant nurse that does the vital signs and the 
baby weight. And you’ll find that at times, we don’t cope and they [District Management] 
don’t take that into consideration that we are dying of the situation that we are working 
in.” (Professional Nurse 19, North West Clinic) 
“I mean, I won’t be able to see all those 28 patients per day or 30 per day because 
somebody was doing the counselling and there is someone doing the mother and 
child transmission of HIV so there would be counselling and doing TB also. And 
there would be chronically ill patients and the acute ill patients and you must see all 
of them. At the end, we don’t even have the stress management intervention.” 
(Professional Nurse 20, North West Clinic) 
 
In addition to this, nurses reported that there are many different policies that are constantly 
being developed or being changed, especially those related to HIV, TB, maternity care and 
mental health care, which nurses are expected to implement and adhere to. Nurses in primary 
health care settings were mainly the ones who reported being affected by this:  
“There are lots of policies out there and although they are good, implementing them is 
very difficult and unrealistic. Every department will come with its policies and you’ll 
be by yourself expected to perform all those duties. And with the mentally ill patients, 
there is a new law which states that if you refer to the hospital you must escort the 
patient. So imagine, you must call the police van if there is no ambulance, and then 
you must escort the patient and hurry back because there is only one professional 
nurse for the whole clinic and there are a lot of patients. So you see how strenuous 
that is.” (Professional Nurse 19, North West Clinic) 
 
Hospital managers, especially those in Gauteng province mentioned that they relied on using 
nursing agencies as a strategy for dealing with nursing shortage to fill gaps. However, one 
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hospital manager noted that nursing agencies tended to deploy their off-duty nurses thus 
denying these nurses adequate resting time. Some respondents commented as follows: 
“So up to now we don’t have enough staff and we are relying on agencies.” (Hospital 
Manager 2, District Hospital 8, Gauteng Province) 
 
“Before we didn’t have time to sit, we didn’t have time for lunch. It was very hectic 
and nurses were going out because they were tired. But now it’s much much better 
because people from Khanyisa [the nursing agency name] are assisting us.” (Staff 
Nurse, Regional Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
 
 
The other disadvantage with using nursing agencies is that some of the nurses used by these 
agencies are often not skilled enough and there is no continuity in patient care and no 
accountability.  
 
An alternative strategy used by hospital managers to fill the gap in human resources was to 
request the available doctors and nurses to work overtime. Although health workers would 
gladly agree to working overtime to supplement their income, the main contention was when 
payment of overtime worked was delayed:   
“Imagine sleeping during the night at the nurses’ home and they call you and ask you 
to come fill in because the staff on duty escorted patients to another facility. Keeping 
in mind there are only three staff members during the night and when the two of them 
go out to escort patients, then there’ll be one person left for the whole hospital. And 
when they call you to work, no one is going to pay those hours back to you.” 
(Professional Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
A strategy used at primary health centres to deal with the challenges of staff shortages 
included equal sharing of the workload; especially taking into consideration additional 
responsibilities of nurses as mothers and wives outside of the work environment. One nurse 
said: 
“There are four of us, two nursing assistants and two enrolled nurses. Everyone deals 
with their own people, one person deals with VCT and TB, one deal with ANC and 
child health and so forth. So far, it’s working because by the time you knock off, you 
still have some energy. When you leave here, you still have responsibilities; you have 
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a home, you have kids, maybe you study. Since they introduced this mechanism, the 
workload is better.” (Assistant Nurse 10, Gauteng Clinic)  
 
 
Recruitment and Retention Challenges: 
A number of hospital and human resource managers in rural facilities reported that it was 
rather challenging to recruit and retain health workers in their hospitals due to several factors 
such as the lengthy recruitment process, low or inadequate salaries, the remoteness of the 
area, limited access and availability of social amenities as well as lack of provision of 
accommodation for staff. One hospital manager reported frustrations related to filling a vacant 
position mainly due to the lengthy and bureaucratic recruitment processes which neglect to 
recognise the urgency of filling such positions:  
“I would have to write a motivation to say I need a doctor to be appointed at hospital 
X; send it through to my director at hospital services who would look at the motivation 
and give support to the motivation. If this doctor is employed somewhere, they must 
serve [termination of employment] notice implying that yet another month is wasted. 
So it’s more like four or five months. And during that period of time, you are losing 
another doctor because they cannot stand the pressure and they cannot stand the 
workload. So it’s a vicious cycle…” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District 
Hospital 1, North West Province) 
 
 
Finances were reported by some hospital and human resource managers as being a hindrance 
to filling up vacant positions; mainly because of the costs of advertising and inclusion of 
allowances in the overall salary package:  
“We can’t employ large numbers of professionals because of the budget. So we’ve got 
to fill the posts bit by bit.” (Hospital Manager 2, District Hospital 8, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
“There is also challenges of funding currently that we are unable to fill the posts 
because we don’t have funds you know. So unfortunately it is the situation that we 
have to labour under.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North 
West Province) 
“Okay the first challenge is the compensation budget. Compensation budget is 
the overall budget for HR; sometimes the budget we get is not enough for the staff 
establishment given to us. This budget is for the running of the HR Department, 
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for appointments. When I say appointments, I mean the advertising part of it 
because we need to have the budget for sending out the adverts. Then we have the 
budget for salaries and we have to add bonuses, pension, housing subsidy, scarce 
skills allowance and all these allowances. So when it’s not enough, you can’t be 
able to appoint more staff and you can’t replace staff that has resigned.” (Human 
Resource Manager 3, Regional Hospital 10, Gauteng Province) 
 
A National Department of Health policymaker concurred with these challenges that hospital 
managers face in filling vacant positions but emphasised the importance of managing the 
process to ensure that only funded posts are filled. This informant remarked as follows:  
“I think the process of filling up posts is a bit of a challenge. I understand the 
frustration from some people but on the other hand unless you manage the process, 
what you might have is what was taking place in the homelands where people would 
just fill posts regardless of whether there is money or not. At the moment it’s a bit of a 
problem because you have provinces that decentralise and others centralise” 
(Policymaker 1, National Government)  
 
 
For Gauteng province in particular, almost all human resource managers that were 
interviewed complained about the inefficiency of the Gauteng Shared Services Centre 
(GSSC), a provincial structure which uses a centralised system to process and capture HR 
data. Several challenges were noted with this system including contributing to the lengthy 
periods to fill vacant posts, delays in capturing information, capturing of wrong information 
as well as lost information:   
“Some years back, we used to capture HR information in the system ourselves and 
we knew what is going on. But then sometime in 1999, a new office came into place, 
the GSSC [Gauteng Shared Services Centre]. It is where most of our documents 
from HR are provincially processed and captured. So we collect the information 
from the employees and we send it through to our employment equity unit and then it 
goes to GSSC for capturing. So you find that that information is not captured and 
you phone to do follow ups. You send documents twice or thrice in order to be 
captured; even now our leave system is not up to date because of the processing by 
GSSC.” (Human Resource Manager 4, Revitalised Regional Hospital, Gauteng 
Province) 
“The GSSC [Gauteng Shared Services Centre] is not running smoothly. The late 
applications are one of the challenges and the process of the paper work, it takes too 
long; it can be three months or so. We really don’t have doctors and on the 18th of 
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May, it was the closing date for applications. As you can see, we are nearly 
reaching the 18
thJune and we still haven’t got the applications from GSSC. I must 
short list and then interview, it’s not easy. GSSC captures wrong information, they 
are late with things, and things get lost. I would say that’s the problem.”(Human 
Resource Manager 2, District Hospital 9, Gauteng Province) 
 
Several respondents, notably those working in rural hospitals stated that recruiting young 
health professionals and retaining health workers in general in a rural facility is a challenge 
due to the remoteness of such areas and limited access and availability of social amenities. 
These respondents commented as follows:  
“I think with us the challenge is also mainly because of the remoteness of this area. 
There is a lack of facilities, the schooling and your entertainment facilities you know 
it’s another challenge.” (Health Manager 1, District Hospital, North West Province)  
 
“For young people, it might not be so nice because when I came here I already had 
my family. It’s my husband and my kid, those were the things most important to me but 
young people would look at something else…you know…there’s not even real 
basketball team or a real rugby team or a swimming pool or…err…a place where you 
can get together… I think it lacks adventure. We don’t have a church and we have to 
travel to get to church, we have to travel to get to the bank, you have to travel to get to 
everything.” (Medical Officer, District Hospital, North West Province) 
“Our main problem regarding recruitment is that it is difficult for us to attract 
scarce skills professionals especially because of the remoteness of this 
place.”(Human Resource Manager 5, District Hospital 7, North West Province) 
 
Although no doctor agreed to participate in the in-depth interviews in Gauteng province, 
several foreign doctors that were approached mentioned informally that foreign doctors leave 
because of immigration problems. It was noted that foreign doctors are given refugee status 
and that getting a permanent resident status was difficult. These doctors further mentioned 
that most of the foreign doctors were working illegally in the hospitals. While acknowledging 
the need for increased number of doctors in the study settings, the ability of some doctors to 
practice illegally raises great concerns about loopholes in the quality of the recruitment 
process at these study sites.  
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Inadequate Salaries:  
A key de-motivating factor mentioned by the majority of health workers was inadequate 
salaries. In both Gauteng and North West provinces, and in hospitals and clinics, all 
categories of health workers considered their salaries to be too low. To supplement their 
salaries, doctors reported doing parallel health sector consulting as well as doing locums 
while nurses admitted engaging in moonlighting either in private hospitals or other public 
hospitals within and even outside the provinces where they are located. However, doctors 
reported having fewer opportunities for locum work in rural areas, thus diminishing their 
willingness to settle in rural facilities.  
“The ones [doctors] that are in town do part-times and sessions somewhere else. 
And here, there is no place where they can do such things so they just move on.” 
(Hospital Manager 3, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province)  
 
With regard to nurses moonlighting, a document review showed that nursing agencies tended 
to pay higher salaries than the public hospitals. However, in-depth interviews could not 
confirm if these amounts were the same in the study sites.  
“A fulltime nurse at [public] hospital earns an hourly rate of R41,05 but agencies 
charge R46.08 an hour for ward nurse, R50,90 for high-care nurse and R68,99 for 
nurses with intensive care unit (ICU) experience. A staff nurse earns R28,03 an hour 
but agencies charge R35,11.” (Benjamin C, Business Day Newspaper, 17 January 
2007) 
 
Several human resource managers were further of the view that attracting scarce skills 
professionals was another recruitment challenge, and this was attributed to low salaries. One 
commented as follows: 
“At the moment, the challenge that we face is attracting scarce skills staff, like 
pharmacists, doctors, professional nurses. For instance, when we had a post for a 
pharmacist, we interviewed and then the person decided to decline because the 
salary we offered was too low, so we had to re-advertise. So the challenge is 
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attracting and retaining scarce skills staff.” (Human Resource 1, District Hospital 5, 
Gauteng Province)  
 
However, other hospital managers were of the opinion that some health workers were using 
their hospitals as a stepping stone to acquire training and for reaching higher positions and 
better salaries elsewhere:  
“And then the people from outside come, they just come for us to train them and then 
it’s as if they are waiting halfway station and when they get higher posts, then they are 
gone.” (Hospital Manager 2, District Hospital 8, Gauteng Province)  
 
“You will have a new person…you always have a new person to teach and that’s a 
problem for us as managers you know. From time to time, you’ve got a new person 
because this one just came to address their financial frustrations and once they’ve 
been able to do that they go away.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital 
1, North West Province) 
 
Limited Opportunities for Growth:  
Another major demotivating factor specifically for nurses was the length of time it took to get 
the opportunity to upgrade to the next level of nursing; and this was particularly an issue 
raised by the lower categories of nurses. Some of them reported that it took 20 years before 
they were considered to further their training to become professional nurses. This concern was 
mainly raised by hospital nurses in both provinces.  
Because of the increased workload, these nurses were even unable to take their annual or sick 
leave to attend short courses to improve their skills. 
“You have people who are not able to take their annual leave. And you’ll have people 
who may not be exposed to short courses you know, workshops to sharpen their 
skills.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North West Province) 
 
“What I have noticed about the staff here is that they are responsible because even if 
one of them is sick, they force themselves to come to work if they know that someone is 
away on leave.” (Assistant Nurse 14, Gauteng Clinic) 
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Lack of Accommodation:  
Lack of accommodation for staff in rural facilities, especially for nurses, was also a recurring 
theme related to recruitment and retention challenges of staff. Other issues included lack of 
water and sanitation in rural communities. 
“There are no places to stay, no nurse’s homes” (Staff Nurse, District Hospital, North 
West Province)  
 
“Personally I don’t think they are going to be able to address the shortage of nurses 
for now because there is no one who wants to come to the rural areas; we are not able 
to get proper accommodation. I rent a room in the village and there is no water and 
proper sanitation in this village. Who is going to agree to come here and suffer the 
way I am suffering now?” (Professional Nurse 20, North West Clinic) 
 
 
During fieldwork, I also observed that for both hospitals in North West and Gauteng 
provinces that were providing accommodation for health workers, preference for better and 
bigger houses was given to doctors as opposed to nurses. Even in the same hospital, nurses 
were usually accommodated in one-roomed flat-like structures or nursing homes while 
doctors tended to stay in structured brick houses. In some cases where the hospitals provided 
accommodation, nurses reported that they were treated like ‘teenagers’ irrespective of 
whether they are married or not. For instance, in one hospital in Gauteng province, nurses 
reported that overnight visitors were not allowed in their accommodation; regardless of 
whether such a visitor was a spouse or not and that these restrictions had tendencies to cause 
tensions in family relationships. Nurses in this hospital reported that the gates where the 
accommodation was located opened at 6h00am and closed at 23h00pm. There were also 
concerns that the security staff responsible for locking the gates was not always on-site in the 
event of emergencies.   
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Weak Supervision, Interpersonal Relationships and Communication:  
A substantial number of health workers from different categories of health facility (primary 
health care and hospitals) referred to the poor management, poor relationships between 
managers and front-line staff as well as weak communication as key challenges. Other 
recurring themes amongst respondents from primary health care facilities in particular were 
lack of support from the district office and unresponsive HR department while hospital health 
workers raised concerns about lack of agency on the part of institutional hospital and human 
resource managers. 
 
In terms of limited support from the district office, there was general consensus amongst 
nurses of all categories in primary health care centres in Gauteng and North West provinces 
that district managers seldom visits clinics and community health centres and these nurses 
were concerned that they were hardly supervised. According to these nurses, district managers 
are mainly interested in getting health statistics and no support whatsoever is offered in 
reaching the targets for such statistics.  
“So do you think they support and motivate us, they don’t. January to January they 
[district managers] don’t come here, you seldom see one of them coming; we are 
not supported, we are just neglected. What they want is statistics at the end of the 
day and continuous workshops, they never come here. Since coming here, I have 
only seen one manager once. And I have worked here for one year six months. We 
need their support, we need them down here.”(Professional Nurse 10, North West 
Clinic) 
“The painful part is that the top management in the district don't know what is 
happening down there. You talk, you report, you phone and all they do is to promise 
and promise. At the end of the day, nothing is done. It’s like they don't care. As long 
as they get their salaries and submit their stats [statistics] every month, they don't 
care what is actually going on at the ground level. Down here is where all the action 
is happening.” (Professional Nurse 8, Gauteng Clinic) 
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Because the district managers rarely visit the clinics and community health centres, they are 
hardly aware of the daily challenges and needs at these primary health care centres. One nurse 
commented as follows: 
“We work under a ceiling that is falling apart meaning that if there can be a big 
storm, the roof will fall. Even in our nurses’ homes, we have insects and they bite us. 
I used my phone to take a picture of these insects and send it to my district manager; 
telling him that ‘look at the things that bite us here’, but still nothing happened.” 
(Professional Nurse 17, North West Clinic) 
 
There was also a strong perception that district managers are unresponsive to the needs of the 
clinics; leading to difficulties in the day to day functioning of the clinics without availability 
of consumables required. One nurse commented as follows:  
“Yes, right now as I am talking to you, I just do my own thing without consulting 
people in the sub-district. We do not have a working facility phone; although we 
have a phone, it does not have airtime. They usually put R700.00 airtime per month 
but the airtime finished on the 16
th
 up till now the phone is still not loaded. Even if 
something can happen here, we don’t know how we are going to communicate with 
them [sub-district managers]. Like yesterday I had to call an ambulance using my 
own phone.” (Professional Nurse 17, North West Clinic) 
 
An overwhelming majority of nurses of all categories from primary health care centres in the 
two provinces pointed out that the HR department was unresponsive, unsupportive and 
inaccessible. For instance, a major concern was that the HR department was outside the 
vicinity of the clinics and community health centres, thus making it difficult for nurses to 
easily access it; especially taking into consideration that the operational hours of these offices 
clashed with the nurses working hours.   
“Our HR is far away, it’s in Hillbrow. So you can only go there at specific times, 
you cannot just show up there. It’s quite difficult especially if you are working since 
our HR doesn't open on weekends. Our office hours here are from 8:00 to 16:00. 
They also work from 8:00 to 16:00. So if you have a problem, you have to take one 
day leave whereas what you are going to do there is work related. When you get 
there, you wait for a long time and they take you from pillar to post. Those are some 
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of the challenges that we face with the HR department.” (Professional Nurse 8, 
Gauteng Clinic) 
“When you want information from HR, it’s a problem most of the time as they are 
situated very far from here and you have to go there physically. You see, where we’re 
situated the [phone] network is very bad and sometimes the [phone] line cuts while you 
are still talking to HR, that’s why we don’t bother with the phone.” (Professional Nurse 
16, North West Clinic) 
 
Poor communication and consultation between management and staff at institution level came 
consistently in the interviews with nurses in hospital and primary health care settings in the 
two provinces. Communication was reported to be rather weak on issues relating to deciding 
on the weekly duty roaster, and payment of night duty and overtime allowances. With regards 
to duty rosters, one lower cadre nurse felt that there was lack of consultation from operational 
managers when compiling duty roasters to ensure that the working times suit nurses: 
“You’ll find that maybe at times a professional nurse or nursing manager is compiling 
weekly duty list but you as a junior nurse you are not consulted. She will not ask you 
which days will be suitable for you to be off work...or if the working days are okay for 
you. She just writes the days down and then when you try to negotiate with her about 
the days that are suitable for you she will tell you about the shortage of staff. So you 
find that this causes job dissatisfaction because you need those days and you won’t get 
them.” (Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
It was also the opinion of some nurses that institutional managers were autocratic; offering 
limited interaction and negotiation with staff. Feelings of fear of victimisation by institutional 
managers were also noted by some respondents: 
“Sometimes it happens that they call you during the night asking you to come and fill 
in because there is no sister in charge [professional nurse] in the hospital. You will 
work without any agreement on how they are going to replace the hours that you 
worked or how are they going to pay you for the hours that you worked. Sometimes 
you’ll just see additional money in your bank account and you don’t know where it 
comes from and when you go and ask them about it they will tell you that ‘it’s your 
money so what do you want, you’ve got the money.” (Professional Nurse, District 
Hospital, North West) 
 
“What they do is just sit there and send us papers. Like now, you are here asking me 
questions, that’s interaction and I’m able to tell you how I feel. But if you are doing an 
interview, the questions they send to us limits us at the same time how can you give me 
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two lines to comment whereas I have a lot to say? Give me five pages so that I can 
write more. So it’s either they are not doing their job or they keep those paper as a 
form of evidence for when so and so comes, they will say ‘here’s evidence, we are 
doing our job’. So that’s my personal view. It’s like in the firms where you are 
supervised by a Boer; you choose what you have to say because you will get fired” 
(Male Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
 
 
Some respondents felt that they were not appreciated by their managers irrespective of the 
efforts they made to perform effectively despite challenging working conditions described 
above. One respondent mentioned that managers were very quick to be judgemental if clinical 
errors occur but were not appreciative if staff does well.  
“And they [managers] will come and ask you why you didn’t do one, two and three. 
And then you tell them that we are only two [nurses] but we have tried to do what we 
can do. And they will tell you ‘no you have to do the entire job and not leave anything 
behind’, never mind how many you are but everything must be done and it must be up 
to date on a daily basis.” (Professional Nurse, District Hospital, North West) 
 
“One mistake you do then they [management] are on your case but when you go all 
out, there’s not even a simple thank you. That ‘oh well we’ve heard you did this and 
that and thank you’, nothing.” (Male Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
 
In one hospital, a human resource manager reported poor communication between the hospital 
management and the unions, where unions were said to be reporting issues still under 
discussion with their members prior to an agreement being reached, thus causing confusion 
amongst staff and exacerbating tensions between HR managers and staff: 
 “We encounter problems with poor communication by the unions. You will find that 
from the union’s side, if we discuss something that is a proposal between the 
employer and the unions, the unions report that to their members while it is still in a 
negotiation phase. Then employees would come directly to HR, and we try to 
emphasize that it’s only the discussion between the union and the employer; we 
can’t give that information because we don’t have anything on paper.” (Human 
Resource Manager 4, Revitalised Regional Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
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4.3.3 Other Motivational and Retention Strategies 
In addition to asking health workers about what attracts and motivates them, human resource 
managers were also asked if at all there were any other current strategies at hospital level to 
motivate and retain health workers. Apart from the HRH interventions being investigated in 
this thesis, human resource managers indicated that other strategies that were used included 
certificates to recognise employees of the year, welcoming parties, celebration of birthdays, 
availability of rest rooms, short training and provision of study leave.  
“We had a function where we awarded people ‘certificates of employee of the 
year’.” (Human Resource Manager 1, District Hospital 5, Gauteng Province)  
“We organise welcoming parties for them. Also, every month we celebrate birthdays 
for our staff members. Also, it’s very few institutions that have tea making machines 
for their staff members, so we had to make sure that we have that. This year we are 
planning to have rest rooms for them.”(Human Resource Manager 3, Regional 
Hospital 10, Gauteng Province)  
 
 
In addition, the Gauteng Health Department initiative to encourage staff that was reported by 
human resource managers included the Khanyisa Service Excellence Recognition Awards, 
which aimed to recognise individuals and groups who have provided excellent service and/or 
developed projects and systems that significantly improved the provision of quality healthcare 
and social services in Gauteng province. 
“For the department, they had those Khanyisa Awards.” (Human Resource 
Manager 2, District Hospital 9, Gauteng Province)  
 
Health sector-wide initiatives that were mentioned by several respondents from both Gauteng 
and North West provinces included the Performance Management Development System 
(PMDS), uniform allowance and housing allowance: 
“And another thing is the PMDS [performance management development system], 
which is a department evaluation where they recognise and reward people. PMDS is 
a system that they use to evaluate employees for a period of twelve months. It’s 
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between the employee and the immediate supervisor; we use the job description for 
the whole period to say this is what is expected from you for this year and then on 
quarterly basis we do reviews.” (Human Resource Manager 3, Regional Hospital 
10, Gauteng Province)  
I know that the nurses get uniform allowance once a year. Previously it was R1 500 
but I heard they are going to increase it.” (Human Resource Manager 1, District 
Hospital 5, Gauteng Province) 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter reported on factors of motivation and de-motivation of health workers as well as 
the human resources challenges that contribute to de-motivation in the facilities that 
participated in this study. Interestingly, the findings also revealed that nurses in particular, 
viewed the primary health care setting as less strenuous and as a preferred setting for working 
towards retirement than the hospital setting. The chapter concluded with highlighting that 
within the facilities and provinces where the study was conducted, there was a culture of 
initiating incentives and this was in the form of Khanyisa Service Excellence Recognition 
Awards in Gauteng province, the health-sector wide Performance Management Development 
System (PMDS), and the uniform and housing allowances amongst others.  
 
While these initiatives are a positive sign of the efforts to motivate and retain health workers, 
an interesting finding of this study was that regardless of these initiatives, nurses in particular 
embraced the opportunity for internal migration from public to private facilities, and from 
clinics to hospitals and vice versa. According to these nurses, their ability to change facilities 
provided more opportunities for their clinical growth. The findings are useful in depicting the 
incentive environment within which the incentive strategies under investigation in this study 
are implemented. The next chapter will discuss the results of two of these interventions, the 
rural allowance and scarce skills allowance.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES ON THE RURAL AND SCARCE 
SKILLS ALLOWANCES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins a series of three Chapters (5, 6 and 7) that forms part of the crux of this 
thesis, which is to describe the policy development and implementation processes of the 
incentive strategies under investigation in this study as well as to present findings on the 
influence of these strategies on the motivation and retention of health workers. In this chapter, 
and the subsequent ones (Chapter 6 and 7), there are two parts; the first part provides a basis 
for understanding the key events and processes that led to the development and 
implementation of the incentive strategies of interest in this study using the Walt and Gilson 
framework. The second part illustrates how the manner in which the incentive strategies of 
interest in this study were developed and implemented may or may not have led to the 
achievement of their intended objectives drawing from the adapted Hertzberg two-factor 
theory conceptual framework in Chapter 2. This will be done by discussing participant’s 
perceptions on the influence of these incentive strategies on the motivation and retention of 
health workers in the facilities that participated in the study. The differences between 
provinces, cadres and setting (hospital and primary health care) will be reflected.  
 
5.2 Description of the Development and Implementation of Rural and 
Scarce Skills Allowances 
Using the Walt and Gilson [198] triangular framework, this section will discuss the emerging 
findings starting with the context within which the rural and scarce skills allowances were 
introduced and this will be followed by the description of the actual content of these 
strategies. The main drivers or actors of the development and implementation of the rural and 
scarce skills policies will then be discussed, including their roles and influences. The findings 
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related to the effects of each stage of the policy process will also be discussed where 
applicable. The results in this section will mainly be based on the document review and the in-
depth interviews with key informants, hospital managers and human resources managers.  
 
5.2.1 Contextual Factors  
A triangulation of interviews with key informants and a document analysis revealed that in 
2004, around the time of the country’s third democratic elections, the South African 
government introduced two targeted financial incentive strategies for health professionals at 
the same time; a revised rural allowance and a scarce skills allowance. Prior to the 
introduction of these allowances, an initial rural recruitment allowance was instituted in 1994. 
A document review revealed that it was later recognised that this recruitment allowance 
needed to be revised following extensive debates in the Public Service Bargaining Chamber 
(PSBC) arguing that this allowance was only granted to doctors and dentists and that it had 
remained at a fixed rate since its inception [169]. These debates then led to the development 
and implementation of these two separate allowances; the rural allowance and the scarce skills 
allowance. 
 
The document review also highlighted that in a period leading to the introduction of the rural 
and scarce skills allowances, the National Department of Health put in place several other 
strategies and policy initiatives to address the inequities in the distribution of health workers 
and the mal-distribution between rural and urban settings (Table 10). This Table also 
summarises some of the contextual influences and broader political and health sector changes 
within which the rural and scarce skills allowances were developed and implemented.  
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Table 10: Timeline of the Policy Initiatives and Key Events in the Development of the 
Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances 
Year Policy Initiatives and Key Events  
1996 – Government recruited first group of Cuban doctors to boost staffing in rural areas. 
Training of medical doctors in Cuba was also initiated. 
1998 – Government introduced community service for doctors and for allied health 
professionals making it mandatory for these health professionals to work in underserved 
areas for 1–year period. 
2004 
 
– South Africa’s third democratic elections where Mr Thabo Mbeki was re-elected as 
president. 
– Government introduced two targeted financial incentives: 
 A rural allowance to attract and retain certain health professionals in rural facilities. 
 A scarce skills allowance to attract and retain certain scarce categories of health 
professionals in the public health sector. 
– Government released a policy on the recruitment and employment of foreign health 
professionals restricting recruitment to persons with verified qualifications and 
competencies to work in underserved areas.  
– Government finalised a bilateral agreement with Iran to allow Iranian doctors to work in 
rural health facilities in South Africa. 
– Government promulgated the National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 with certificate of 
need provision for health professionals wishing to establish a private practice to decrease 
the concentration of health professionals in urban areas. This clause has never been 
enacted.  
2006 – Government appointed a new Deputy Director General for Human Resources.  
– Activists developed a Draft Rural Health Strategy for South Africa to improve health 
services in rural areas in the period 2006-2009. 
2007 – Government signed an agreement to allow recruitment of Tunisian medical practitioners 
for temporary employment in rural areas in South Africa.  
2008 
 
– Government introduced community service for nurses, making it mandatory for nurses 
with 4-year diplomas or degrees to work in the public sector and under-served areas for 
a 1-year period. 
2009 – Government appointed a new Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motswaledi 
2010 – World Health Organisation launched a set of recommendations on increasing access of 
health workers in remote and rural areas through improved retention in South Africa 
2010 – Government appointed a new Director General, Ms Precious Matsoso 
 
With regards to the design of the rural allowance, some policymakers who were closely 
involved during the initial stages of this policy reported that it was introduced to address the 
HRH crisis in the country at that time. In particular, to address the geographical inequities and 
imbalances in the distribution of health professionals between urban and rural areas in the 
public health sector:  
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“My understanding of the rural allowance and the reason for putting it in place was 
based on a very simple principle on how do we encourage doctors and nurses to 
work at specific underserved areas.” (Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service 
and Administration)  
“It was a huge policy problem that we have enormous inequities in the distribution 
of doctors in rural areas. The reason for the rural allowance is that health workers 
tend to drift to cities, so countries put in place incentives like rural allowances to try 
to send most of the health workers to more remote areas.” (Policymaker 7, National 
Treasury) 
 
A document analysis of the 2006 Human Resources for Health Strategy noted that scarce 
skills allowance was designed to ensure that the South African health system possesses an 
adequate supply of health-related skills from which to draw its human resources in the long 
term [8]. However, there was agreement amongst some policymakers that the scarce skills 
allowance was introduced as a temporary strategy intended to retain certain health 
professionals in the public health sector through increased remuneration; hence it was only 
implemented in the health sector:  
“Let me put it this way, when we first thought of the scarce skills allowance, we 
have always thought of it as an interim measure because our view was that if a skill 
is scarce today it may not be scarce tomorrow.” (Policymaker 2, Department of 
Public Service and Administration)  
“Well, scarce skills [allowance] really was seen as a temporary strategy because at 
that time we felt that certain professions were being paid too low and thus it was 
difficult to retain them so we wanted to improve the remuneration of those 
professionals. It was a question of if you were to pay people more, who are the 
categories who are most difficult to attract and retain in the public sector.” 
(Policymaker 7, National Treasury) 
 
Other policymakers believed that in the post-apartheid era, opportunities opened up for 
doctors and nurses to migrate to other countries in pursuit of higher salaries and that this 
prompted the government to initiate strategies like rural and scarce skills allowances to keep 
them in the country. Some commented that: 
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“The argument was that these people have got scarce skills and they are being 
poached by external forces both nationally and internationally. Our doctors were 
leaving us and going internationally and our nurses were leaving us going 
internationally and in the private sector. That was the purpose of the scarce 
skills...just to try to address that.” (Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service 
and Administration)  
“So migration has always been a problem; however I think an increase in migration 
was brought to the fore by the nursing profession because after 1994 [post 
democracy], every South African could go anywhere in the world. It was no more 
the privileges of the white people only. And when nurses started migrating, people 
started seeing heydays because our health system depends a lot on the nursing 
profession.” (Policymaker 1, National Department of Health) 
 
In support of the views from the key informants’ interviews, during the three years prior to the 
introduction of the rural and scarce skills allowances, the media headlines often highlighted 
the human resource crisis in the health sector. For instance, on the 28
th
 April 2000, The 
Citizen newspaper published an article entitled “hospital staff shortage strain” which reported 
that staff losses from the public to the private sector as well as to overseas continued to put a 
strain on the staff who remained. An excerpt from this newspaper is shown below making 
reference to a comment by Dr Zola Njongwe, who was the Chief Medical Superintended at 
Pretoria Academic hospital: 
“Pretoria academic hospital is losing about ten highly qualified nurses a month to 
the private sector and overseas hospitals.” (The Citizen, Health Systems Trust 
News, 28 April 2000) 
 
The analysis of the media releases also revealed that this crisis was not only experienced by 
one province or one hospital, this was a country-wide problem; and the exodus was mainly 
amongst doctors and nurses. The then Health Minister, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was 
quoted in the media sharing figures demonstrating that in 2001: 
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“As many as 3,500 South African health professionals were working in Australia, 
2,360 in Canada, 1,600 in New Zealand, 9,000 in the United Kingdom and 7,000 in 
the United States.” (Cullinan K and Thom A, Health-e News, 18 May 2005) 
 
In July 2002, reporters from The Sunday Tribune newspaper also reported that the ripple 
effect of the nursing brain drain on the South African health system was that there were fewer 
nurses to cope with the crisis, more so, the remaining ones were moonlighting to fill the shifts 
as well as to earn more money. The result of this was in some instances, quality care was 
compromised and this was the case even at private hospitals.  
 
Instead of the situation improving, it was getting worse. In August 2003, The Pretoria News 
reported that the Pretoria Academic hospital was the hardest hit by the exodus of nurses in 
particular, with 550 vacancies reported in late 2003 [239]. Dr Kobie Marais, an Assistant 
Director at this hospital, was also quoted in this newspaper emphasising the human resource 
crisis in this hospital; particularly the influence thereof whereby significant amount of money 
was spend on a monthly basis hiring agency nurses to fill the gap:  
“The hospital has provision for a total nursing complement of 1,600.This hospital, 
like many other hospitals in the province was understaffed and people overworked. 
This year alone, the hospital lost 57 nurses, 22 of whom left for the private sector or 
hospitals abroad. The hospital pay between R1.8 million and R2 million a month to 
agencies that supply us with extra contract nurses. Units like maternity, ICU, and 
theatres, which needed skilled and experienced nurses, were finding it particularly 
hard to cope.” (Mchunu N, Pretoria News, 22 August 2003) 
 
Again, in 2003, Health Systems Trust compiled vacancy figures in the public health sector 
which depicted a bleak picture in most of the provinces. For instance, in Mpumalanga, an 
astonishing 67% of posts were vacant, 41% in the Free State, 33% in the North West, 32% in 
Gauteng, 28% in the Eastern Cape, 27% in the Northern Cape, 25% in KwaZulu-Natal, 13% 
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in Limpopo and 14% in the Western Cape [240]. Health-e News Service, also quoted Dr 
Percy Mahlathi, the then Health Departments Chief Director for Human Resources, stating 
that rural provinces were mostly affected; with posts advertised in provinces such as the 
Eastern Cape receiving zero applications because of the difficulty experienced with attracting 
professionals to such provinces [241]. The Secretary General of the National Education 
Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU), Mr. Fikile Majola, was also quoted saying 
part of the reason why people are not going to rural areas is because working conditions are 
unattractive [241]. 
 
Several other reasons were given for this crisis in the health sector. The government’s budget 
cut for training and the reduction of the number of training colleges for nurses at that time 
were blamed on the crisis [242]. The major reason that was reported for the crisis was the 
difficulty by government to compete with the higher salaries offered abroad [242]. An extract 
from the Business Times newspaper at that time illustrated the differences in remuneration 
overseas compared to South Africa:  
“A recent advert for a post in the UK offers between R256,000 and R448,000 a year, 
while Saudi Arabia nurses can earn an annual tax-free salary of R228,000 to 
R360,000. Compare this with local nurse whose starting salary after four years of 
training is about R62,400 to R64,800 a year. Thereafter, depending on experience 
and qualifications, an average nurse working in the ICU department or theatre will 
earn R84,000 to R96,000 a year.” (Shevel A, Business Times, 2 February 2003) 
 
5.2.2 Policy Content  
According to the rural allowance policy, the intention of this incentive strategy was “to attract 
and retain health professionals to work full-time in public health services in rural, under-
served areas, and other inhospitable areas identified by provincial health departments” 
[243]. The scarce skills allowance policy on the other hand, noted that this policy was 
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intended to attract and retain designated health professional categories working in clinical 
service delivery of the public health sector on a full-time basis, including those in the 
management of the function of their specialities [244]. Although community service doctors 
and interns were eligible for the rural allowance [243], interns were excluded from the scarce 
skills allowance [244]. The then Minister of Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was 
quoted as saying that the rural allowance would benefit 33,000 full-time health professionals 
working in designated areas [245-247]; while the scarce skills allowance was expected to 
benefit 62,000 full-time health professionals in specified categories regardless of the 
geographic area in which they work [245]. The Minister also reported that the government 
allocated R500 million (approximately US$71 million) in 2004, a further R750 million 
(US$107 million) in 2005 and R1 billion in 2006 for the implementation of the rural and 
scarce skills allowances [245-247].  
 
Several similarities were identified with the design of the rural allowance and the scarce skills 
allowance. Firstly, interviews with policymakers and an analysis of the rural and scarce skills 
allowance policies revealed that not all health professionals were eligible and that the 
proportionate increase also differed by professional group [243, 244]. For instance, the rural 
allowance benefitted targeted categories of health professionals working in health facilities 
designated as rural in the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) as well 
as areas designated by the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) based 
on the previous ‘rural recruitment allowance’ (Table 11) [243]. The rural allowance policy 
also listed a total of 13 ISRDS areas and none of these were in the two provinces (Gauteng 
and North West) where this study was conducted [243]. Additionally, the policy listed 142 
PSCBC designated institutions and of these only 16 was from North West province and none 
from Gauteng province [243]. An additional list of 38 areas proposed by Provincial Heads 
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was also included in the policy and of these only 3 were from North West province and none 
from Gauteng province [243].  
 
Table 11: Rural Allowance per Category of Staff by Designated Area  
 
Registered health professionals (categories) 
Percentage Increase  
ISRDS nodes PSCBC designated rural areas 
and other inhospitable areas 
identified by provincial 
departments of Health 
Dental Specialist, Dentist 
Medical Doctor, Medical Specialist 
22% 18% 
Dental Technician, Dietician, Nutritionist, 
Occupational Therapist 
Pharmacologist, Physiotherapist, Psychologist, 
Radiographer, Pharmacist, Speech Therapist 
17% 12% 
Professional Nurses (excluding student 
professional nurse) 
12% 8% 
Source: Public Health and Welfare Sector Bargaining Council Resolution No. 2 of 2004.  
Professional Nurse generically refers to nurses registered with the SANC and not to rank 
Community service workers and interns were included 
 
The ISDRS areas were identified in 2001 by the second democratic government president, Mr 
Thabo Mbeki as the 13 most disadvantaged rural areas requiring urgent development. Other 
areas covered by the rural allowance policy were those referred to as ‘inhospitable’ and these 
were to be determined by the provincial heads of health depending on the availability of funds 
within provincial budgets. The rural allowance policy also noted that the percentage increase 
differed for ISRDS and PSCBC designated and inhospitable areas. Although the difference 
between these was minimal, the percentage increase was slightly higher in ISRDS areas 
(Table 11). Of significance to note in Table 11 is the differential allowance increases paid out 
to the different health worker categories, with doctors receiving the highest allowances of 
between 18-22 percent of their annual salaries while professional nurses got the lowest of 
between 8-12 percent.  
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As with the rural allowance policy, the scarce skills allowance also benefited targeted 
categories of health professionals considered as possessing scarce skills regardless of the 
place where they worked (Table 12) [244]. One policymaker made the following remark: 
“The scarce skills [allowance] is paid to doctors and to certain categories of 
nurses; these are the professionals that we believe we are having difficulties 
retaining.” (Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service and Administration)  
 
Table 12: Scarce Skills Allowance per Category  
 
Registered health professionals (designated categories) Percentages 
Medical and Dental Specialist, Dentist, Medical Doctor, Pharmacist 
Pharmacologist 
15% 
Dental Technician, Psychologist, Dietician, Nutritionist, Occupational Therapist, 
Physiotherapist, Radiographer, Speech Therapist 
10% 
Professional Nurses with qualifications in the following specialities and performing 
functions as pertaining to the following specialities: 
 Operating Theatre Technique 
 Critical Care (intensive care) 
 Oncology 
10% 
Source: Public Health and Welfare Sector Bargaining Council Agreement No. 1 of 2004 
Professional Nurse generically refers to nurses registered with the SANC and not to rank 
 
Table 12 further illustrates that when scarce skills allowance was first implemented in 2004, 
only three nursing specialities (operating theatre, intensive care and oncology nurses) 
qualified for this incentive strategy. Furthermore, professional nurses only qualified for the 
scarce skills allowance if they were working in wards where they could perform the specified 
nursing specialities [244], which meant that specialised nurses with the same qualifications 
but working in other settings were not eligible. The policy documents revealed that the scarce 
skills allowance was exclusively targeted at hospital level health professionals and excluded 
professional nurses in the primary health care (PHC) setting who generally did not possess the 
stipulated nursing specialities. In addition, this policy excluded other critical nursing 
specialities such as midwifery, psychiatry, paediatric nursing and many others. Although  the 
119 
 
2006 National Scarce Skills List of the Department of Labour (DoL) [248] mentioned 
registered nurses and primary health care nurses as scarce skills, this did not necessarily imply 
that these nurses would automatically benefit from the scarce skills allowance. The list was 
mainly intended to emphasis shortages and need within these categories.  
 
An important finding revealed by in-depth interviews across all respondents in this study was 
that both the rural and scarce skills allowance policies excluded the lower categories of nurses 
(staff nurses with 2 years of training and assistant nurses with 1-year training). When asked 
why, one policymaker reasoned that there was no evidence to show that these categories were 
difficult to recruit: 
“We looked at the numbers and the inequities, and generally the inequities are in 
the skilled personnel. There is really no data to indicate that it’s difficult to recruit 
staff nurses to rural areas. The ratios of the staff nurses to population are very 
similar across the country.” (Policymaker 7, National Treasury) 
 
The other health categories that were excluded by these policies were those in the fields of 
environmental health, medical technology and emergency care. A policymaker from a 
provincial health department level raised concerns with regard to the alienation of other health 
professionals by the scarce skills allowance policy: 
“Scarce skills allowance had good intentions because it benefited certain 
categories. But, what it also did was to alienate other professionals thus making it 
difficult for us to appreciate the good it has done.” (Policymaker 3, Gauteng 
Department of Health) 
 
Another similarity between these allowances was that both the rural and the scarce skills 
allowances were awarded retrospectively to July 2003 [243, 244]. As was the case with the 
rural allowance, differential percentages of the scarce skills allowance were awarded for the 
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different health worker categories, with 15% being paid to doctors while professional nurses 
were paid 10% of their annual salaries [244]. Although both the rural and scarce skills 
allowance policies did not stipulate the actual amount that would be allocated for these 
allowances, media releases between 2004 and 2006 quoted the Minister of Health, Dr Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang claiming that an entry-level medical doctor working in a rural area with 
an annual salary of R150,000 (US$21,000; $1=R7 at the time) would gain R15,000 
(US$2,100) per year [245-247].  
 
Interviews with key informants revealed conflicting views with regard to the evidence base 
for the reforms. One key informant from National Treasury commented that research was 
conducted to guide decisions made related to the amounts that were payable and the health 
professionals that had to benefit from the rural and scarce skills allowances: 
“We did quite a lot of research from our side [National Treasury]. Not only our 
research because [department of] health would modify a bit what we did and they 
have their own ideas…so the three departments [National Department of Health, 
National Treasury and DPSA] put quite a great input into the process but I think it 
was fairly researched.” (Policymaker 7, National Treasury)  
 
Another informant from a Professional Association was of the view that the evidence that 
guided decisions was inadequate because it failed to go deeper into investigating how other 
countries are paying their health professionals in order to retain them comparable to South 
Africa.  
“…whatever you are going to implement should be informed by the findings. I think 
there wasn’t proper research done to say what is it that other countries are paying 
[to] keep their doctors. And for this policy [rural allowance] to address all the 
underlying issues, you need to have done thorough research.” (Key Informant 5, 
Professional Association) 
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Based on the document analysis and policymaker interviews, the percentages for both the 
rural and scarce skills allowances and health professional eligibility were supposed to be 
reviewed on an annual basis to ensure equity. Below is a quotation from a National 
Government policymaker commenting about the rural allowance policy as well as an extract 
from the scarce skills allowance policy reflecting this: 
“When the rural allowance was introduced, the Department of Health was required to 
conduct an analysis as part of the agreement. It was supposed to be an annual or every 
third year analysis, I can’t remember the specifics. That would then determine if they 
needed to roll it out further or extend it”. (Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service 
and Administration) 
“The determination of percentages of allowances for the different grouping of 
health professional categories will be subject of annual collective bargaining 
process with the intention of achieving equity.” [244] 
 
Additionally, both rural and scarce skills policies mentioned that after every three-years from 
the date of implementation, the agreements would be subject to re-negotiation [243, 244]. 
These policies also mentioned that termination of payment of both the rural and scarce skills 
allowances could be instituted subject to certain job transfer or promotion circumstances [243, 
244]. For instance, the rural allowance policy noted that if institutions benefitting from this 
strategy were to be reclassified, payment of the allowance may be reviewed or terminated 
after giving affected health professionals three months’ notice [243]. In addition, the rural 
allowance was to be reviewed or terminated in the event of a job transfer or promotion that 
does not qualify for this allowance.  
 
Regarding the scarce skills allowance, the policy mentioned that this incentive could also be 
reviewed or terminated should the health professional be transferred or promoted to a post not 
designated as a scarce skill as well as in the event where the designated occupation groups are 
reclassified. However, during implementation, it appears that this was not as straightforward 
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as anticipated. It was the belief of some hospital managers in North West province that certain 
health workers ‘abused’ the provision of the rural and the scarce skills allowances to secure or 
‘bargain’ for senior positions and higher salary scales. These managers were of the view that 
some health professionals locate to a rural facility only to benefit from the rural and the scarce 
skills allowances which would then put them into a certain salary bracket. They would then 
work for few months in this rural facility and go back to an urban setting to negotiate for a 
counter offer that would be higher than the salary bracket they are receiving. Some 
commented as follows: 
“Scarce skills [allowance] was one of those policies that were supposed to assist but 
the situation is still the same. People are actually using these things [rural and 
scarce skills allowances] to actually bargain.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised 
District Hospital 1, North West Province)  
“Staff would go to Vryburg hospital, work there for three to four months, get rural 
and scarce skills allowance and then they would come back here. Then you are 
stranded, you want them, the next thing they earn more than everybody.” (Hospital 
Manager 7, Regional Hospital 6, North West Province) 
 
Another design similarity, apparent from the policymaker interviews and document analysis 
was that both allowances were awarded by Government as “non-pensionable fixed percentage 
linked to the annual salary notch” [243, 244]. This implied that the percentage amount was 
not used for the calculation of the pension funds of these health workers. One key informant 
commented as follows:  
“The major issue is that both scarce skills and rural allowance are not 
pensionable” (Key Informant 5, Professional Association) 
 
Mack Lukhele, the President of the South African Medical Association (SAMA), the largest 
doctors’ organisation in the country, was also quoted in a Health Systems Trust News report 
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as saying that health professionals were not happy that these allowances were not 
pensionable: 
“Health care professionals were unhappy that the allowances were not 
pensionable.” (Kahn T, Health Systems Trust News, 20 June 2006) 
 
A noteworthy finding from the document analysis was that for both the rural and the scarce 
skills allowances, the rate has remained fixed. This is interesting considering that one of the 
arguments presented at the introduction of the rural allowance was that it was meant to 
replace the earlier 1994 rural recruitment allowance which had remained at a fixed rate since 
its inception. Yet, since its implementation in 2004, no amendments had been made to the 
rural allowance rate. The scarce skills allowance, on the other hand, has since 2007 been 
replaced by the OSD which will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
5.2.3 Actors and their Roles  
In this section, the key actors that were involved in the design and implementation of the rural 
and scarce skills allowances are discussed. However, this cannot be understood without 
giving a brief background of how conditions of service in the public sector are set. In South 
Africa, public sector conditions of service (issues such as remuneration or working hours) are 
determined on the basis of central collective bargaining process between the employer 
(government) and recognised labour representatives (unions or professional associations), in 
line with provisions of the Labour Relations Act [249]. The Public Sector Coordinating 
Bargaining Council (PSCBC) is the country’s largest bargaining structure and the Department 
of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) is also very closely involved in the processes as 
one policymaker stipulated in the quote below: 
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“The allowances are part of the conditions of service. So if the Health Department 
wants to put an allowance in place, they will have to discuss and debate it and then 
we work together as DPSA to say what are the implications of this policy across the 
public service.” (Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service and Administration)  
 
Figure 5 depicts the main actors related to this case study based on the document review and 
interviews with key informants. The Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA) played a critical role during the design phase of the rural and scarce skills 
allowances. According to the DPSA website, the role of one of its seven programmes called 
the Management of Compensation is “to develop and implement compensation policies and 
guidelines for the public sector, to ensure co-ordinated bargaining as well as effective 
programme management for the establishment of the Single Public Service” [250]. In relation 
to the design of the rural and scarce skills allowances, a policymaker from this programme at 
the DPSA stated that his departments’ role was to provide guidance on the technical 
implications of these allowances, to participate in the negotiation processes and, to 
communicate the agreement to all relevant departments once a directive has been issued: 
“We as the DPSA assist in dealing with technical implications, as in how we plan to 
implement it, what are the cost implications and then we engage in the negotiation 
processes. Once the bargaining is finished and an agreement is signed, the Minister 
of Public Service and Administration issues what we call a directive in order to give 
effect to that agreement. This directive then allows all the Departments to implement 
the outcome of the agreement, so that’s our job, to support them in all that and to 
then communicate the agreement after its determination to all the Departments. Our 
own Minister [of DPSA] is the only person who can determine or approve any 
allowance in the Department of Health.” (Policymaker 2, Department of Public 
Service and Administration)  
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Figure 5: Key Actors Involved in Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances Processes  
 
 
According to both the rural and scarce skills allowance policies, the Provincial Departments 
of Health (PDoH) were the key implementing actors [243, 244]. With regards to the rural 
allowance, part of their role was to identify areas that were considered inhospitable [243]. 
One policymaker remarked that this decision came after some provinces such as Gauteng and 
Western Cape were considered urban; as such they were not initially considered to benefit 
from the rural allowance:  
“Basically when it [rural allowance] was introduced, there were certain provinces, 
I think Gauteng and Western Cape being some of them, where initially they felt that 
we shouldn’t even have a rural allowance because we are not rural [provinces]. 
There were all these debates and the HOD’s [Head of the Departments] fought for 
us saying that there are areas that are rural in these provinces. It was then agreed 
that we use the concept of ‘inhospitable’ allowance meaning Orange Farm is not 
rural but it’s inhospitable; people are not attracted there simply because of the way 
it is.” (Policymaker 3, Gauteng Department of Health)  
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Key informant interviews revealed that the National Treasury was responsible for securing 
funds for the implementation of these allowances. These interviews also demonstrated that 
robust debates happened between the National Treasury and the National Department of 
Health regarding the decision to determine which categories of health professionals should 
benefit from both rural and scarce skills allowances. Some from the National Treasury had 
suggested that even professional nurses should not have been eligible for the rural and scarce 
skills allowances, but the National Department of Health argued for a compromise to be 
made.  
“In some provinces, you find that you have excess of certain categories in a poorer 
province but it’s difficult to keep certain scarce personnel in the poorer provinces. 
So from our side [National Treasury], it was based on the numbers but typically, 
Health [Department] was vocal about what they want. In fact, we [National 
Treasury] argued based on the number that even professional nurses should not 
have got rural and scarce skills allowances. When we look at physiotherapists for 
instance, we would say they would have to get these allowances because there is a 
huge differential in their distribution, but as for professional nurses they are always 
there. So the Department of Health made a political argument on that.” 
(Policymaker 7, National Treasury)  
 
The National Treasury and the National Department of Health were also very influential with 
regard to determining the different percentage amounts for the different categories of health 
professionals. A policymaker from National Treasury commented as follows when asked 
about how the percentages were determined for the different categories of health workers: 
“It was part of the trade-off. We didn’t think any nurse should get the allowances for 
the same reasons that I said that the ratio between a nurse in Gauteng and a nurse 
in Limpopo was almost similar whereas the ratio of doctors was 50 to 1 or 20 to 1. 
So we felt that there was no need to give nurses allowances. So the Health 
Department pushed politically for the nurses to be considered. They said, ‘look, we 
would really like to bring in professional nurses but we would bring them at a lower 
level’. (Policymaker 7, National Treasury)  
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The unions, particularly the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA), 
also played a critical role in arguing for the nurses’ interests during the design stages of the 
rural and scarce skills allowances. Other unions that participated in the bargaining discussions 
during the design phase were the National Education and Health Workers’ Union 
(NEHAWU) and the Public Servants Association (PSA). Details of their actual involvement 
are discussed further in the next section.  
 
5.2.4 Policy Process and Challenges 
A number of themes emerged when different groups of participants were asked about the 
process of the design and implementation of the rural and scarce skills allowances. These 
themes, which highlight some of the design and implementation challenges, are discussed 
below:  
 
Contestations between policymakers and unions: 
A media release in 2003 reported that during the design phase of the rural and scarce skills 
allowances, there were contestations between the three labour organisations in the central 
bargaining chamber and the National Department of Health regarding the exclusion of the 
lower categories of nurses [251]. According to this newspaper article, the unions objected to 
only professional nurses being eligible for rural allowance [251]. They therefore argued for 
other health categories, particularly the lower categories of nurses (staff nurses and assistant 
nurses), to also benefit from these allowances [251]. At that time, these unions were refusing 
to sign the agreement, claiming that the government was not consultative when determining 
the criteria for the health professionals eligible for these allowances [251].  
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In a desperate attempt to argue for the inclusion of junior nurses, the document review 
revealed that the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA) proposed to 
the National Health Department at that time that instead of paying backdated amounts to July 
2003, the Department should consider paying from the date of implementation which was 
March 2004 and rather use the money that would have been saved to include other nursing 
categories [251]. An excerpt from this newspaper noted that: 
“The allowances are to be back dated to July 2003, but DENOSA has proposed that 
they [professional nurses] be paid from the date of implementation, the saving can 
be used to accommodate all the categories of nurses.” (Petros N, Business Day, 10 
December 2003) 
 
The unions were also unhappy with the discrepancies between the amounts offered to doctors 
and nurses, arguing that the amounts, particularly for rural allowance should be the same for 
all health professionals in rural areas instead of doctors receiving higher percentages [251]. 
These contestations resulted in delays in signing the agreement to the extent that it was feared 
that the R500 million already earmarked by the National Treasury for 2004 may be withdrawn 
if the agreement was not reached by March 2004. Consequent to this, there was immense 
pressure to implement these two allowances before the end of the 2003/04 financial year to 
avoid the possibility of losing the money. A review of the directives from the Provincial 
Departments of Health to their Directors and Heads of Regions and Institutions highlighted 
this pressure to implement these allowances as follows: 
“The allowances came into effect from 1 July 2003 and should be paid without any 
further delay. The last supplementary salary runs for the 2003/4 tax year will be 
from 20-22 February 2004. You are therefore requested to ensure that all 
transactions are captured and approved by PERSAL [Personnel and Salary 
Information System] by no later than 16 February 2004.” [252]  
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Therefore, this made it difficult for DENOSA to pursue its proposal further and it ultimately 
succumbed to pressure and signed the agreement; with the lower categories of nurses not 
included in the final agreement.  
 
Definition of ‘rural’ at provincial discretion and interpretation: 
The interviews with key informants and hospital managers indicated that there were problems 
with the implementation of the rural allowance policy. At least four policymakers and all 
hospital managers from the two provinces reported that the National Department of Health 
left the decision on what constitutes ‘rural areas’ at the discretion of provincial health 
departments. Provincial health departments then designated ‘rural areas’ without national 
oversight for consistency within or across provinces, thus leaving room for uncertainty and 
subjective interpretation of this policy. For awarding rural allowances, the provincial 
Department of Health also relied on an outdated list of hospitals that excluded a number of 
rural institutions [253]: 
“I think rural allowance was most appropriate but it was not necessarily 
implemented correctly because the declaration of what is rural depended on the 
provinces. And the problem is that if you leave any policy to individual 
interpretation, you’ll actually have a problem.” (Policymaker 1, National 
Department of Health) 
“The designation of an area that is considered rural appears to be vague and is left 
at the discretion of the local authorities. This has created a lot of problems.” (Key 
Informant 5, Professional Association) 
 
One hospital manager even reported that for her hospital to be considered for rural allowance, 
management at the hospital had to write a motivation letter to the Provincial Department of 
Health arguing that their hospital should be considered because they were struggling with 
attracting and retaining health workers:  
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“The initial implementation was not good because Hospital [X] was not amongst the 
hospitals considered for rural allowance, so the nurses in our hospital were not 
getting it, and it was dearly causing a lot of problems because we could not attract 
and retain personnel but after we wrote the motivation letter, it was then included.” 
(Health Manager 9, District Hospital 7, North West Province) 
 
Another hospital manager was of the view that the provincial government should have 
classified areas based on the distance people travel to access essential services.  
“I think they should have classified ‘rural’ in terms of distance, in terms of being far 
from cities. Although we have the basic services, but they are far and there is a lot 
travelling that we do here in order to get basic services.” (Hospital Manager 3, 
Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province)  
 
Exclusion of certain nursing specialities to benefit from scarce skills allowance 
According to the scarce skills allowance policy, only three nursing specialities (oncology, 
theatre, and intensive care) were targeted to benefit from this incentive strategy [244]. There 
was general concern amongst professional nurses in the two provinces that this allowance 
excluded other nursing specialities. For instance, nursing with a primary health care (PHC) 
qualification was initially not covered by this policy but ended up benefiting in some facilities 
after the 2006 Department of Labour National Scarce Skills List specified them as scarce 
skills. Although this list did not necessarily imply that PHC nurses should benefit from the 
scarce skills allowance, it contributed to the variation in the implementation and interpretation 
of the scarce skills allowance as some facilities paid out the scarce skills allowance to PHC 
nurses while others did not. In addition, midwives at the primary health care setting were 
regarded by most respondents as an important scarce skill that should have been considered 
for this incentive but were not. This became even more confusing for some professional 
nurses when nurses with a PHC qualification were later included as scarce skills but midwives 
were not. One nurse remarked as follows: 
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“The same thing applies to the midwives that we have here. They don't consider it 
[midwifery] as a scarce skill and yet the midwives have undergone a one year 
course for midwifery and the PHC nurses have also done a one year course for 
PHC. What is the difference? It’s worse because a midwife is an independent 
practitioner who does everything by themselves while a PHC nurse refers patients to 
the doctors all the time. Where is the scarce skill really according to your 
observation?” (Professional Nurse 9, Gauteng Province Community Health Centre)  
 
One key informant commented that during its design stage, it could have been better if the 
context was considered for determining what constitutes a scarce skill mainly because 
depending on the context, a scarce skill in one province or facility might not be regarded as 
such in another setting.  
“I think there is room for acknowledging that there are certain people that have 
specialised skills and those people should get scarce skills allowance. But then I 
don’t think scarce skills was adequately defined. You must also remember that 
scarce skills is context specific where you find that in Gauteng a scarce skill is only 
a certain skill and if you go to the Northern Cape or Limpopo that scarce skill is 
completely different. So for me, I think the manner in which scarce skills should 
have been defined should have been context specific; provincial and field specific.” 
(Policymaker 6, Statutory Body)  
 
Weak communication and coordination 
Considering that both rural and scarce skills allowances excluded certain categories of health 
workers, one policymaker reported that there was weak communication in relation to the 
rationale for excluding certain categories of nurses to benefit from rural allowance. This 
respondent further noted that clear communication was also not provided to the hospital 
managers by the Provincial Department of Health to enable these managers to provide reliable 
information to the nurses who were not eligible to benefit from this policy. A professional 
nurse from a district hospital in North West province concurred with this policymaker:  
“There was no clear communication to the nursing profession resulting in 
confusion. I’m not saying that the policy was not clear, I’m saying that the 
132 
 
communication was not done to make people to understand what the rural 
allowance was for, who qualified for it, what are the implications for implementing 
it? And even managers within health services also found it difficult to understand 
[the policy]. As a result, when nurses queried whether they are eligible or not, the 
responses they got were often not helpful.” (Policymaker 6, Statutory Body) 
“We have tried to question why other nursing staff was not getting it [rural 
allowance] and we didn’t get full explanation. They only told us that only 
professional nurses qualify for this.” (Professional Nurse, District Hospital, North 
West) 
 
These views were also expressed in relation to scarce skills allowance. Professional nurses 
from primary health care settings in the two provinces reported that clarity was not provided 
on why only certain nursing specialities were eligible to benefit from scarce skills allowance 
and not others:  
“We don't know how many years you should have before you get the money for the 
scarce skills, if you have got the skill.” (Professional Nurse 6, Gauteng Clinic) 
“I still have unanswered questions regarding scarce skills allowance, of which I am 
trying to get somebody to answer them but nobody is answering.” (Professional 
Nurse 10, North West Clinic) 
 
However, according to an excerpt from the directive circulated to the Heads of the Provincial 
Departments of Health and Human Resources Managers on the 29
th
 January 2004, the design 
of the rural and scarce skills allowances was done in a consultative manner: 
“It followed a process of extensive consultation with a variety of stakeholders.” 
[252] 
 
Lack of monitoring and evaluation 
One of the key design limitations of the rural and scarce skills allowance policies was that 
there were no monitoring and evaluation plans with clear indicators to enable policymakers to 
identify potential implementation challenges timeously. Although both these policies 
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mentioned that annual reviews would take place [243, 244], this did not happen. Interviews 
with key informants showed that the Department of Health has not conducted a review nor 
has it evaluated the effectiveness of these allowances: 
“I can’t say whether rural allowance is effective or not, because we haven’t done 
research. I am not sure whether the allowance brought more doctors and health 
professionals into those areas and secondly if at all they were retained there”. 
(Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service and Administration) 
“I don’t think anybody in the department did any study to really ascertain if the 
scarce skills allowance really made the difference, we didn’t do it and I am not 
aware if any other province did that.” (Policymaker 3, Gauteng Department of 
Health) 
 
5.3 Perceptions on the Influence of Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances 
In the previous section, the description of the development and implementation processes, 
including challenges of rural and scarce skills allowances was provided. In this section, I will 
share key findings on how the successes and failures of the design and implementation of the 
rural and scarce skills allowances contributed to their impact on the motivation and retention 
of health professionals. The findings are based on the in-depth interviews with key 
informants, nurses of all categories, hospital CEOs, human resource managers as well as a 
survey with nurses and doctors. This will be reported according to six main themes 
highlighted in Table 13 below: 
 
Table 13: Dominant Themes identified for Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances 
 
1. Rural and scarce skills allowances partially improved recruitment.  
2. Scarce skills allowance encouraged nurses to specialise. 
3. Rural allowance did not take into account the remoteness of area.  
4. Rural and scarce skills allowances not linked to performance. 
5. Rural and scarce skills allowances were seen as divisive incentives. 
6. Financial incentives ineffective if implemented in isolation. 
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5.3.1 Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances Partially Improved Recruitment 
In general, across the different groups of respondents, both rural and scarce skills allowances 
were regarded as good policies in principle: 
“Scarce skills allowance had good intentions because you know, it applies to certain 
categories.” (Policymaker 3, Gauteng Department of Health)  
“I think rural allowance was the most appropriate policy...” (Policymaker 1, 
National Department of Health) 
“Yeah, scarce skills [allowance] is really a good policy. Since the health workers 
were really underpaid, anything that increases their scales is really a good thing. So 
scarce skills was really a good thing that they introduced it.” (Professional Nurse 
10, Gauteng Province CHC)  
 
In the quantitative survey, nurses of all categories and doctors were asked whether the rural 
and scarce skills allowances influenced their attraction, motivation and retention. The findings 
in Table 14  illustrate that only a small proportion of hospital-based health workers receiving 
the rural and scarce skills allowance thought that the incentives had influenced their 
attraction, motivation or retention. Clinic health workers concurred that neither allowance had 
influenced attraction but over 60% of health professionals in clinics agreed that receiving the 
rural or scarce skills allowance had increased their motivation and retention (Table 14). The 
difference between hospital and clinic health workers was significantly different for 
motivation for the rural allowance (Χ2 test, p=0.02), and for retention for the scarce skills 
allowance (Χ2 test, p=0.03). 
 
The qualitative findings on the one hand reflected mixed views amongst all groups of the 
respondents in relation to whether the rural and scarce skills allowances influenced the 
attraction, motivation and retention of health professionals. For instance, some respondents, 
particularly the hospital managers, remarked that both the rural and scarce skills allowances 
had enticed health professionals to the public sector:  
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“Since our hospital was included as rural and our nurses started getting rural 
allowance, we were able to attract more nurses and retain them. Rural allowance is 
partially effective.” (Hospital Manager 9, District Hospital 7, North West Province)
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Table 14: Perceived Effectiveness of the Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances 
 
Allowance Hospital Clinic  
Receiving rural allowance 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
*P-
Value 
Yes 11.4% 
(n=66) 
Rural allowance attracted me to come and work 
for this facility 
24.0 6.4 70.0 28.8 0.0 72.2 0.503 
Rural allowance motivates me to do my job 
better 
28.5 6.7 65.0 61.1 5.6 33.3 0.021 
Rural allowance encourages me to remain 
working in this facility 
31.1 13.3 55.6 61.1 11.1 27.8 0.080 
Receiving scarce skills allowance 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
P-Value 
Yes 11.1% 
(n=64) 
Scarce skills allowance attracted me to come 
and work for this facility 
20.4 14.3 65.3 30.8 15.4 53.8 0.701 
Scarce skills allowance motivates me to do my 
job better 
38.0 12.0 50.0 61.5 0.0 38.5 0.204 
Scarce skills allowance encourages me to remain 
working in this facility 
30.0 12.0 58.0 69.2 0.0 30.8 0.027 
Satisfaction with rural and scarce skills allowances 
Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
P-Value 
 N=66 
Satisfaction with rural allowance (for those 
getting RA) 
70.6 100.0 71.4 29.4 0.0 28.6 0.449 
 N=64 
Satisfaction with scarce skills allowance (for 
those getting SSA) 
70.4 83.3 86.7 29.6 16.7 13.3 0.306 
*Chi square test
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“They [rural and scarce skills allowances] are effective in terms of drawing people 
there bringing people there, creating the presence of professionals in the facilities.” 
(Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North West Province) 
 
Other hospital managers were of the view that scarce skills allowance contributed to the 
retention of certain specialised nurses:  
“Our theatre nurses are here, they didn’t go away.” (Hospital Manager 2, District 
Hospital 8, Gauteng Province)  
 
Amongst nurses who were getting rural and scarce skills allowances and who felt that these 
incentives were effective, it was reported that these allowances boosted their salaries and 
enabled them to pay their debts. This view was particularly voiced by professional nurses 
from primary health care settings:  
“Let’s say I’m satisfied with scarce skills [allowance]. I benefit a lot from it because 
at least I can meet some of my needs.” (Professional Nurse 13, North West CHC) 
 “It [rural allowance] has helped me a lot because with this allowance I am able to 
pay certain debt; that is why I think it is effective.” (Professional Nurse 20, North 
West Clinic) 
“At least the rural allowance boosts our income a bit.” (Professional Nurse 16, 
North West Clinic) 
 
Another hospital manager, who was a radiographer by profession, reported that when he was 
still practising as a radiographer, getting the scarce skills allowance used to boost his ego and 
confidence through knowing that he was earning more than his other colleagues: 
“It’s [scarce skills allowance] effective, I used to get it as a radiographer and it 
made a huge influence and it also boosted my confidence because you know you are 
earning more than this one. That’s what it has done for me.” (Hospital Manager 7, 
Regional Hospital 6, North West Province)  
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In contradiction to these positive responses, other respondents mentioned that both the rural 
and scarce skills allowances were ineffective. In one study hospital from the North West 
province, we were told by the Clinical Manager during data collection that eight doctors had 
resigned in a period of six months. Other respondents commented that:  
“Rural and scarce skills [allowances] never attracted me here. You can see the 
effect that people are gone, that means if rural and scarce skills allowance were 
effective, people would stay here” (Medical Officer, District Hospital, North West 
Province) 
“The rural allowance did not necessarily make nurses to be thousand when they 
were twelve.” (Hospital Manager 5, Revitalised District Hospital 3, North West 
Province) 
 
According to some respondents, scarce skills did not serve as an incentive to attract doctors in 
particular because all doctors received it regardless of where they were located: 
 “If I work in Kimberly I get it [scarce skills], if I work in Cape Town I still get 
scarce skills. So that would not attract anyone from Cape Town to work at this 
place.” (Medical Doctor, Regional Hospital, North West) 
 
One hospital manager was of the view that even with the implementation of rural allowance, 
it is still difficult to attract young health professionals to the rural facilities. This manager 
further stipulated the difficulties of trying to recruit health professionals to posts in rural areas 
that were not attractive to them.  
“Mmh, so now before a person comes here they ask themselves many questions 
especially the young ones. And the second challenge is to attract them to this area. 
It’s like they don’t find this area attractive because it’s a rural area. So sometimes 
you don’t get responses to adverts. You advertise but you don’t get candidates.” 
(Hospital Manager 3, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province) 
 
Other respondents commented that in general, financial incentives may be effective in 
addressing short-term financial needs but that they have limited long-term impact.  
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“You give people rural allowance but salary excites you for the first three-four 
months. Once you re-adjust your financial commitments it is no longer enough. And 
we know the more you earn the more you want and that’s basically the challenge, it 
doesn’t make sustainable influence.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District 
Hospital 1, North West Province) 
“You can give people a million [rands] but after a year they will go.” (Medical 
Officer, District Hospital, North West Province)  
 
5.3.2 Scarce Skills Allowance Encouraged Nurses to Specialise 
There was consensus amongst hospital managers and different categories of nurses at hospital 
and primary health care settings that an unintended positive outcome of the implementation of 
scarce skills allowance was that it encouraged nurses to specialise; even though this was 
mainly for financial gains. This could have been because this incentive strategy was targeted 
at only three nursing specialities namely oncology, theatre and intensive care. Two years after 
its implementation, nurses with a PHC qualification were also included to benefit. Therefore 
nurses tended to specialise in these fields in order to benefit:   
“A lot of people were not interested in doing PHC (primary health care) but now 
there is a lot of interest.” (Professional Nurse 8, Gauteng Clinic) 
“We had more people applying for theatre, so you could see that they are going the 
route of acquiring scarce skills qualifications where they would gain financially.” 
(Hospital Manager 2, District Hospital 8, Gauteng Province) 
 
One nurse even reported that prior to the implementation of scarce skills allowance, 
admission to specialise in Primary Health Care used to be easy, but that stricter admission 
requirements have since been applied since the qualification is now in high demand: 
“At first you would have to apply to do PHC and there was no way they could not 
accept you but now they don't admit people like before. They go through their 
applications and they choose who they want. I don't know which criteria they use. It 
is no longer like before whereby if you had applied you knew that you are in even if 
they have not responded. Now they just decline people and choose a few to show 
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that there is more people applying to go to school.” (Professional Nurse 8, Gauteng 
Clinic) 
 
Although nurses acknowledged that they needed to specialise in order to benefit from the 
scarce skills allowance, a number of them commented that the number of years it takes before 
they are released to further their studies was a hindrance. Because of staff shortages, when 
nurses request to be released for study leave they are in most cases denied such opportunities 
and several of them mentioned that the waiting can take as long as 10 years before being 
considered. This view was expressed by nurses of all categories from the two provinces and 
from hospitals and clinics:  
“You find that you want to go to school [to specialise] but they don’t want to release 
you because they think that there will be a gap, who is going to work in your space 
while you are gone.” (Professional Nurse 17, North West Clinic) 
“They just told us to go to school but they don’t create a chance for us to go. They 
will tell you to wait for 10 years and when you are getting old, they then send you to 
school. And I hate that thing about hospitals because they don’t want us to go to 
school.” (Staff Nurse, District Hospital 9, Gauteng Province) 
“If you could have a look at the students, they are very old and if you ask them for 
how long they’ve been working at the hospital you’ll be shocked.” (Assistant Nurse, 
Revitalised District Hospital 4, Gauteng Province) 
 
5.3.3 Rural Allowance did not take into Account the Remoteness of the Area 
When the rural allowance was implemented, there was differentiation in percentages between 
the rural nodes. Health professionals located in ISRDS areas got between 12% and 22% while 
their counterparts in PSCBC rural areas and those areas identified by provinces received 
between 8% and 18%. Regardless of this, there was a unanimous view amongst hospital 
managers and all groups of health professionals that participated in this study that the 
implementation of rural allowance did not take into consideration the remoteness of an area.  
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“The problem with rural allowance is that the rural allowance [amount] that a 
person gets here [deep rural area] is just the same amount that a person gets in 
Vryburg [rural town]. So a person doesn’t see any difference of why should they 
stay here whilst they could get what they get here in Vryburg you see? The semi-
rural should receive lower percentage than the extreme rural.” (Health Manager 3, 
Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province) 
 
In addition, other respondents were critical that the allowance does not make up for the lack 
of amenities in deep rural areas as well as the distance a person had to travel to get to town for 
basic necessities:  
“I get rural allowance; it’s about two thousand rands [per month]. For me to get to 
town just for a decent meal at a restaurant I have to travel for about 80km. There 
are no recreational facilities here. So you actually spend that money on transport 
anyway.” (Medical Specialist, Regional Hospital, North West Province)  
For the rural doctors to get a pizza, he has to travel 70 km a single trip.” (Key 
Informant 5, Professional Association) 
 
Even some professional nurses who were receiving the rural allowance in a clinic setting 
complained that this allowance does not take into account the distance that they have to travel 
to get to work:  
“Eish it’s too little. I thought when they were talking about an allowance they were 
going to calculate it according to the distance from where you are working. Maybe 
if it was calculated that way it could be satisfactory but up to so far I’m not happy 
about it.” (Professional Nurse 16, North West Clinic)  
 
The issue of the distance to get to work was also expressed by some of the junior nurses since 
all of them were excluded from benefiting from this allowance. One assistant nurse expressed 
her sadness of not receiving rural allowance as follows: 
“It’s very painful that I’m not getting rural allowance, I travel plus minus 70 kilos 
[kilometres] and there is no transport to get here. Even though it’s the same village, 
it’s very far from where I stay.” (Assistant Nurse 5, North West Clinic) 
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Although in hindsight it seemed like the higher percentages in ISRDS areas aimed to 
accommodate the deep remote areas, the interviews with health professionals and hospital 
managers further demonstrated that the amount was considered too low relative to the benefits 
that health professionals in urban areas have. For example, some respondents mentioned that 
unlike rural health professionals, those working in urban areas had better quality of life and 
that doctors in particular are able to do locums to supplement their salaries.  
“…the amount that you get in rural allowance you can make up for that. They get 
the rural allowance however a doctor who is here in Joburg who is also a medical 
officer can go and do locums. They even make more money from the locums than 
rural doctors.” (Key Informant 5, Professional Association) 
“The doctors who are working in the urban areas make more money than the rural 
allowance. And this low income is not fulfilling for the rural area, at the end of the 
day, doctors in urban areas can acquire more money and a better quality of life.” 
(Medical Officer, District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
5.3.4 Discrepancies of Allowances between the Different Health Worker Categories  
Considering that nurses’ salaries are generally far lower than that of the doctors, some 
participants expected that the nurses’ percentage of the rural and the scarce skills allowances 
would have been higher than that of the doctors but this was not the case. These participants 
commented as follows regarding the discrepancy of the percentages between doctors and 
nurses: 
“The discrepancy between categories is too big because you will find that nurses get 
8% and doctors get 18%. The gap is just too wide.” (Hospital Manager 9, District 
Hospital 7, North West Province)  
“If you look at the wage, people cannot live on R5,000. The living wage can't be 
under R5,000.” (Professional Nurse, North West Clinic) 
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5.3.5 Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances not Performance-Based  
A number of respondents noted that the provision of rural and scarce skills allowances was 
not linked to performance of health professionals. This view was shared mainly by hospital 
managers and different categories of health professionals; with one professional nurse from a 
North West clinic arguing that acquiring a scarce skill does not necessarily translate to 
improved performance if years of experience are not taken into consideration:  
“According to me, they must also consider your performance because you might 
have that scarce skills but you might not be able to perform with that. So I would say 
they have to consider the years of experience that one has.” (Professional Nurse 10, 
North West Clinic) 
 
Other participants noted that if rural allowance was effective in motivation, there would be 
high productivity amongst health workers and improved quality of care. 
“Hey rural allowance does not motivate staff because if it was motivating them to 
do more, we would be seeing high productivity of which it doesn’t make the 
difference.” (Hospital Manager 3, District Hospital, North West Province) 
But they [rural and scarce skills allowance] don’t address issues of quality and 
issues of access.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital, North West 
Province) 
 
5.3.6 Rural and Scarce Skills Allowances seen as Divisive Incentives 
Policymakers, hospital managers and health workers (doctors and nurses) at hospital and 
primary health care settings consistently perceived the rural and scarce skills allowances to be 
divisive because these allowances excluded the lower categories of nurses. Even those who 
benefitted from these allowances shared these sentiments: 
“Doctors and professional nurses are given rural allowance but certain categories 
of nurses are not given, I think that is totally wrong.” (Medical Officer, District 
Hospital, North West Province) 
144 
 
“The rural allowance has created a lot of confusion so is the scarce skills 
allowance. I think basically with both the rural allowance and the scarce skill 
[allowance]…people were very dissatisfied about the manner in which it was 
implemented also that there are some categories of people that benefited from these 
allowances, some people did not benefit.” (Policy Maker 6, Statutory Body) 
 
A unanimous view amongst almost all categories of health professionals, especially nurses 
working in hospital setting, was that both rural and scarce skills allowances failed to take into 
account that health professionals work as teams. Some remarked as follows:  
“When a patient arrives, we know what to do before the professional nurses even 
attend to the patient. And there are instances when we even help them [professional 
nurses] to give service. So for rural allowance to not even cover us it’s not nice.” 
(Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
“I think it’s not effective especially for the team. In theatre, they work as a team; 
you’ve got your enrolled nurses and everybody there. But only doctors and 
professional nurses are receiving it.” (Hospital Manager 7, Regional Hospital 6, 
North West Province)  
“The same applies to scarce skills allowance, yes it’s there but for whom? Who is 
not specialising? Yes a PHC nurse sees patients but does that PHC nurse attend to 
all patients alone? No! The scarce skills [allowance] is based on one person, 
forgetting that others are also doing their part.” (Professional Nurse 9, Gauteng 
CHC)  
 
The exclusion of the lower cadres of nurses from the rural and scarce skills allowances has 
had unintended negative consequences. Nurses of all categories, especially those in hospitals, 
reported that when professional nurses who received the rural or scarce skills allowances 
requested assistance from the lower nursing cadres, these nurses would refuse indicating that 
the professional nurses should do the job on their own because they got allowances. In 
general, the ineligible cadres felt that their exclusion was unfair and this made them feel 
undervalued and dissatisfied:  
“The rural allowance is only paid to professional nurses. Enrolled nurses and 
assistant nurses are not getting rural allowance. This thing causes a lot of conflict 
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because sometimes if you work with a registered nurse and she wants you to assist 
her, you say to her ‘do your work, you are getting rural allowance’.” (Staff Nurse, 
District Hospital, North West) 
“If a PHC nurse cannot do it and I can except that I don’t have a certificate, is it 
fair? Others end up not wanting to help because how can you come and ask me for 
help since you are supposed to know it all.” (Professional Nurse 9, Gauteng CHC)  
 
Interestingly, the interviews with the lower cadres of nurses showed that some of them had 
some level of understanding and acceptance of the rationale for being excluded from 
benefiting from the scarce skills allowance. For instance, some of these nurses in both 
provinces and in hospital and primary health care setting reported that those who have 
specialised skills deserved to get the scarce skills allowance:  
“We are not trained for those things [specialised qualifications] that they require to 
get that money, so I don’t expect to get it [scarce skills allowance] because I don’t 
have the skills. The rural allowance I think I deserve to get it but the scarce skills 
allowance I don’t have theatre tech [qualification] so I don’t deserve to get it.” 
(Staff Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province)  
 
However, other junior nurses felt that they should have been given at least a lower percentage 
of what the professional nurses were getting from the scarce skills allowance instead of not 
being recognised at all.  
“Let me say when it comes to scarce skills [allowance] at least they should give us 
half of what the sisters [professional nurses] are getting because we know that they 
are more educated. Like maybe R200 to show that I am working with a sister that 
has a speciality. As I have mentioned they have primary health care [qualification] 
and they teach us also. I’m not denying that we gain knowledge from them but at 
least if they give us R200 this would mean we work well and we would be happy.” 
(Staff Nurse 1, North West CHC)  
 
5.3.7 Financial Incentives Ineffective if Implemented in Isolation 
An overwhelming view amongst most participants (nurses, doctors, hospital managers and 
policymakers) was that financial incentives alone are insufficient to motivate and retain health 
146 
 
professionals; a range of other factors were also perceived as important. For instance, for 
those health professionals working in either hospital or primary health care settings who have 
children, the choice of working in a particular area would vastly depend on whether the area 
has good schools for children:  
“The strategy should not only be about money. It is true money helps, but if you 
have kids that go to school, you won’t come here because there are no good 
schools.” (Medical Officer, District Hospital, North West Province)  
“As for now, retaining them is so difficult. They usually stay but they eventually go 
because of schools, we are in a small Afrikaans-speaking town; so their kids 
couldn’t get schools here. So the reason for them not staying is that now they have 
kids and they have to attend English medium schools. One of the main reasons that 
make people not to come here especially if they are not South African is that there 
are no schools with English as a medium. So even if a person has accepted the offer, 
they would cancel because of the school.” (Hospital Manager 9, District Hospital 7, 
North West Province) 
 
Other factors that were mentioned by a number of participants included unavailability of 
accommodation for health professionals in rural areas, safety, limited opportunities for 
training, lack of support from managers and unavailability of resources. One professional 
nurse from a community health centre in Gauteng province commented as follows: 
“Sometimes money alone doesn’t make a person happy. Okay, you can go to a rural 
area just to get the rural allowance if maybe you really need money. But if you are 
not used to working in a rural area, you will be frustrated because most of the time 
in rural areas they don't have all the equipment or whatever resources you are 
supposed to be using, so it can be frustrating work-wise but okay financially.” 
(Professional Nurse 10, Gauteng Province CHC)  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has begun to explore some of the complexities of designing and implementing 
two financial incentive strategies, the rural allowance and scarce skills allowance and how 
these may have influenced the motivation and retention of health professionals. In general, 
both rural and scarce skills allowances were regarded as good policies which were partially 
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successful in enticing health professionals to facilities in the public sector. To a certain extent, 
these allowances have boosted the salaries of health professionals who received them. The 
data presented in this chapter also showed that the scarce skills allowance encouraged an 
increasing number of nurses to specialise in order to gain financially from this allowance.  
 
However, one of the notable aspects of the design of the rural and scarce skills allowances 
was that these strategies were targeted at certain health professionals, thus excluding other 
categories from benefiting. This led to these incentive strategies being considered as divisive. 
The unintended consequence of this was the erosion of team spirit amongst nurses of all 
categories. This may have implications for the quality of care provided which is critical in 
light of the continuous media reports related to the poor quality of care in many public sector 
facilities. Another key design feature for these two allowances was the differentiation in the 
amounts that were paid out to health professionals; with professional nurses receiving the 
lowest amounts. This raised issues of equity whereby some respondents argued that 
professional nurses should have been considered for higher percentages payable because of 
the wide salary gap between doctors and nurses. Another key implementation feature of these 
two allowances was weak communication, particularly to those that were excluded from 
benefiting from these allowances. In addition, because of failure to put in place monitoring 
and evaluation systems, there were limited opportunities for correcting emerging 
implementation challenges.  
 
Overall, this chapter highlighted the importance of paying attention to process factors if these 
financial incentives were to achieve their intended purpose. The next chapter will examine the 
design and implementation of the OSD and its influence on the motivation and retention of 
health professionals.  
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY ON THE OCCUPATION 
SPECIFIC DISPENSATION (OSD) FOR NURSES 
 
6.1 Description of the Development and Implementation of OSD for Nurses 
6.1.1  Contextual Factors  
The document analysis and interviews with key informants and policymakers revealed that 
the introduction of the OSD was in part, a direct response to the exodus of health 
professionals to developed countries in search for better salaries and working conditions. For 
instance, research published by Health Systems Trust in 2005 demonstrated that 27% of 
public sector posts for health professionals, amounting to approximately 46,000 jobs, 
remained unfilled [247]. Even after almost three years following the implementation of the 
rural and scarce skills allowances, media releases continued to paint a bleak picture with 
regard to the human resources for health situation in the country. For example, one news 
article reported that doctors were leaving the country in large numbers.  
“Many doctors leave the country after doing community service and there is a sense 
that not enough is done to encourage them to stay.” (Cullinan K and Thom A, 
Health-e News, 18 May 2005) 
 
Furthermore, on the 17
th
 January 2007 the Gauteng MEC for Health, Mr Brian Hlongwa, was 
quoted emphasising the plight of health professionals in Gauteng province as follows: 
“Johannesburg hospital alone spent more than 19 million in payments for agency 
nurses in 2005, more than three times what the hospital spent in 2003 because 
nurses are leaving faster than they were being hired.” (Benjamin C, Business Day 
Newspaper, 17 January 2007) 
 
The Gauteng MEC continued to report that as nurses left the public hospitals, patient care was 
compromised in critical units such as intensive care, casualty and theatre. Interestingly, two of 
these units (intensive care and theatre) are the ones that were targeted and benefitted from 
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scarce skills allowance in 2004; thus raising concerns about the influence of this allowance in 
retaining health professionals.  
“Between 2003 and 2005, more than 218 nurses were hired by the hospital 
[Johannesburg hospital] and 406 nurses left, leaving Johannesburg hospital short of 
staff, affecting areas such as intensive care, casualty and theatre.” (Benjamin C, 
Business Day Newspaper, 17 January 2007) 
 
Therefore, in July 2007, the South African government introduced OSD to attract, motivate 
and retain health professionals in the public health sector [254]. When key informants were 
asked about factors that led to the agreement on OSD, they concurred with the document 
analysis that this strategy came about because of the migration of health professionals as well 
as the geographical imbalances between urban and rural areas and the mal-distribution 
between the private and public sectors.  
“I think people were leaving in such large quantities from our continent that 
countries needed to do something and that's when it [OSD] happened’. 
(Policymaker 8, National Department of Health)  
“I think it's a lot of things, I don't think it's only one thing. But I think one of the 
most burning issues was the lack of nurses in the country, there was such a shortage 
of nurses in our country, in the entire country, private and public sectors.” (KII 8, 
Gauteng Department of Health)  
 
Prior to the announcement of the OSD by the National Department of Health, nurses made 
history in June 2007 by participating in a month-long country-wide public sector strike related 
to dissatisfaction with wages. Recognising the significance and implications of this strike, on 
the 12
th
 June 2007, a press release from the South African Nursing Council (SANC) pleaded 
with the nurses to return to work and respect patients’ right to care. This appeal from SANC 
Executive Committee (Exco), as extracted from the document analysis, read as follows: 
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“To the nurses, please return urgently to work to care for our community. To the 
general public, please protect the safety of nurses and allow them to return to 
work.” [255]  
 
Media reports at that time implied that this protracted public servant strike led to the 
development of OSD. However, several key informants disagreed with this. According to 
these respondents, the strike only accelerated the implementation of the OSD:  
“The strike came after the OSD was already thought of.” (KII 3, Nursing Union) 
“I wouldn’t say the strike of 2007 specifically led to the OSD agreement; but of 
course the strike overall assisted.” (KII 18, Nursing Union)  
“I think it [OSD] was in the pipeline, these other issues just contributed to the 
urgency.” (KII 8, Gauteng Department of Health) 
 
The document review supported interviews with key informants. On the 6
th
 June 2006, the 
South African Health Minister, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was quoted in a media release 
revealing plans to improve the remuneration of health professionals working in the public 
sector, which according to her was a neglected issue: 
“We accept that over the past few years, the remuneration of health workers has 
lagged behind those of other public sector workers. We are working closely with the 
Department of Public Service and Administration and National Treasury on 
developing a revised remuneration structure for health workers. This should be 
implemented in the next financial year.” [256]   
 
In her statement during the signing of the OSD agreement on the 14
th
 September 2007, the 
Minister of Health further confirmed that the engagements around the OSD policy had been 
longstanding: 
“The signing of this agreement today is a culmination of extensive engagements that 
has taken place for more than five years.” [257]  
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It also emerged from the document analysis that following the strike action, there was a 
collective bargaining process to conclude an agreement on OSD. The Minister of Health 
speech on the day the OSD agreement was signed confirmed this: 
“You will recall that after the strike, we met as the Department of Health and 
organised labour and committed ourselves to earnestly engage in a collective 
bargaining process to conclude an agreement on the OSD for nurses.” [257]  
 
Nursing was identified as the first occupation category to benefit from the OSD. When the 
key informants were asked about the reasons for prioritising nursing, there was consensus 
amongst them that the public health sector was losing nurses more than any other health 
category because of international migration of health professionals. There was also 
consideration that the previous incentive strategies, rural and scarce skills allowances, had 
favoured doctors more than nurses as one policymaker commented as follows:  
“Now it [implementation of OSD] started with nursing, the reason why it started in 
nursing was because that’s the biggest single category of health professionals. Our 
health services rely on nursing. And we were very clear that unless we start with 
nursing, there’ll be serious problems because the dispensation of scarce skills and 
rural allowance favoured doctors. We said if we do that again, we are going to have 
a problem.” (Policymaker 1, National Department of Health) 
 
In terms of the political and economic circumstances of the country at that time, the design 
and implementation of the OSD coincided with the 2007/2008 global economic crisis 
although South Africa officially entered recession in May 2009 [258]. Again, the country 
underwent frequent changes with regard to the leadership at the health department; for 
instance the position of the Minister of Health was held by three different people between late 
2008 and early 2009. However, these political changes in leadership did not have any 
substantial influence on the implementation of the OSD.    
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6.1.2  Policy Content  
The three primary official OSD documents from which this section will draw were:  
a. The PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2007 which outlines the broader OSD policy for all 
public sectors;  
b. PHSDSBC Resolution 3 of 2007 which was specifically recognised as the OSD policy 
for nurses; and  
c. 2007 DPSA Directive on the Implementation of OSD for Nurses.  
 
According to the PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2007, “the intention of the OSD was to improve the 
ability of the public service to attract and retain skilled professionals and other specialists by 
providing differentiated remuneration dispensation for the vast number of occupations in the 
public service” [259]. Table 15 shows the specific objectives of the OSD as extracted from 
Resolution 1 of 2007 and Resolution 3 of 2007 policy documents.  
 
Table 15: Objectives of the Occupation Specific Dispensation 
 
 To improve the public service’s ability to attract and retain skilled employees 
 To cater for unique needs of the different occupations 
 To provide adequate and clear salary progression and career pathing opportunities based 
on competencies, experience and performance  
 To recognise relevant experience on appointment from outside the public health sector 
 To consolidate benefits and allowances into salary  
 To provide for the replacement of the Scarce Skills Framework with a revised salary 
structure 
Source: PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2007 and PHSDSBC Resolution 3 of 2007 
 
A review of the OSD policy documents further revealed that: 
 The OSD benefits would be based on the relevant experience and duties that the 
beneficiaries (nurses) were performing as of 30
th
 June 2007. 
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 The OSD was to be implemented over a three to five year period with effect from 1 
July 2007. 
 The OSD was intended to provide adequate salary progression for employees who 
chose to remain in clinical care instead of moving to management or specialist 
positions. 
 Employees on salaries already higher than the new salary scales were to retain their 
existing salaries. 
 The Rural Allowance was not affected by the implementation of the OSD; the 
employer (the Department of Health) would still continue paying this allowance until 
re-negotiation in the PHSDSBC.  
 
 
PHSDSBC Resolution 3 of 2007 recognised Registered Nurses (Professional Nurses), Staff 
Nurses (Enrolled Nurses) and Nursing Assistants (Enrolled Nursing Assistants) as defined in 
section 30 and 31 of the Nursing Act as categories who should benefit from the OSD [254]. 
The OSD policy further clarified that for them to benefit, these nurses were expected to 
maintain registration with the SANC as well as to submit proof of certificates and registration 
of such certificates with SANC [254, 260]. Nurses were also expected to produce service 
records proving their length of service as nurses in the public sector, and to submit these by 
the 30
th
 March 2008 [254, 260].  
 
A press release by the National Department of Health on the 15
th
 January 2008 revealed that 
OSD was to benefit 100,000 nurses employed by the government before March 2008 [261]. 
The Minister of Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was quoted saying: 
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“The implementation of this agreement [OSD] is an enormous task as there are 
about 100,000 nurses employed in the public sector and for each of these employees, 
a separate translation transaction has to be effected.” [261] 
 
Subsequent to signing the Resolution on OSD for nurses, the Minister of Health also 
announced that nurses were going to receive salary increments of between 20% and 80% 
[257, 261]. At the signing of a collective agreement on OSD, the Minister of Health was 
quoted as saying: 
“I am very excited to announce to our nurses that as a result of the agreement [on 
OSD] we have signed today, the entry level salaries for Staff Nurses will increase by 
20%. The entry level salaries for Nursing Assistants and Professional Nurses in 
general nursing will both increase by 24%. Certain professional nurses serving in 
speciality areas could subject to appointment requirements receive up to 88% 
increases at production levels depending on their current salary positions.” [257]  
 
Table 16 depicts how the entry level salaries of the different categories of nurses were 
expected to be affected by the implementation of the OSD [257]. 
 
Table 16: Nurses Salary Adjustment in Line with OSD 
Current Job Title 
Starting 
Salary Before 
7.5% 
Adjustment 
Starting 
Salary After 
7.5% 
Adjustment 
(Pre-OSD) 
OSD Starting 
Salary 
Percentage 
Improvement 
Professional Nurse (Specialty) R79,407 R85,362 R160,470 88% 
Professional Nurse (General) R79,407 R85,362 R106,086 24% 
Staff Nurse R54,222 R58,290 R70,140 20% 
Assistant Nurse  R40,227 R43,245 R53,757 24% 
Source: Press Release by the Department of Health, 14 September 2007 
Of importance to note from the OSD policy and press releases by the Department of Health 
was the fact that these OSD salary adjustments were in addition to the 7.5% general salary 
adjustment reached based on inflation following the negotiations at the end of the public 
service strike in June 2007 and that these increases were to be paid retrospectively with effect 
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from 1 July 2007 [254, 257, 261]. The huge salary increases in the speciality area in particular 
were primarily attributed to the incorporation of the scarce skills allowance into these nurses’ 
salaries (Table 16).  
 
The OSD policy for nurses also stated that the Department of Health, as the employer, was to 
ensure that funds were set aside to implement the approved revised salary structures per 
identified occupation [254]. The OSD policy and the DPSA directive further noted that for the 
2007/08 financial year, the funds for the implementation of the OSD for nurses would be 
allocated in the provincial budgets [254, 260]. According to the Minister of Health, an amount 
of approximately R1,458 billion was allocated by the National Treasury for the OSD for 
nurses in 2007 [257, 261].  
 
In the OSD policy, several key concepts are listed as critical in understanding differentiation 
in the remuneration of nurses and these included ‘grade progression’, ‘grade level’, ‘pay 
progression’, ‘post promotion’, ‘post level’, ‘performance’, ‘competencies’, and ‘experiential 
competency’ [254, 259, 260]. Although Annexure A of the OSD document for professional 
nurses provides definitions for some of these concepts, these definitions are broad and open to 
interpretation [262]. For instance, ‘competency’ is defined as “the specific knowledge, skills, 
judgement and personal attributes required for a health professional to practice safely and 
ethically in a designated role and setting” (p2) [262]. This definition was too vague 
considering that every health professional is expected to have the “required skills and 
knowledge” and to “practice safely and ethically”.  
 
The DPSA directive, clause 7.7 detailed that “grade progression is not an automatic salary 
increase but it is a forward-looking plan to systematically increase salaries after pre-
determined periods based on specific criteria such as sustained above average performance, 
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qualifications and experience for at least 4 annual performance cycles” [260]. Although 
employees expected to benefit as part of grade progression (Appendix 4) indicated this was 
only for achieving above average performance. There was however also no clear measurable 
and systematic indicators to determine the criteria for above average performance in the OSD 
policy.  
 
With regard to career path, the OSD policy recognised specified post-basic clinical 
qualifications as listed in Regulation 212 of the South African Nursing Council. This list is 
shown in Table 17. A notable element from Table 17Table 17Error! Reference source not 
found. is that in terms of midwifery and psychiatry, only the advanced one-year post-basic 
courses were recognised as specialities. With regard to the primary health care stream, a 
further one-year post basic over and above the R425 qualification (diploma or degree in 
nursing) was required for recognition purposes. The OSD incentive does also not cover 
professional nurses and staff nurses who are still students.  
 
Table 17: Nursing Speciality Fields in R212 
 
 Child Nursing Science 
 Community Nursing Science 
 Gerontological Nursing Science 
 Medical and Surgical Nursing Science 
 Advanced Midwifery and Neonatal 
Nursing Science  
 Advanced Psychiatric Nursing Science 
 Paediatric Nursing Science 
 Advanced Paediatric and Neonatal 
Nursing Science 
 Intensive Nursing Science 
 Oncology Nursing Science 
 Operating Theatre Nursing Science 
 Ophthalmic Nursing Science  
 Orthopaedic Nursing Science 
Source: Annexure A – OSD Professional Nurses Policy  
 
 
6.1.3 Actors and their Roles  
Figure 6 illustrates the key actors that were mentioned by key informants in relation to the 
OSD policy processes. This figure demonstrates that the important actors from the health 
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sector included the National and Provincial Departments of Health as well as the Nursing 
Unions. Almost all key informants agreed that overall leadership in the development of the 
OSD policy was shared between the National Department of Health and the DPSA. The 
Bargaining Council, on the one hand, played a coordination role and managed stakeholders 
involved during the OSD negotiations while the National Treasury, on the other hand, played 
a key role of allocating funds to implement this policy.  
 
Figure 6: Key Actors Involved in the OSD Processes 
 
 
 
 
National Department of 
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 Human Resources Policy, 
Research & Planning 
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Provincial Department of 
Health  
 Human Resources Policy, 
Research and Planning 
Portfolio 
 Hospital Managers (CEOs)  
 Facility level Human 
Resource Managers  
 Nursing Managers 
 
Recipients 
 Professional Nurses  
 
Non-Recipients  
 Professional Nurses, Staff 
Nurses, Nursing Assistants 
Health Sector Unions 
 Democratic Nurses 
Organisation of South 
Africa (DENOSA) 
 National Education, Health 
and Allied Workers’ Union 
(NEHAWU) 
 Health and Other Service 
Personnel Trade Union of 
South Africa 
(HOSPERSA) 
 Public Servants Association 
(PSA) 
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Some key informants commented as follows:  
“It was the National Department of Health that drove the process primarily; and 
obviously DPSA got involved in formalising it. I think both drove the development of 
the policy very much. I think the money was determined by the Financial 
Committees and the National Treasury.” (KII 8, Gauteng Department of Health)  
“The Bargaining Council played a central role because the coordination took place there 
and the stakeholders were all managed there. Each stakeholder had to come and defend 
its own mandate and also there were bilaterals between the department and the various 
stakeholders.” (KII 20, Nursing Union)  
 
A unanimous view amongst key informants representing organised labour was that the 
nursing unions were very instrumental in protecting nurses’ interests during the OSD 
negotiations. Aside from the reasoning that nurses were prioritised because of the recognition 
that they are the backbone of the health system, intense lobbying by organised labour, 
particularly by the Democratic Nurses Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA), contributed 
to nursing being identified as the first occupation category to benefit from the OSD. One key 
informant commented that: 
“Well, DENOSA was in the forefront of the OSD, in fact we were just about the only 
union that wanted the OSD since its inception. Remember DENOSA raised the issue 
of the OSD through the general review of the nursing salaries; it has been 
DENOSA’s call since its inception” (KII 20, Nursing Union) 
“They [DENOSA] have been sitting in the Bargaining Council, so they played a role 
in trying to get the OSD out there. (KII 27, Nursing Manager) 
 
However, the main area of contention was in relation to the prioritisation of nurses over other 
health professionals during the design of the OSD policy, especially among the labour 
organisations in the central bargaining chamber. DENOSA was criticised for promoting 
elitism in the sense that OSD was not being given to all public sector employees at the same 
159 
 
time, possibly causing divisions amongst public servants as illustrated by the following 
quotes:   
“At that time, government said I have got X amount of money to improve the 
salaries of health professionals, but it is not enough to improve the salaries of 
everybody. Now all of us as health professionals had to say ‘start with us’ so it was 
so difficult. So when we thought that we had convinced the government to start with 
the nurses, when it went to the Bargaining Chamber with other trade unions, we 
were seen as people that were promoting elitism. We were asked ‘why only nurses, 
what about cleaners?” (KII 18, Nursing Union) 
“Other unions used to say, ‘no the OSD is promoting elitism, it is dividing workers.’ 
So there were opponents within and outside of the trade union movement. People felt 
that this was an elitist thing, it was dividing the public servants in the sense that we 
are not giving it to everybody, we wanted to single out a particular category of 
public servant and not paying the cleaner or whatever other professional.” (KII 20, 
Nursing Union) 
 
The provincial Department of Health, particularly the Human Resource Policy, Research and 
Planning division, played a critical role during the design of the OSD. Interviews with nurses, 
hospital managers and human resource managers revealed that at hospital level, the CEOs, 
Human Resources Managers and Nursing Managers were primarily responsible for the 
implementation of the OSD. Other personnel that played a role according to interviews with 
hospital and human resource managers included district managers, administration officers and 
human resources clerks. Interviews with hospital managers also demonstrated that in at least 
three hospitals in Gauteng province, task teams were established to assist with the 
implementation of the OSD.  
 
Interviews with key informants further revealed that there was discernible tension with regard 
to the involvement of some professionals without a nursing background during the 
development and implementation of the OSD as these ‘non-nursing’ professionals were 
considered to be less knowledgeable about the complexities of nursing specialities, principles 
and issues:  
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“You know it was difficult because most of the people involved and working on the 
OSD were non-nursing professional people. So it was difficult sometimes to explain 
to a non-nursing person certain [nursing] principles.” (KII 8, Gauteng Department 
of Health) 
 
 
6.1.4 Policy Process and Challenges 
A review of the OSD policy and interviews with key informants, hospital managers and 
human resource managers demonstrated that the implementation of the OSD was undertaken 
in two phases. Phase 1 involved a salary adjustment to include the 7.5% general increase 
based on inflation following the strike as well as an increase to the entry level salaries of all 
categories of nurses; by 20% for staff nurses, 24% for assistant nurses and professional nurses 
in general nursing, and 88% for professional nurses with specialties. Phase 2, on the other 
hand, involved a salary adjustment based on the number of years of relevant experience of 
nurses in the various categories. Media releases and interviews with key informants also 
revealed that the OSD implementation required a complex series of events. The Minister of 
Health was quoted on the 14
th
 December 2008 in her statement on the progress made in the 
implementation of the OSD referring to the complexity of implementing this incentive 
strategy, bearing in mind that 100,000 nurses of all categories were expected to benefit from 
this strategy: 
“The implementation of this agreement [OSD] is an enormous task…For each of the 
employees; a separate translation transaction has to be approved. Most provinces 
also had to adjust their nursing organisational structure to allow for the transition 
from the old dispensation to the OSD.”  
 
The implementation of the OSD was decentralised, meaning that the responsibility for 
implementation, including funding was delegated from national to provincial health 
departments and from the province down to the district, sub-district and facility levels. It was 
positive to note that almost all facilities in both Gauteng and North West provinces reported 
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using the OSD policy, better known as Resolution 3 of 2007, as a resource for 
implementation. Figure 7 summarises the process of OSD implementation at institution level 
as described by hospital manager and human resource managers in North West and Gauteng 
provinces. An important element that seemed to have worked well in the implementation of 
the OSD at institution level was the establishment of task teams. Hospital managers who 
reported that a task team had been established in their facilities mentioned that they had fewer 
implementation challenges. This was because these task teams met regularly and created an 
opportunity for implementers to bounce ideas with task team members to ensure that there 
was some level of uniformity in understanding of the OSD policy.  
“One of the reasons for the success of the OSD process was the formation of the 
task teams prior to implementation.” (Assistant Nursing Manager, Central Hospital, 
Gauteng Province) 
“For us it was a bit better because we formulated a committee locally so that 
whatever we do go through the committee for them to audit things and to make sure 
it’s correct. We consulted them if there were misunderstandings or questions of 
clarity.” (Hospital Manager 4, District Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
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Figure 7: Process of OSD Implementation at Institution Level 
 
As with rural and scarce skills allowances, the design and implementation of the OSD was not 
without challenges. These are explained in detail according to several themes below: 
  
Rushed implementation of the OSD 
As mentioned in the section on contextual factors, the protracted strike accelerated the 
implementation of the OSD; however, this influenced the ability of the government to plan 
adequately. There was thus consensus amongst hospital managers in both Gauteng and North 
West provinces that the OSD was implemented in a rushed and pressured manner.  
“I think the way OSD was implemented, it was in a rush, there were deadlines to say 
on a certain date implementation must start. It was putting a lot of people under 
pressure. I think it would have been done smarter if it was done at a natural pace 
and everybody has been comfortable with the implementation (Hospital Manager 4, 
District Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
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In addition, insufficient time was allocated for the training of the implementers at institution 
level, there was no reference made in the OSD policy as to who would be trained on OSD 
implementation or the length of the training, so this aspect was neglected. Interviews with key 
informants suggested that OSD implementation was also dependent indirectly on other 
agencies such as the South African Nursing Council (SANC), as nurses were required to 
submit proof of their registration and specialised qualifications with the SANC. An informant 
from a nursing union blamed the SANC for failure to record the relevant nursing 
qualifications. 
“I must say SANC nearly failed the [nurses] on OSD; there are things in SANC that 
we must correct, around the registration of certain courses, accreditation of courses 
and so forth because we have a large chunk of nurses who were left out of the OSD 
because they are not regarded as speciality.” (KII 20, Nursing Union) 
  
 
On the other hand, SANC shifted the blame on the nurses for their tardiness in registering 
their qualifications and only doing so when these were required as part of the OSD 
implementation. Nurses were also required to produce their length of service record. 
However, in planning for OSD implementation, consideration was not taken that in general, 
nurses move around and that in some instances, a single nurse might have worked in a 
number of provinces; thus requiring additional time to collate proof of length of service from 
different provinces.  
Lack of recognition of the complexities of nursing specialties 
In the formulation of the OSD policy, the policymakers did not take into account the 
complexities of the various nursing specialities. One respondent remarked as follows: 
“Nursing is a complicated profession, there are different specialities. So nursing 
OSD is not as straight forward as any OSD. I think there were grey areas in the 
implementation of OSD or no clarity” (KII 27, Nursing Manager)  
 
164 
 
This policy design weakness led to inconsistencies and challenges during implementation. A 
general concern by several key informants and nurses of all categories, particularly those 
working in hospital settings, was in relation to Regulation R212 which was used to determine 
nursing specialties. According to these respondents, this regulation was not a comprehensive 
list of the overall nursing specialities; it thus excluded a number of existing nursing 
specialities. One nursing manager commented that using Regulation R212 was in a way a 
strategy by the National Health Department to minimise the number of specialties that was 
supposed to benefit from OSD because the Department of Health was initially not aware that 
there are so many nursing specialties:  
“Another interesting thing about specialities is that by the time the National Health 
tried to get a list of what are specialities, they [National Health] couldn’t believe 
that there can be so many specialities. And then they started to think about how can 
they limit or put more boundaries to what specialities are. They then went to the 
Nursing Council and the Nursing Council gave them what I would call the petty 
Regulation 212 because Regulation 212 is not comprehensive of what specialities 
are in nursing and they just used R212. So if you are not on 212 specialities, then 
you are out.” (KII 27, Nursing Manager)  
 
The OSD policy also lacked clarity on how nurses with more than one speciality were to be 
rewarded. Furthermore, a “grandfather” clause was introduced that allowed nurses who 
worked in a speciality area, but without the formal qualification, to benefit from OSD. On the 
other hand, those with the formal qualification, but not working in the specialised area could 
not benefit. This resulted in unhappiness among those nurses and movement of some nurses 
out of managerial positions back to their specialised area or work where OSD was paid. One 
hospital manager said: 
“Another area which was not very clear was the grandfather clause for the 
maternity section. You know, we are sitting on a time bomb with the midwives that 
are working in the maternity ward that don’t have advanced midwifery. They also 
want to be recognised because they are working in maternity ward. They are 
unhappy and now and then they threaten to request themselves out of maternity 
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ward, they want to go to general wards.” (Health Manager 4, District Hospital, 
Gauteng) 
 
A review of a report by the Public Servants Association (PSA), one of the unions, showed that 
another challenge related to specialities was that due to internal rotation policies, particularly 
in hospitals, nursing staff in specialities were requested to rotate to non-speciality areas whilst 
they were paid according to their field of speciality. However, non-speciality nursing staff 
who were rotated to fields of speciality did not receive additional remuneration associated 
with the specialities, whilst they performed the duties of specialised nursing [263]. A letter by 
the Principal Specialist and Head of one Gauteng hospital to the SANC chairperson noted 
some of the concerns related to specialities: 
“Fewer registered nurses are choosing to work in medical wards following the 
implementation of the OSD. This is because medical nurses do not qualify for OSD 
as there is no recognised post-basic qualification in medical nursing. Consequently, 
there are fewer registered nurses in medical wards and care of medical inpatients is 
severely compromised.” (Principal Specialist and Head, Regional Hospital, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
Varied interpretation and implementation of the OSD  
A dominant view across all groups of respondents and across different health facilities was 
that the OSD policy was interpreted differently. Key informants, hospital managers and 
nurses of all categories pointed out that in both study provinces, implementation varied across 
health facilities at the same level, and also between primary health care facilities and 
hospitals.  
“There have been lot of provincial variations; the problem with the OSD is that one 
province interpreted it like this and another province interpreted it like that in spite 
of the fact that there have been national guidelines.” (Policymaker 8, National 
Department of Health) 
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“As I have mentioned, it [OSD] was implemented differently for the clinics and 
hospitals. The amounts at clinics are higher than the ones at the hospitals.” 
(Professional Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
Inadvertently, OSD contributed to further ‘imbalances’ in the distribution of nurses between 
hospital and primary health care facilities as well as between provinces. Professional nurses 
particularly those in hospitals, tended to move from certain crucial departments such as 
casualty where they were needed most to other wards that were recognised as specialities such 
as theatre or intensive care in order to benefit from the OSD. Others reported considering 
moving to other provinces where their specialities were recognised for higher OSD benefits: 
“Somewhere in North West [Province], I heard OSD is being paid to psychiatry 
nurses; we’ll all be moving to North West so that we can get the money.” 
(Professional Nurse, Regional Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
 
Weak communication and coordination 
Prior to and during the implementation of the OSD, nurses received information from the 
media and their labour organisations. It appears from interviews with nurses and key 
informants that there were many mixed messages sent out to nurses. For example, at the time 
when the OSD was announced in the media, it was promoted more as a general nurses’ salary 
increase, neglecting an emphasis on the key underpinnings which are stipulated in the policy 
such as ‘career path’, ‘pay and grade progression’, ‘competencies’ and ‘performance’. This 
resulted in disappointment and unrealistic expectations among nurses: 
“In the news, it was said that nurses will get a lot of money”. (Nursing Assistant, 
Regional Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
“Unfortunately in the eyes of the nurses, it [OSD] was more about the salary 
increment. Nurses look at their salary and say ‘no, but this thing [OSD] did not 
benefit me’. (KII 2, Nursing Union) 
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Communication and coordination between the National Department of Health and provinces 
was also inadequate, and it was not clear what support was given to provinces during 
implementation or how the provinces in turn supported the districts and hospitals. It was also 
not clear whether and how coordination happened between the SANC and the provinces or 
health facilities. In addition, nowhere in the OSD policy were the general responsibilities of 
multiple implementation partners explicitly stated (e.g. provincial level, hospital and human 
resource managers) as well as the steps required for effective implementation. One hospital 
manager commented as follows: 
“Provinces did as they wish, that’s why a nurse in here can be paid differently from 
a nurse in Eastern Cape or a nurse in Limpopo province. For me, the current system 
does not work because provinces are independent entities; national [government] 
usually can say here is a guideline and provinces can decide on how they implement 
it.” (Hospital Manager 7, Provincial Hospital, North West Province)  
 
In terms of the sequencing of events, the announcement on the OSD was made by the 
Minister of Health, Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang prior to ensuring that sufficient resources 
were in place, such as the required financial and human resources. For instance, financial 
resources were not made available immediately for individual hospital managers. This on its 
own created a lot of confusion and dismay amongst nurses and hospital managers. One 
hospital manager said: 
The people who planned it [OSD] are wrong because you can’t plan to give people 
money whilst you don’t have that money at hand. In our case, we had to pay the 
nurses even though we didn’t budget for OSD. It was said that the budget for OSD 
will come from the province, but it never came at that time. (Hospital Manager 9, 
District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
In the design of the OSD policy, frontline nurses and hospital managers were not involved; 
this was an unfortunate exclusion considering that hospital management are the ones that face 
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the brunt of any unintended consequences of policy implementation. Some nurses commented 
as follows: 
“I think in the decision making, they must involve us because you find that they do 
things at higher level yet it's not going to suit us at the grassroots level.” 
(Professional Nurse 17, Central Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
“Nurses who are hands on were never consulted before [OSD] implementation” 
(Professional Nurse 24, North West CHC) 
 
6.2 Perceptions of the Influence of the OSD on Motivation and Retention 
This section seeks to report on whether the manner in which OSD was implemented had any 
influence on the motivation and retention of nurses. This will be done by reporting on three 
key themes shown in Table 18Error! Reference source not found. below:   
 
Table 18: Dominant Themes identified for the OSD 
 
1. Partial effectiveness of the OSD on the motivation and retention of nurses 
2. OSD seen as a divisive incentives 
3. Inequities in the OSD implementation 
 
6.2.1 Partial Effectiveness of the OSD on the Motivation and Retention of Nurses  
Regardless of the implementation challenges mentioned above, there was general agreement 
amongst respondents, especially the key informants, that the OSD was a good policy which 
was informed by the human resource problems in the public health sector illustrated by the 
following comments:  
“Well, in theory it [OSD] was a brilliant idea and it should have gone a long way to 
solve some of the problems.” (KII 7, Gauteng Department of Health) 
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“The OSD was a good idea, what we need to do now is to look beyond the monetary 
aspects of OSD and look at the career path issues.” (Policymaker 8, National 
Department of Health) 
 
However, there were ambivalent feelings across respondents with regards to whether the OSD 
achieved what it was intended to achieve or not. Key informants and hospital managers in 
particular, reported that the OSD attracted nurses from overseas back into the country and 
from the private to the public health sector:  
“I have realised that when I was in PE, just before I came here, the introduction of 
the OSD attracted a lot nurses from the private sector…when I came here in 2008 
February, we employed about 160 nurses from the private sector.” (KII 10, Eastern 
Cape Department of Health)  
“…turnover was high…there was a time when we were really struggling to recruit 
nurses, but I must say the OSD made a huge difference because we are able to 
recruit people from private sector and we also got two nurses from overseas.” 
(Hospital Manager 4, District Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
 
However, these findings were in sharp contrast with the survey results which found that the 
OSD only attracted 18.7% and 27.8% of the nurses to hospitals and clinics respectively (Table 
19). The results from the survey also showed that the OSD was partially effective in 
motivation, with half of the participants from hospitals and 62.5% from clinics reporting that 
it motivated them (Table 19). In addition, more respondents from clinics mentioned that OSD 
was effective in their retention than hospital respondents and this difference was statistically 
significant (Χ2 test, p=0.02). Half of the clinic respondents who got the OSD also reported 
that they were satisfied with the OSD compared to only 31.9% of hospital respondents, 
however this difference was not significant (Χ2 test,  p=0.074).  
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From the in-depth interviews with the nurses, those that reported being motivated by the OSD 
mentioned reasons related to the fact that this incentive boosted their salaries, thus enabling 
them to better manage their financial commitments as illustrated in the quotations below:  
“Yes, it motivates me because I used to be unhappy at work thinking of the people 
that I owe money, thinking they would send me to jail or something. Now I am able 
to focus on my work.” (Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
“It [OSD] boosted our salaries. Yes, I’m happy but it’s not something to discuss 
with others that did not get it.” (Professional Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
A hospital manager from North West province added that OSD also enabled the nurses to 
afford some material things that they had always desired.  
“In a way, it [OSD] has made them [nurses] happy because they have been able to 
attain the things they wanted like cars and other stuff. So in a way, it has boosted up 
their morale… to a certain extent.” (Hospital Manager 3, District Hospital, North 
West Province) 
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Table 19: Perceived Influence of the OSD on Attraction, Motivation and Retention 
Allowance Hospital  Clinic  
     
Receiving OSD 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Disagree  
(%) 
 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%)  
Disagree  
(%) 
P-value 
         
Yes 30.4 % 
(n=176) 
OSD attracted me to come and work for this 
facility 
20.0 9.0 71.1  27.8 12.9 59.3 0.264 
OSD motivates me to do my job better 49.6 7.9 42.5  62.5 10.7 26.8 0.138 
OSD encourages me to remain working in this 
facility 
39.0 7.1 53.9  46.4 17.9 35.7 0.023 
Satisfaction with OSD 
Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
 
Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
P-value 
 n=167 
Satisfaction with OSD amount (for those 
getting OSD) 
31.9 6.2 61.9 
 
50.0 5.6 44.4 0.074 
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Due to its emphasis on nursing speciality, there was general agreement amongst key 
informants that the introduction of the OSD did in fact encourage nurses to improve their 
qualification as well as to specialise.  
“We have now also seen more and more nurses improving their education by going 
on to specialise because they know immediately after specialising, they would then 
get into the higher notches and so forth.” (KII 20, Nursing Union) 
 
However several nurses, especially staff nurses and assistant nurses working in a hospital 
setting, expressed dissatisfaction with the limited opportunities available to them for further 
training. These nurses reported that there was no uniform criterion for identifying candidates 
to do bridging courses to enable them to become professional nurses; different hospitals 
applied different selection criterion leading to inequities and lack of transparency towards 
those competing to do further training.  
 
6.2.2 OSD was seen as a Divisive Incentive Strategy  
Because it was interpreted differently between and within provinces and institutions, as with 
rural and scarce skills allowances, OSD was seen as a divisive incentive strategy. The unions 
were particularly blamed by some key informants for this division amongst nurses, arguing 
that the unions failed to grapple with the realities that nurses on the ground are facing.  
“The unions have actually divided nurses without even knowing because that OSD is 
selective, it's meant for certain people. Now, how do you decide that this nurse is 
providing better nursing care than the other in such a way that this one should be 
recognised and the other not? So, the unions themselves did not grapple with this 
issue of OSD in a way that it should have been. I don’t know how informed are 
nurse leaders in the unions in relation to the real nursing issues.” (KII 17, Nursing 
Academic)  
“They [DENOSA] have been sitting in the Bargaining Council, so they played a role 
in trying to get the OSD out there. But what was interesting to me was that when it 
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was implemented, it was as if DENOSA was on the side of the provinces who wanted 
to pay nurses less.” (KII 27, Nursing Manager) 
 
This problem of OSD being perceived as a divisive strategy was due to several reasons. As a 
result of sub-optimal human resource information system, there was an undercount of the total 
number of nurses in the public health sector by 10,000 individuals. Although this was a policy 
design problem, it had ramifications during implementation and raised concern amongst some 
key informants about the management of this incentive strategy. Hence, the implementation 
of the OSD proved to be more expensive than previously planned, illustrated by these 
comments from key informants: 
“And then our information system became a challenge for the country. It became 
clear that the government doesn’t know how many nurses they actually have. I 
remember they were even roughly quoting figures saying they had whatever X 
number of nurses in the public sector; only to find that they under-budgeted with 
10,000 nurses. So you see, those for me are the issues that are very interesting and it 
goes back to say how are we managing?” (KII 18, Nursing Union)  
“It [OSD] went a bit crazy because of the numbers; we couldn’t get the accurate 
number of the nurses.” (Policymaker 2, Department of Public Service and 
Administration) 
  
Some respondents were of the opinion that OSD was not based on research evidence; pointing 
out that if formative research had been conducted to shape this policy, problems of under-
budgeting and under-count of nurses in the public sector could have been avoided:  
“I think before they could implement it [OSD], they were supposed to do thorough 
research and correct calculation.” (Hospital Manager 9, District Hospital, North 
West Province)  
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6.2.3  Inequities in the OSD Implementation  
An overwhelming majority of the nurses of all categories from different health facilities in the 
two provinces reported inequities in the implementation of the OSD whereby nurses of the 
same category with the same qualifications were rewarded differently. In some cases, nurses 
working as managers were earning salaries lower than the nurses that they were managing. 
This led to disgruntlement and dissatisfaction among nurses: 
 “My colleague and I came here on the same date, month and year and we were 
here from school. We qualified on the same date and we arrived here on the same 
date. But when it comes to OSD, we didn’t get the same amount.” (Professional 
Nurse, District Hospital, North West Province) 
“We experienced problems of people not being happy with their OSD. We 
have a person in theatre who is an operational manager, she’s very unhappy 
because people who are her juniors are actually earning more than she is 
earning because they were translated as specialised professionals and they 
are earning a lot.” (Hospital Manager 4, District Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
 
Due to the challenges from the varied interpretation and implementation of the OSD, as well 
as the lack of clarity on nursing specialities, other nurses reported being incorrectly over-
rewarded and later expected to repay the monies; this was particularly the case in some 
hospitals. This caused great tension between hospital management and nurses; especially 
because nurses were not given the liberty to determine the amount they could afford to repay 
considering their other financial commitments:  
“They give you money and after that they call you to say they have given you money 
that you did not qualify for. That is heart-breaking because I am now expected to 
pay back the money. Worst of all, I don’t choose the amount I can afford to pay and 
the period for paying it back.” (Staff Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
 
It is nurses like these who felt that OSD has had limited if no influence on their motivation 
and retention as shown by these comments below:  
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“Oh no… no ways. OSD is not effective in retaining me here. More especially the 
way things are.” (Assistant Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
“Overall nurses are leaving everywhere in the hospital, especially after the 
implementation of OSD, people are leaving.” (Professional Nurse, Regional Hospital, 
Gauteng Province) 
 
 
The findings further showed that OSD favoured professional nurses more than the lower cadre 
of nurses; resulting in limited effort exerted by the lower nursing categories in individual 
performance as well as negative effect on team effort. This perception was shared by all 
categories of nurses, especially those in hospital setting: 
“When OSD was introduced, the junior nurses were not considered and in 
nursing, the senior nurses cannot do the work alone without the junior ones. 
We are not happy with the way it was done” (Professional Nurse, Regional 
Hospital, North West)  
 
“In reality, the wards are maintained by enrolled nurses. The sisters 
[professional nurses] mostly do paper work, but we are the one’s doing most of 
the things like bathing the patients, giving medicine and so on; although they 
[professional nurses] help” (Staff Nurse, District Hospital, Gauteng Province)  
 
“If you know that someone in your ward got it [OSD] and that somebody 
request your assistance, you would say ‘no, you do it yourself, you got the 
money and I didn’t” (Assistant Nurse, Provincial Hospital, Gauteng Province) 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion  
As with rural and scarce skills allowances, OSD was also regarded as a good policy that 
increased the recruitment, motivation and retention of nurses to a certain extent and has 
encouraged nurses to specialise. However, this chapter reinforces the findings in Chapter 6 of 
the importance of better planning and management of the implementation process of the 
financial incentive strategy to ensure consistency in implementation for the strategy to 
achieve its intended purpose. The chapter demonstrated that OSD implementation was 
decentralised and implementation involved a complex series of events which required careful 
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planning, management and coordination to ensure consistency and avoid other unintended 
consequences. In Chapter 8, the final case study focuses on the implementation processes of a 
non-financial incentive, the hospital revitalisation programme, as well as the perceived 
influence of this strategy on the motivation and retention of health workers.  
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CHAPTER 7: HOSPITAL REVITALISATION CASE STUDY 
 
7.1 Description of the Development and Implementation of the Hospital 
Revitalisation Programme 
7.1.1 Contextual Factors  
When the democratic government took power in 1994, the main focus was on improving 
access to health care for all the people in the country. With primary health care as a central 
pillar of the new health system, there have been efforts to build and upgrade clinics and 
hospitals around the country. A document review and analysis revealed that in 1996, the 
NDoH conducted a national hospital infrastructure audit which included 434 hospitals [264]. 
The findings of this audit showed that a third of facilities needed complete replacement or 
major repairs [265].  
 
In response to these findings, a decision was taken by the NDoH to embark on what was 
initially termed the Hospital Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (HRR) programme [266]. 
According to the Director of the Hospital Revitalisation Programme, this programme was 
initially intended to address the infrastructure backlog caused by the apartheid regime [266]. 
However, it was soon recognised by the NDoH that improvements in infrastructure would not 
necessarily lead to service delivery improvement; this therefore informed the decision to 
initiate a new programme referred to as Hospital Revitalisation Programme (HRP) which 
would not only address infrastructure but also health technology and/or equipment, 
organisational development and management, and quality assurance [267, 268]. The HRP was 
then launched in the 2003/04 financial year and was initiated as a multi-pronged and long 
term strategy anticipated to take approximately 20 years to complete [266, 267, 269]. 
Revitalisation was also intended to ensure that communities have better access to services. 
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In March 2007, the then Gauteng Premier, Mbhazima Shilowa, was quoted in his speech at 
the opening of the Pretoria Academic hospital reflecting on how this programme came about: 
“As we improve the health infrastructure, we realised that in most cases, this did not 
translate into improved service delivery. Therefore, a more comprehensive 
programme, called the revitalisation programme was developed to address the many 
factors affecting the delivery of quality health care. Over and above infrastructural 
improvement, we said health equipment must be of good quality and always 
available. There should be improvement in human resources and the management of 
the hospital. The programme also addresses the issues of quality information 
management as critical in improving efficiency.” (Mbhazima Shilowa, Gauteng 
Department of Health, Press Release, 2 March 2007)  
 
7.1.2 Policy Content  
A document review of the Department of Health 2000/01 annual report and the Revitalisation 
Project Unit highlighted five core and interrelated components of the hospital revitalisation 
programme which are health infrastructure; health technology; organisational development 
and management; quality assurance; and monitoring and evaluation [267, 268]. The 
Directorate for the Revitalisation Projects, located within the National Department of Health, 
noted that the health infrastructure component involved “the process of briefing, design, 
development of master plan, cash flow projection, tender, construction, handover, 
maintenance and design evaluation” [267]. The health technology on the other hand focused 
on “auditing and purchasing of equipment based on service packages, development of 
sustainable systems for health technology planning and general management and 
maintenance of technologies” [267]. With regard to the organisational and management 
component, the aim was to strengthen institutional and operational efficiency of public 
hospitals by improving the management systems, structures and processes [267]. The quality 
assurance component involved the modification of hospital systems in order to improve the 
quality of services that are required including improvement and sustainability of quality of 
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services provided in the public hospitals [267]. Finally, the monitoring and evaluation 
component was aimed at producing consistent information to enable the NDoH to determine 
the accomplishments within the context of the implementation of the projects as well as to 
ensure accountability [267].  
 
Hospital revitalisation is also listed as one of the themes of the Ten-Point Plan Strategic 
Framework for the period of 2004-2009 [265]. Within the 10-point plan, the revitalisation of 
hospital services includes: “updating the National Planning Framework, improving the 
condition of hospitals, improving the condition of equipment, decentralisation of hospital 
management and rationalisation of highly specialised services” [265]. Both policymakers and 
hospital managers seemed to be in agreement with the document review with regard to the 
intention of hospital revitalisation:  
“Revitalisation was intended at improving services and structural capacity in order 
for the system to proactively be responsive to issues we have.” (Hospital Manager 5, 
Revitalised Hospital 3, North West Province) 
“What revitalisation was trying to do was to say as we improve the working 
conditions of health professionals, we must also look at putting the right equipment 
in place, new X-ray machines and whatever else is required so that people should 
feel that the environment is welcoming.” (Policymaker 1, National Department of 
Health)  
 
In total, 242 hospitals nationally were said to benefit from this programme. Media releases in 
2004 quoted the Department of Health HRP project director, Lucky Mandla Chawane stating 
that a budget estimate of R649-million was put forward for 2002/3 financial year; R717-
million for 2003/4; about R911-million for 2004/5, and R1,027-billion for 2005/6 [269]. The 
expected cost allocated for North West province was R418-million to complete 39 projects 
and 20 hospitals, while Gauteng province was allocated R598-million for completion of 352 
projects and 31 hospitals.  
180 
 
 
7.1.3 Policy Actors and their Roles 
The document review and analysis revealed that the hospital revitalisation programme was 
located within the Health Service Delivery cluster of the National Department of Health and 
that multiple stakeholders played a critical role in the initiation and implementation of this 
programme. The National Department of Health and Social Development, which is a 
partnership between the health department and social development, was responsible for 
administering the process as well as ensuring that the planned revitalisation adheres to its 
quality framework. The Provincial Departments of Health on the other hand were responsible 
for producing business cases for the hospitals that they wish to include under the programme 
to NDoH, which then presents it to Treasury. The other key player was the National Treasury 
which was responsible for providing funds to the hospitals to implement the programme. The 
primary implementer of the hospital revitalisation programme was the Department of Public 
Works.   
 
The document analysis further showed that when hospital revitalisation was introduced, a 
number of Committees and Task Teams with variety of roles were set up. Firstly, in 1996, the 
National Hospital Co-ordinating Committee (NHCC) was established to drive the process of 
hospital revitalisation [264]. This committee had representation from the National Department 
of Health as well as from each province. It thus encouraged extensive provincial participation 
and was managed by the Hospital Services Chief Directorate [270].  
 
In addition to this, the Directorate for the Revitalisation Project at the national level 
mentioned on their website that the Project Management Forum (PMF), comprising of 
‘specialised’ persons from provinces and the National Department of Health was also 
established [267]. The specialised units that were represented in this forum included health 
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technology, hospital management, health facilities planning and commissioning, quality of 
care and project management [267]. According to the Revitalisation Project Unit, the PMF 
was to be the first point of call providing expertise required by any implementing province 
and the overall role of this forum was noted as follows: 
“The main function of the PMF is to mobilise NDoH and provincial Departments of 
Health (PDoH) directorates and clusters, and to review technical aspects of annual 
work plans. It will also be responsible for advising on technical issues affecting 
implementation.” (The Revitalisation Projects Unit, National Department of Health) 
 
The Revitalisation Unit further stated that the PMF was expected to meet on a quarterly basis 
and hosted on a rotational basis by provinces [267]. Other committees that were established 
included the Parliament Health Committee; the National Health Council; the Quality 
Assurance Management Team; and the National Peer Review Team. In some hospitals, 
public-private partnerships (PPP) were established to fund the programme.  
 
7.1.4 Policy Process and Challenges 
In terms of the strategies that were put in place to support the implementation of the hospital 
revitalisation project, an analysis of the documents reviewed showed that a draft National 
Planning Framework was developed in mid-1998 to guide the development of hospital 
services. The Project Implementation Manual (PIM) was also developed in 1999 and this was 
followed by the development of the 1999-2004 Health Sector Strategic Framework (HSSF).  
 
The Hospital Revitalisation Grant was set aside for the implementation of HRP [267, 268]. In 
a presentation made at the 29
th
 Seminar of the Public Health Group of the International Union 
of Architects, Geoff Abbott and colleagues, who were part of a team of Architects working on 
the Hospital Revitalisation Programme, indicated that the Hospital Revitalisation Grant was a 
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national targeted capital funding project to provinces for hospital development and or 
redevelopment to improve quality of care [271]. They further stated that the disbursement 
process of this grant was supported by legislation; implying that there were formal processes 
of approval for this grant [271]. The website of the Department of Health’s Revitalisation 
Project Unit also noted that the purpose of the Hospital Revitalisation Grant was two-fold: 
“To provide funding to enable provinces to plan, manage, modernise, rationalise, 
and transform the infrastructure, health technology, monitoring and evaluation of 
hospitals in line with national policy objectives.” 
“To transform hospital management and improve quality of care in line with 
national policy.” (The Revitalisation Project Unit, Department of Health) 
 
Media releases at the time when hospital revitalisation was initiated revealed that the pilot 
phase of this programme happened during the 2001/02 period during which only one hospital 
per province was initially expected to benefit [269]. As of 2002/3 financial year, the 
programme was expected to accommodate two to three hospitals per province per year [269]. 
In order for hospitals to benefit from the hospital revitalisation programme, the National 
Department of Health quarterly report and the Revitalisation Project Unit clearly stipulated 
the process shown in Figure 8 [226, 267].  
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Figure 8: Hospital Revitalisation Planning Process 
Source: The Revitalisation Project Unit, National Department of Health 
 
The document analysis further established that one of the critical phases of the hospital 
revitalisation programme was for the Provincial Departments of Health to submit Business 
Service Transformation Plan 
Peer Review Process  
(by National Peer Review Team) 
Submission of Business Cases 
Approval by NDoH 
Exit Strategy – NDoH Assessment 
Approval by NDOH 
Project Brief Development & Design of the Facility 
Approval by NDoH 
Initial Project Implementation Plan 
Annual Project Implementation Plan  
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Cases and Project Implementation Plans (PIP) to the National Department of Health [226]. 
The Business Cases had to address two important issues: the first was the strategic context 
indicating the current and proposed situation regarding health service delivery in the province, 
the priorities of revitalising facilities in the province based on service as well as financial 
issues; the second part of the Business Case dealt with the specifics of the facilities such as 
the size, level of care, capital and operational costs, duration and expected outcomes [226]. In 
the quarterly report, the National Department of Health highlighted several limitations with 
the Business Cases that were submitted for the 2004/2005 financial year and these included 
lack of standardisation of the Business Cases even though a format had been provided; no 
formal approval processes were followed; and insufficient assessment of Business Cases 
because of lack of capacity within the Revitalisation Unit due to drastic staff shortages [226].  
 
In addressing the above limitations, the National Department of Health Hospital 
Revitalisation Unit conducted workshops to explain the standard format, assisted provinces in 
drafting Business Cases, created formal methods of appraisal as well as requested provinces 
to redraft Business Cases of projects [226]. This Unit further actively made efforts to create 
posts for two specialists which were the Deputy Director for Infrastructure and Deputy 
Director for Health Technology, and were in the process of creating a post for the third 
Deputy Director for Organisational Development and Quality Assurance [226].  
 
The 2005 quarterly report on hospital revitalisation further illustrated that with regard to the 
Project Implementation Plans (PIPs), none of the plans were formally appraised and approved 
and that the PIP’s did not conform to the standards as set out in the Project Implementation 
Manual [226]. Although the Project Implementation Plans were expected to be submitted on 
an annual basis, it was also found that Gauteng province did not submit PIPs in 2004 [226]. In 
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addressing these challenges, the Revitalisation Unit appraised all the PIP’s received; however, 
this resulted in one month’s transfer of funds being withheld as none of the provinces 
complied with the deadlines given. The quality and depth of the information submitted was 
also reported to be weak [226]. The 2005 quarterly report further stated that the provinces 
were then expected to resubmit the PIP’s and these were later approved based on detailed 
appraisals and suggestions made by the Revitalisation Unit.  
 
In an attempt to improve the smooth implementation of the hospital revitalisation programme, 
the document analysis revealed that the National Department of Health Revitalisation Projects 
Unit further conducted a telephonic survey with provincial health officials with the intention 
of identifying problems experienced with the provincial Department of Public Works [226]. 
The findings of this survey showed that across all provinces, Public Works lacked technical 
capacity to implement the hospital revitalisation programme and that there were delays in the 
awarding of tenders and or procurement [226]. Other significant challenges identified were 
the continued under-expenditure by the provinces, lack of personnel to manage the 
components of the hospital revitalisation programme, poor quality of data available to the 
National Department of Health, and the monitoring and evaluation of projects [226]. With 
regard to reporting, it was found that the information received from the provincial treasuries 
did not always accurately reflect the progress on site due to slow capturing of payments as 
well as late payments [226].  
 
When looking at the findings of the Revitalisation Projects Unit survey with particular 
attention to the problems at the two provinces that participated in this study, it was found that 
in North West province, the problems faced were that the procurement process, tender board 
as well as appointment of contractors were done by the Department of Public Works and that 
most of the contractors started six months late [226]. The main problem in the Gauteng 
186 
 
province was the tender processes which led to unnecessary delays in the appointment of 
contractors [226]. The other implementation problem in Gauteng was that the provincial 
Department of Public Works appointed inexperienced contractors who were incapable of 
handling projects with huge budgets [226]. As a result, for the 2008 and 2009 financial year, 
the Auditor-General reported an under spending of R35 million on the hospital revitalisation 
programme in Gauteng province alone; including weaknesses in the awarding of contracts, the 
management of assets and adherence to procurement protocols [272]. One key informant 
confirmed these challenges by commenting as follows: 
“The challenge is that revitalisation is taking a long time. There are major delays. The 
fact that the revitalisation programme tries to balance the inclusion of BEE [Black 
Empowerment Enterprise] companies is a little bit of a challenge because sometimes 
they are stuck with people that are incapacitated.” (Policymaker 3, Gauteng 
Department of Health) 
 
This informant further commented on issues of poor management of the revitalisation projects 
as well as the management of the tendering processes; which according to her were due to 
corruption: 
“In some instances, there are allegations of corruption. I think the management of the 
projects is also very poor. In particular, the management of all these small companies 
that they sub-contract is a huge problem. I really do believe that they [contractors] 
need to be trained before they undertake such huge responsibilities.” (Policymaker 3, 
Gauteng Department of Health) 
 
Although a review of the 2005 Department of Health quarterly report indicated that Mamelodi 
hospital, one of the hospitals in the revitalisation programme, was due for completion at the 
end of July 2007 [226], this was not the case in reality. According to the 2005 quarterly 
report, the delay in Mamelodi hospital was due to the disappearance of the initial contractor 
and that a new contractor had to be appointed [226]. Similarly, the report also stated that the 
Business Case for Natalspruit hospital was already completed in 2005 but by 2009 when data 
was collected for this study construction had not yet begun.  
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While monitoring and evaluation was an integral part of the hospital revitalisation 
programme, it was interesting to note in the document analysis the contradictory reports 
between the Department of Health and the National Treasury of what had been achieved by 
what time period and at what cost. For example, the 1999 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 
by National Treasury reported on some of these inconsistencies as follows:  
There were also contradictions that were noted with regard to the budget reported 
by the different health department documents.” (National Treasury, 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 1999) 
 
These contradictions reflected limited communication and coordination between these two 
departments. A reason provided by the National Treasury for the inconsistencies with the 
expenditure on infrastructure in particular was due to the failure of provinces to apply uniform 
classification for infrastructure. For instance, except for the Health and Education 
departments, the other departments that played a critical role in infrastructure development 
were Public Works, Transport and Housing. As a result, some provinces combined functions 
of these departments while other provinces separated the functions: 
It is difficult to assess how much provinces are spending on infrastructure, and to 
separate expenditure on new infrastructure from maintenance spending. Provinces 
do not apply a uniform classification for infrastructure, making it difficult to analyse 
provincial trends. In some provinces, construction and maintenance within the 
social services is recorded in the vote of public works, while in others it is allocated 
to the relevant department. Reforms to budget formats will improve this analysis in 
future. (National Treasury, Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review, 2003/04 – 
2009/10) 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges mentioned above, there had been successes with regard to the 
hospital revitalisation programme. With regards to health infrastructure, nationally, from 1999 
to 2010, at least a total of 120 hospitals had been repaired, upgraded or built. In the two 
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provinces where the current study was conducted, a total of six hospitals had been revitalised 
between 2004 and 2010 as shown in Table 20 below.  
Table 20: Completed Revitalised Hospitals in Gauteng and North West Provinces 2004-
2010  
 
Financial 
Year 
Hospital Name 
North West Gauteng 
2004/05 – Swartruggens  
2005/06   
2006/07  – Steve Biko Academic 
2007/08  – Tembisa 
2008/09 – Vryberg  
2009/10 – Moses Kotane – Mamelodi 
 
 
On the 10
th
 June 2005, Mr Howard Yawa, the North West Member of Executive Council 
(MEC) for Public Works, officially handed over the newly built Swartruggens Hospital in the 
North West Province to the MEC for Health at Borolelo Township [225]. A press release 
issued by the Department of Public Works at that time referred to this hospital as the ‘state of 
the art hospital’, and as the first nationally to be completed under the government’s hospital 
revitalisation programme [225].  
 
It was further stated in the press release that R39 million was spent in this 30 bed hospital to 
construct four private wards with en-suite facilities for more affluent patients with medical aid 
as well as to build 10 houses for staff [225]. The press release further noted that: 
“The hospital is fitted with an electronic patients monitoring and intercom system to 
enable patients to call for attention and receive the highest level of service at a 
public hospital.” [225]  
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In Gauteng province, the Steve Biko Academic Hospital (formerly known as Pretoria 
Academic Hospital) was the first facility to be completed under the revitalisation programme 
[273]. In total, R1.2 billion was invested in the construction of this hospital, R700 million of 
this was spent in physical infrastructure while R500 million was used to purchase the latest 
technology [273]. In his speech at the opening of the Steve Biko Academic hospital 
Mbhazima Shilowa, the former Gauteng Premier, was quoted as saying: 
“After we have done all the work, a sceptic might still ask the question: ‘so what has 
changed if patients still wait in long queues to see a doctor, if they continue to feel 
that they are not receiving proper and adequate care, and if they continue to die in 
stretchers waiting to be attended to.’ A sceptic will be led to conclude that our 
efforts are like pouring old wine in new bottles.” (Mbhazima Shilowa, Gauteng 
Department of Health, Press Release, 2 March 2007) 
 
One of the key informants in Gauteng province who was interviewed for this study appeared 
to be optimistic about the potential influence of the revitalisation of hospitals on staff 
motivation as shown in the comment below: 
“I think any environment that is beautiful, that is clean, that is attractive makes the 
staff to be proud, it motivates them. It makes them to want to work there.” (Policy 
Maker 3, Gauteng Department of Health) 
 
In relation to the component of organisational development and management, which was 
intended to develop the skills of hospital managers and management systems, some successes 
were also noted. During the 2000/1 financial year, an amount of R24-million was spent on 
appointing chief financial officers or senior support staff in the bigger hospitals. Furthermore, 
a document review revealed that financial control in various provincial health departments 
had improved to the point that overspending on budget allocations had been eliminated or 
greatly reduced and this was attributed to better financial management in hospitals where the 
bulk of spending occurred. In the 2007/08 financial year, the Department of Health planned to 
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ensure that at least 50% of hospital managers enrolled in a formal hospital management-
training programme. However, in 2009, the Democratic Alliance former spokesperson, Mike 
Waters was quoted in Mail and Guardian newspaper calling for a survey of the qualifications 
and experience of all hospital executives and other managers, implying that many hospital 
managers still lack technical abilities [274]. One key informant confirmed the latter by 
commenting as follows:  
“You get people who are teachers who have never even been principals in the 
school, running hospitals today. They have no clue what they are talking about. We 
don’t even know what qualifications they have that made them to get the job. Now 
you get doctors saying ‘what do I speak to the teacher about medicine’. We are not 
saying ‘have doctors as CEO’s’, we are saying ‘have people who are qualified’ and 
even if it means people having MBA, put them there; they should know what they are 
talking about. ” (Key Informant 5, Professional Association) 
 
7.2  Perceptions on the Influence of Hospital Revitalisation Programme  
Three main themes emerged when health professionals were asked about their perceptions 
with regards to the influence of the hospital revitalisation programme (HRP) on their 
recruitment, motivation and retention. These are listed in Table 21Error! Reference source 
not found.. This research covers only four revitalised hospitals because of the delays in the 
implementation of this initiative during the research project, as noted above.  
 
Table 21: Dominant Themes identified under Findings on HRP 
 
1. Mixed perceptions about the influence of HRP on motivation and retention  
2. Weak leadership and management of hospitals  
3. Hospital revitalisation alone is not an adequate strategy  
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Table 22: Perceived Influence of the Hospital Revitalisation Programme 
Incentive Hospital 
Those working in revitalised facilities 
Agree 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
N=103 Hospital revitalisation attracted me to come 
and work for this facility 
19.0 10.7 70.4 
Hospital revitalisation motivates me to do my 
job better 
28.5 11.0 60.0 
Hospital revitalisation encourages me to 
remain working in this facility 
29.0 10.1 61.2 
 
7.2.1 Mixed Perceptions about the Influence of the Hospital Revitalisation Programme 
The findings of the survey demonstrated that hospital revitalisation as the only non-financial 
incentive in this study was considered to have had limited impact on the recruitment (17.5%), 
motivation (25.5%) and retention (22.7%) of health personnel (Table 22).  
 
However, in-depth interviews with health professionals reflected divergent views amongst 
respondents with regards to the influence of the hospital revitalisation programme. Those 
respondents that commented positively about this programme, specifically highlighted the 
improvements in physical infrastructure, advanced technology and equipment.  
“So seeing that this hospital looks good I said wow… is this a government 
hospital…you know. So the same environment attracted me because I was working 
in the private sector before.” (Professional Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital, 
North West Province) 
“Err …one would take a look and say wow nice. So when I came here, things were 
so much nicer, you find that there is new advanced technology. So it was very 
attractive and encouraging knowing that I am going to work in this place. I was 
happy when I saw the structure and all the things in this place are attractive.” 
(Assistant Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital, North West Province)  
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The view about the availability of advanced equipment and technology was also shared by 
some hospital managers:  
“In general the revitalisation has been effective. You see, after the revitalisation, we 
have something like oxygen reticulation. So in a critical area like casualty where we 
should resuscitate a person, they are able to get oxygen immediately on the wall.” 
(Hospital Manager 5, Revitalised District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
Other hospital managers were of the view that the improved infrastructure of the hospitals has 
to a certain extent retained health professionals, even if it was on a short term basis.  
“When people get here, the first thing they look at is the space or place that they are 
going to work at. And they actually say, ‘I want to work at this place even if it’s for a 
year because I like the appearance’. But they end up sometimes staying for two to 
three years.” (Hospital Manager 3, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West 
Province) 
“The revitalisation was not intentionally intended at retention of staff, but it has 
contributed to retention.” (Hospital Manager 5, Revitalised District Hospital 2, 
North West Province) 
 
In the context of the prevalence of HIV and AIDS and TB in the country, one health manager 
commented that the refurbishment of the hospital infrastructure through the hospital 
revitalisation programme was effective in integrating these services.  
“And the other people that are very happy about this revitalisation are the wellness 
clinic and TB team. So we are trying to integrate TB and antiretroviral treatment.” 
(Hospital Manager 3, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province)  
 
As shown in Table 23, the staff survey asked participants about their overall satisfaction with 
a number of components of their working environment. 54.1% of those in revitalised hospitals 
reported being satisfied with the physical infrastructure of their hospitals compared to only 
33.7% of those from non-revitalised hospitals, and this difference was statistically significant 
(Χ2 test, p=0.001). Lower levels of satisfaction were reported for the availability of essential 
drugs, but again the rates for revitalised hospitals were significantly higher than those from 
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non-revitalised hospitals (Χ2 test, p=0.04). 36.1% of staff from revitalised hospitals were 
satisfied with equipment and technology compared to 28.4% from non-revitalised hospitals, 
but this difference was not statistically significant (Table 23). Interestingly, satisfaction with 
staff accommodation, schools for their children, and other entertainment in the area were 
lower among revitalised hospital staff, although the difference for staff accommodation was 
not statistically significant between the two groups.  
 
 
194 
 
Table 23: Overall Satisfaction with Working Environment  
 
Revitalised Hospital  Non-Revitalised Hospital  
Satisfaction with overall working environment 
Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
 
Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
P-
value 
N=428 Satisfaction with physical appearance of the 
hospital 
54.1 8.2 37.7  33.7 8.2 58.2 0.001 
Satisfaction with availability of essential 
medicine / drugs 
47.6 8.2 44.2  37.3 5.4 57.4 0.039 
Satisfaction with equipment and technology 
of the hospital 
36.1 3.4 60.5  28.4 3.9 67.7 0.267 
Satisfaction with staff accommodation 20.6 3.7 75.7  22.1 6.8 71.1 0.489 
Satisfaction with education for children 
around the area 
22.2 4.6 67.3  35.7 14.1 50.3 0.005 
Satisfaction with entertainment in the area 14.7 6.9 78.5  25.8 12.6 61.6 0.009 
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However, doctors in particular reported that improvements of the physical structure alone are 
unlikely to attract new health professionals to rural areas especially those who are already 
working in big cities. Their argument was that the improved infrastructure of the hospitals is 
more likely to be appreciated by health professionals that are already working in such 
facilities because they are more aware of the situation prior to the revitalisation and the efforts 
that had been made to improve their working conditions through revitalisation. Improvements 
in hospital infrastructure were also considered to be ineffective in retaining health 
professionals:  
 “No, I think the way the hospital looks is not going to attract anyone new when they 
have the opportunity to be near the big towns. They would rather work in old 
hospitals and be near towns than to come to this hospital. Nonetheless, we are going 
to enjoy this new place.” (Medical Doctor, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North 
West Province). 
“Okay structurally, yes we have a good structure, nice bathrooms, nice air 
conditioners and so forth. These are good for the patients, the patients are 
comfortable and the offices are also good; but this cannot retain people here. Yes, 
little comfort is okay but it may not be the reason that I am staying in the hospital.” 
(Medical Doctor, Revitalised District Hospital 3, North West Province)  
 
In one particular hospital, although the renovations happened, only certain sections of the 
hospital were revamped. The administration building where management personnel are 
located as well as the outpatient department were improved but no refurbishments were 
carried out in the hospital wards. The majority of the nurses in this hospital were not 
impressed with this and commented that this was ineffective for their motivation as reflected 
by the following remarks:  
“No, hospital renovations have not motivated me. They have only increased the size 
of their offices and the OPD and the pharmacy. They have air cons [air 
conditioners] in their offices, but what about the wards?” (Assistant Nurse, Regional 
Hospital 4, Gauteng Province)  
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“Yes the hospital is looking very nice, but when we are talking about the hospital, 
we are talking about the patients. There is comfort up there in the management 
offices but down here in the wards it’s a problem. They are comfortable, we are not. 
It seems like there’s two different hospitals, one hospital that side and the other 
hospital this side.” (Professional Nurse, Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng 
Province) 
 
Other health professionals also felt that even though their revitalised hospitals looked 
attractive, in some instances the new infrastructure was not the most appropriate for their 
clinical needs, for example in the unavailability of isolation rooms for patients with 
communicable diseases. Some nurses commented that: 
“…the structure doesn’t meet the standard of care. We are working in days whereby 
there are a lot of communicable diseases and the structure of this hospital does not 
accommodate that, we don’t have isolation rooms. You have seen our paeds 
[paediatric ward], it only has six beds and when somebody comes with a 
communicable disease what are you going to do?” (Professional Nurse, District 
Hospital, North West Province) 
“I think hospital revitalisation doesn’t make any influence because the hospital is 
small; the building and the wards are not adequate.” (Assistant Nurse, Revitalised 
District Hospital, North West Province) 
 
Consistent with the survey findings which found generally low levels of satisfaction with 
equipment and technology (Table 23), the results from in-depth interviews indicated 
persistent deficiencies in the availability of key equipment: 
“There is lack of equipment in wards and shortage of linen for patients.” (Assistant 
Nurse, Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng Province)  
“You find that people are frustrated about the unavailability of equipment such as 
equipment for critical areas like ICU and theatre. I would say 70% or so of the 
people are frustrated because they really want this equipment and it doesn’t come so 
as a doctor or nurse you go to places where there is equipment. I think those are the 
most frustrating things because you may be a specialist but without equipment it’s a 
challenge.” (Hospital Manager 8, Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng 
Province) 
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However, in some instances, although equipment may be available, there were challenges of 
space where the equipment could be placed and utilised:  
“We do have the equipment but which we currently do not use because of space 
issues.” (Hospital Manager 3, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province) 
 
An interesting view related to equipment was also voiced by another hospital manager from a 
district hospital in North West province who was particularly concerned that even though 
equipment was provided at their hospital, there were no mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the equipment was maintained, or strategies to keep up with advancements in technology: 
“And the other challenge is the issue of equipment, remember technology advances 
rapidly. So there is no strategy in place at hospital level to actually be able to go 
along with the development within this area of equipment management. For example 
we may invest in an X-ray, two years down the line that X-ray is dysfunctional. You 
want to maintain it but it becomes too costly to do that. When you look at the recent 
models compared to what you have, yours is much more costly to maintain than 
buying a new model.” (Hospital Manager 1, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North 
West Province) 
 
One doctor from North West hospital seemed frustrated that there was limited coordination 
with regards to the equipment that the hospital requests. In his view, although the hospital 
orders a particular item of equipment through the National Department of Health, sometimes 
what gets delivered is completely different: 
“I think there is a bit of a problem with equipment. Sometimes you make a list of the 
equipment you want, the next thing you receive stuff that you didn’t order. Let me 
give you an example, you may want an ultra sound machine for the hospital because 
the one you have is broken. Because it is more than R5,000, we cannot buy it 
through the hospital budget but have to order it through central office [National 
Department of Health]. And when your request comes, you receive a bed for theatre 
or an anaesthetic machine rather than what you initially ordered.” (Medical Doctor, 
Revitalised District Hospital 3, District Hospital)  
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7.2.2 Weak Leadership and Management of Hospitals 
The hospital revitalisation programme was primarily focused on the physical infrastructure, 
and less attention was put on the management component. As such, the qualitative findings 
showed that in general, the majority of the health professionals in revitalised hospitals, 
especially nurses of all categories, had negative perceptions about leadership and management 
in their hospitals. These respondents raised concerns about authoritative managers who lack 
the ability to engage with staff problems:  
“Management should adopt the democratic leadership style and stop oppressing 
their subordinates.” (Professional Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North 
West Province) 
“Managers should walk around and see what staff is doing and hear about their 
problems.” (Operational Manager, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West 
Province) 
“Our nurses are resigning every month but management is doing nothing about it.” 
(Assistant Nurse, Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng Province) 
 
Poor relations with regards to issues around communication and consultation with staff were 
also raised by some nurses as a point of concern as reflected in the quote below:  
“Management lacks the right way to consult and properly communicate issues with 
staff. We need regular management and personnel meetings, at least once a month 
to discuss staff dissatisfaction, strengths and weakness in order to work towards 
improving quality of care.” (Professional Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 1, 
North West Province)  
 
In addition, there was a unanimous view amongst all categories of nurses in revitalised 
hospitals that personnel in management positions lacked the capacity to deal with staff 
respectfully.  
“Management needs to be trained on how to manage and treat staff with respect 
irrespective of their rank. We must work as a team and not to oppress the ones that 
are inferior to them.” (Staff Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North West 
Province) 
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“When you make a mistake, management insults you in front of patients.” (Assistant 
Nurse, Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng Province)  
“We deserve respect from management; our managers do not communicate with 
staff in a professional manner.” (Professional Nurse, Revitalised Regional Hospital 
4, Gauteng Province)  
 
Management was also criticised for being ignorant of fair labour practices; particularly in 
relation to offering fair opportunities for staff training. It was also the view of some 
respondents that labour and the human resources departments were in some cases, 
unresponsive to grievances of the health professionals: 
“Management needs to practice fair labour practices in terms of enabling fair 
opportunities for staff training and workshop attendance. They must also be open 
and transparent.” (Professional Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North West 
Province)  
“…and the labour department do not assist us with our grievances.” (Professional 
Nurse, Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng Province)  
“HR [human resource department] should also do their job properly and take staff 
problems seriously.” (Staff Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 1, North West 
Province) 
 
Although not a dominant theme, one professional nurse insinuated that female managers were 
more problematic than their male counterparts.  
“The majority of women holding better [management] positions seem to be a 
problem; if only there can be better interaction between staff and management.” 
(Professional Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province) 
 
7.2.3 Hospital Revitalisation alone is not an Adequate Strategy 
Some health professionals were of the opinion that in addition to improved infrastructure, 
other factors are important such as addressing issues of accommodation, safety, salaries, 
equipment and drugs. These opinions were expressed across all respondents and from both the 
Gauteng and North West provinces.  
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“Sometimes a person says that I want to stay here but seeing that you don’t have 
accommodation for me, I won’t be able to stay in the village because of the security 
of my car, there are no garages in the villages, there is no water and there are no 
essentials, so I can’t unless you are going to assist me to look for accommodation. 
They rent but there is no safe accommodation where their cars can be safe or 
whatever assets they have because sometimes they are robbed in the village.” 
(Hospital Manager 3, Revitalised District Hospital 2, North West Province) 
“I love my job, but I cannot sit back just because I love the environment, no…I 
would still go. I am here for the money to support my family.” (Staff Nurse, 
Revitalised Regional Hospital 4, Gauteng Province) 
“The renovation is okay but we don’t have equipment and drugs; it’s only the 
building that has changed” (Staff Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital 3, North West 
Province). 
 
The lower categories of nurses in North West province were particularly more concerned 
about the human resource aspects as the hospitals were being renovated: 
“Yes it [hospital revitalisation] motivates me at the same time it doesn’t motivate me 
because I am asking myself why are they not increasing staff because as much as we 
need beautiful wards, we also need more staff.” (Staff Nurse, Revitalised District 
Hospital 1, North West Province) 
 What I am asking myself is that as they are extending the hospital, are they going to 
have more staff” (Assistant Nurse, Revitalised District Hospital, North West 
Province). 
 
 
7.3  Conclusion  
This chapter started off with describing the policymaking and implementation processes of 
the hospital revitalisation programme (HRP) and then critically analysed some of the 
successes and challenges of this intervention. Thereafter, the perceptions on the influence of 
HRP on the motivation and retention of health workers were also discussed under three main 
themes. The following chapter will present further quantitative findings on the job 
satisfaction, organisational commitment and intention to quit of health workers.  
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CHAPTER 8: JOB SATISFACTION, INTENTION TO QUIT 
AND ORGANISATIONAL COMMITMENT 
 
8.1 Introduction  
In Chapters 5 to 7, the results of the successes and the failures of the design and 
implementation processes of the incentive strategies investigated in this study, as well as their 
perceived influence on the motivation and retention of health workers were presented. In this 
chapter, I investigate the job satisfaction, intention to quit and organisational commitment of 
these health workers in order to assess how the interventions may have affected these 
elements. This chapter will start of by reporting the results of the consistency of the survey 
tools used and this will be followed by the findings on the Abridged Job in General (aJIG) 
and Abridged Job Descriptive Index (aJDI) for hospitals and clinics. Thereafter, the findings 
on health workers’ Intention to Quit (ITQ) and Organisational Commitment (OC) will be 
presented. The impact of the interventions on health workers’ satisfaction, intention to quit 
and organisational commitment will then be discussed. The chapter will end with reporting on 
the predictors of job satisfaction, intention to quit and organisational commitment while 
adjusting for other confounders.  
 
8.2 Consistency of Survey Tools 
As noted in the Chapter 3 on Methodology, the aJIG was used to measure overall satisfaction 
in the different categories of health workers working in hospitals and clinics in Gauteng and 
North West provinces. The aJDI was used to determine satisfaction with work itself, pay, 
promotion, supervision and colleagues. The Organisational Commitment Questionnaire 
(OCQ) measured health workers’ loyalty to remain working at their respective facilities while 
the Intention to Quit scale measured the participants’ intention to leave their current facilities. 
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Cronbach’s Alpha was used to evaluate the internal reliability and consistency of the survey 
instruments as shown in Table 24. This table illustrates that the coefficients of all the scales 
are reasonably high, for both hospital and clinic respondents, suggesting that the aJIG, aJDI, 
OC and ITQ scales are reliable and consistent.  
 
Table 24: Consistency of Survey Tools 
Test Scale 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Hospitals Clinics Combined 
aJIG 0.81 0.75 0.80 
aJDI-Work 0.71 0.75 0.73 
aJDI-Pay 0.62 0.71 0.65 
aJDI-Promotion  0.73 0.72 0.73 
aJDI-Supervisor  0.78 0.81 0.79 
aJDI-Colleagues  0.79 0.85 0.81 
Organisational Commitment  0.84 0.86 0.85 
Intention to Quit  0.81 0.79 0.80 
 
Previous research on the aJIG scale found an alpha of 0.85 or more [275]. In this study, the 8-
items on the aJIG scale had a mean reliability coefficient of 0.81 for hospitals and 0.75 for 
clinics. The results also indicate that each of the aJDI subscales also had adequate mean 
reliability scores. The lowest Cronbach’s alpha was found for the “Satisfaction with Present 
Pay” subscale with scores of 0.62 in hospitals and 0.71 in clinics.  
 
For the 15-item Organisational Commitment scale, detailed item analysis showed a problem 
with item number 9 which read as follows: “It would take very little change in my present 
circumstances to cause me to leave this organisation (facility)”. This was a complexly worded 
and reverse scored item which respondents possibly did not understand clearly. The 
correlation for this item with others in the scale was -0.12 for hospitals and -0.06 for clinics so 
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it was excluded from the final scale. The Cronbach’s alpha for the remaining 14 items was 
0.84 for hospitals and 0.86 for clinics (Table 24). Previous research on the Organisational 
Commitment scale found coefficient alphas range from 0.82 to 0.93 with a median of 0.90 
[78]. The Intention to Quit scale had a strong total mean reliability coefficient for both 
hospitals and clinics (∝=0.81 and 0.79 respectively).  
 
8.3 Overall Job Satisfaction of Survey Respondents 
In order to determine whether doctors and nurses that participated in this study were satisfied 
with their overall jobs or with certain aspects of their jobs (work, pay, promotion, supervisor, 
co-workers), we assessed whether they were above or below the neutral point on each of the 
aJDI and aJIG scales. According to Balzer and colleagues [230], there is no real neutral point 
on these scales; however they propose some guidelines to establish ranges between 
satisfaction, neutrality and dissatisfaction. The range of possible scores on the 8-item aJIG 
scale was from 0 to 24 while possible scale scores for aJDI were from 0 to 15. Therefore, 
using guidelines by Balzer and colleagues [230], in this study, a ‘neutral’ range of 9.78 to 
14.22 was established for the aJIG scale while 7.33 to 10.67 ‘neutral’ range was established 
for the aJDI scales [276]. For both of these scales, scores above the neutral range indicated 
‘satisfaction’ while scores below the neutral range indicated ‘dissatisfaction’ [276].  
 
Table 25 shows the job satisfaction results for the 422 respondents from hospitals. Overall, 
the aJIG scale resulted in a mean score of 15.0 (SD=6.9) indicating that these respondents 
were generally satisfied with their overall job. One-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference for health worker category in hospitals (p=0.045). However, no significant 
differences were observed for gender (p=0.761), marital status (p=0.930), province (p=0.353) 
and location (p=0.869).  
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For the aJDI scale, the results demonstrated that the participants were generally dissatisfied 
with pay and promotion; with the mean scores of 3.8 (SD=3.6) and 6.1 (SD=4.6) respectively. 
There were no significant differences between groups with regards to the promotion subscale. 
However, Table 25 shows that with regard to the pay subscale, there were significant 
differences for health worker category (p=0.045). Significant differences were also observed 
for province (p=0.001), with Gauteng respondents reporting lower satisfaction with pay (M = 
3.3, SD = 0.34) than North West respondents (M = 4.6, SD = 3.8). The pay subscale in 
hospitals also reflected significant differences between locations (p=0.02).  
 
With regards to the work subscale, the overall mean score fell within the neutral range and it 
was 8.9 (SD=4.5). There was significant gender differences (p=0.032). Although both males 
and females satisfaction levels with their work fell within the neutral range, males had a 
slightly higher mean score of 10.1 (SD=4.5) than females with a mean score of 8.7 (SD=4.5). 
The overall mean score for satisfaction with supervision for hospital respondents also fell 
within the neutral range (M = 8.7, SD = 4.9) and there were no significant differences between 
groups. Table 25 also demonstrates that hospital respondents were most satisfied with their 
co-workers (M = 10.9, SD = 4.4) with no significant differences observed between sub-
groups. 
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Table 25: Summary Statistics of Responses to the Scales of aJIG and aJDI (Hospitals)  
Category  
aJIG  aJDI-Work aJDI-Pay aJDI-Promotion aJDI- Supervision 
aJDI- 
Co-workers 
 
Mean  
(SD) 
P-Value 
Mean  
(SD) 
P-Value 
Mean 
(SD) 
P-Value 
Mean  
(SD) 
P- 
Value  
Mean 
(SD) 
P- 
Value 
Mean  
(SD) 
P- 
Value 
Overall 15.0 (6.9) - 8.9 (4.5) - 3.8 (3.6) - 6.1 (4.6) - 8.7 (4.9)  10.9 (4.4) - 
Gender 
Male 14.7 (7.7) 
0.761 
10.1 (4.5) 
0.032 
3.6 (3.5) 
0.679 
5.4 (4.9) 
0.230 
8.8 (5.2) 
0.887 
10.8 (4.6) 
0.878 
Female 14.9 (6.8) 8.7 (4.5) 3.9 (3.6) 6.2 (4.5) 8.7 (4.9) 10.9 (4.4) 
              
Marital 
status 
Single 15.0 (6.8) 
0.930 
9.0 (4.5) 
0.327 
4.1 (3.7) 
0.332 
5.7 (4.7) 
0.329 
8.5 (4.9) 
0.750 
10.7 (4.7) 
0.575 
Married  14.9 (7.2) 9.1 (4.6) 3.6 (3.5) 6.4 (4.5) 8.9 (4.9) 11.2 (4.2) 
Divorced/ 
Separated/ Widowed 
14.6 (6.4) 8.1 (4.3) 3.7 (3.6) 6.3 (4.4) 8.8 (5.4) 10.7 (4.4) 
              
Health 
worker 
category 
Doctor 14.2 (7.7) 
0.045 
10.7 (4.3) 
0.056 
3.2 (3.3) 
0.046 
5.0 (4.6) 
0.111 
8.3 (5.4) 
0.077 
10.8 (4.4) 
0.062 
Professional Nurse 13.9 (7.5) 9.1 (4.8) 3.9 (3.9) 6.7 (4.9) 8.2 (5.1) 10.2 (4.6) 
Staff Nurse 15.2 (6.3) 8.5 (4.1) 3.2 (2.7) 5.6 (4.3) 9.9 (4.8) 11.5 (4.4) 
Assistant Nurse 16.2 (6.2) 8.6 (4.4) 4.4 (3.7) 6.1 (4.4) 8.7 (4.7) 11.4 (4.1) 
              
Province 
Gauteng 15.2 (6.5) 
0.353 
9.1 (4.5) 
0.558 
3.3 (3.4) 
0.001 
6.1 (4.5) 
0.823 
9.0 (5.0) 
0.169 
11.0 (4.4) 
0.514 
North West 14.6 (7.5) 8.8 (4.6) 4.6 (3.8) 6.2 (4.7) 8.3 (4.8) 10.7 (4.5) 
              
Location 
Gauteng urban 15.2 (6.5) 
0.065 
9.1 (4.5) 
0.842 
3.3 (3.4) 
0.002 
6.1 (4.5) 
0.773 
9.0 (5.0) 
0.277 
11.0 (4.4) 
0.722 North West urban 13.2 (7.9) 8.8 (4.5) 4.4 (3.5) 5.9 (4.6) 8.7 (4.7) 10.5 (4.2) 
North West rural 15.5 (7.1) 8.8 (4.7) 4.7 (4.1) 6.4 (4.8) 8.1 (4.9) 10.9 (4.6) 
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Table 26 below provides the results of the aJIG and aJDI scales for the 136 respondents that 
participated from clinics. According to this table, clinic health professionals reported high 
overall job satisfaction with a total mean score of 16.3 (SD=5.9); no significant differences 
were noted between groups.  
 
Regarding the aJDI scales, as with the hospital participants, clinic respondents were least 
satisfied with pay with a mean score of 4.5 (SD=4.3) and there were significant differences 
with regard to province and location (p=0.001 for both). Gauteng health professionals were 
significantly more dissatisfied with pay with a mean score of 3.3 (SD=3.5) than their North 
West counterparts with a mean of 6.1 (SD=4.9). The overall mean score for the promotion 
subscale in clinics fell within the neutral range (M = 7.6, SD = 4.4); however, there were 
significant differences between provinces (p=0.048) and by location (p=0.024). The one-way 
ANOVA revealed that Gauteng health professionals were significantly more dissatisfied with 
promotion (p=0.045) with a mean score of 6.9 (SD=3.8) while the North West health 
professionals fell within the neutral range with a mean score of 8.5 (SD=5.0).  
 
The results in Table 26 also illustrate that the overall mean score for satisfaction with 
supervision fell within the neutral range (M = 8.8, SD = 5.0). There were no significant 
differences between groups. Health professionals in clinics were also moderately satisfied 
with their work but there were no between groups significant differences. As with the hospital 
respondents, clinic health professionals were also satisfied with their co-workers, with the 
overall mean score of 11.2 (SD=4.7). North West health professionals were significantly more 
satisfied with their co-workers with a mean score of 12.3 (SD=3.5) while Gauteng health 
professionals fell within the neutral range with a mean score of 10.5 (SD=5.3 (p=0.032).  
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Table 26: Summary Statistics of Responses to the Scales of aJIG and aJDI (Clinics)  
Category  
aJIG aJDI-Work aJDI-Pay aJDI-Promotion aJDI- Supervision 
aJDI- 
Co-workers 
 
Mean  
(SD) 
P-
Value 
Mean 
 (SD) 
P-
Value 
Mean 
(SD) 
P-Value 
Mean  
(SD) 
P-Value  
Mean 
(SD) 
P-Value 
Mean 
(SD) 
P- 
Value 
Overall 16.3 (5.9) - 10.9 (4.2) - 4.5 (4.3) - 7.6 (4.4) - 8.8 (5.0) - 11.2 (4.7) - 
Gender 
Male 15.5 (6.6) 
0.612 
10.6 (4.9) 
0.816 
3.8 (5.1) 
0.581 
9.3 (5.4) 
0.138 
11.3 (4.9) 
0.061 
12.1 (4.6) 
0.480 
Female 16.3 (5.9) 10.9 (4.2) 4.5 (4.2) 7.4 (4.3) 8.6 (4.9) 11.1 (4.7) 
              
Marital 
status 
Single 15.5 (6.2) 
0.255 
10.1 (4.1) 
0.203 
4.2 (3.9) 
0.822 
7.1 (4.2) 
0.636 
8.9 (5.0) 
0.940 
10.7 (4.9) 
0.615 
Married  16.2 (6.1) 11.5 (4.2) 4.7 (4.9) 7.9 (4.5) 8.7 (5.1) 11.6 (4.9) 
Divorced/ 
Separated/ widowed 
17.9 (4.8) 10.6 (4.4) 4.4 (3.5) 7.8 (4.6) 9.1 (5.1) 11.2 (4.1) 
              
Health 
worker 
category 
Doctor 17.0 (0.0) 
0.898 
13.0 (2.8) 
0.911 
7.0 (4.2) 
0.291 
11.0 (1.4) 
0.731 
12.0 (4.2) 
0.265 
13.0 (0.0) 
0.938 
Professional Nurse 15.9 (6.4) 10.8 (4.4) 4.7 (4.1) 7.5 (4.7) 8.8 (5.3) 11.0 (4.6) 
Staff Nurse 16.7 (4.7) 11.0 (4.3) 2.8 (3.8) 7.4 (3.7) 7.1 (5.2) 11.2 (5.1) 
Assistant Nurse 16.7 (5.6) 10.8 (4.0) 4.7 (4.8) 7.7 (4.3) 9.6 (4.1) 11.5 (4.9) 
              
Province 
Gauteng 15.9 (5.8) 
0.391 
10.7 (4.2) 
0.572 
3.3 (3.5) 
0.001 
6.9 (3.8) 
0.048 
8.2 (5.2) 
0.064 
10.5 (5.3) 
0.032 
North West 16.8 (6.1) 11.1 (4.2) 6.1 (4.9) 8.5 (5.0) 9.8 (4.6) 12. 3 (3.5) 
              
Location 
Gauteng urban 15.9 (5.8) 
0.673 
10.7 (4.2) 
0.760 
3.4 (3.4) 
0.001 
6.9 (3.8) 
0.024 
8.2 (5.2) 
0.179 
10.5 (5.3) 
0.095 North West urban 17.4 (4.4) 12.0 (4.6) 6.8 (5.4) 5.0 (4.8) 9.6 (6.1) 13.0 (2.4) 
North West rural 16.7 (6.3) 11.0 (4.2) 6.1 (4.9) 8.9 (5.0) 9.8 (4.5) 12.2 (3.6) 
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8.4 Intention to Quit and Organisational Commitment of Survey 
Respondents 
The scoring for the ITQ was determined by summing up the responses to the four items, 
leading to a minimum score of 4 and a maximum score of 28. Following the scoring 
guidelines used in the aJIG and aJDI, a score of 14 was regarded as the neutral point, 
implying that scores above 14 indicated “high intention to leave” while a score below 14 
indicated “low intention to leave”.  
 
Table 27 shows the results of the intention to quit and organisational commitment of 444 
hospital respondents and 144 clinic respondents. In general, health professionals in hospitals 
reported a high intention to quit, with an overall mean score of 15.2 (SD=6.9) while clinic 
health professionals reported a lower intention to quit with a mean score of 12.9 (SD=6.4). 
The findings suggest that there was a significant difference between genders amongst clinic 
respondents. For instance, the results of the ANOVA test demonstrated that males in clinics 
had significantly high intention to quit with a mean score of 16.4 (SD=7.8) comparable to 
their female counterparts with a mean score of 12.6 (SD=6.2) (p=0.042). No significant 
differences were noted between groups in hospitals for intention to quit.  
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Table 27: Summary Statistics of Responses to the Intention to Quit (ITQ) and Organisational Commitment (OC) Scales 
 
Category  
HOSPITALS CLINICS 
ITQ OC ITQ OC 
Mean (SD) P-Value Mean (SD) P-value  Mean (SD) P-Value Mean (SD) P-value  
Overall 15.2 (6.9) - 4.2 (0.9) - 12.9 (6.4) - 4.3 (1.1) - 
Gender 
Male 16.2 (7.1) 
0.215 
4.0 (0.9) 
0.113 
16.4 (7.8) 
0.042 
4.5 (0.6)  
0.661 
Female 15.0 (6.9) 4.3 (0.9) 12.6 (6.2) 4.4 (1.1) 
          
Marital status  
Single 15.6 (7.3) 
0.186 
4.1 (0.9) 
0.257 
14.4 (6.4) 
0.095 
4.3 (1.1) 
0.567 
Married  15.2 (6.4) 4.3 (0.9) 11.8 (6.4) 4.3 (1.0) 
Divorced/ Separated/ 
Widowed 
13.6 (7.1) 4.3 (0.9) 12.2 (5.7) 4.6 (1.1) 
          
Health worker  
category 
Doctor 16.1 (7.5) 
0.510 
3.9 (0.8) 
0.027 
0.8 (4.2) 
0.683 
4.6 (0.2) 
0.527 
Professional Nurse 16.1 (7.2) 4.2 (0.8) 13.1 (6.8) 4.3 (1.1) 
Staff Nurse 14.9 (6.8) 4.4 (1.0) 13.5 (7.1) 4.7 (0.6) 
Assistant Nurse 13.9 (6.4) 4.2 (1.1) 12.5 (5.3) 4.3 (1.3) 
          
Province 
Gauteng 14.8 (6.9) 
0.228 
4.3 (0.9) 
0.125 
12.9 (6.2)  
0.967 
4.2 (1.1) 
0.015 
North West 15.7 (6.9) 4.1 (0.9) 12.9 (6.8) 4.6 (1.1) 
          
Location 
Gauteng urban 14.8 (6.9) 
0.354 
4.3 (0.9) 
0.078 
12.9 (6.2) 
0.999 
4.2 (1.1) 
0.041 North West urban 16.2 (7.2) 3.9 (0.9) 13.0 (6.0) 4.3 (1.1) 
North West rural 15.3 (6.8) 4.2 (1.0) 12.1 (6.9) 4.7 (1.2) 
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Contrary to the earlier finding in Table 8 indicating that only a small proportion of the 
hospital health professionals in Gauteng (20.7%) and North West (20.3%) changed jobs in the 
past year, the results of the intention to quit of hospital respondents was above the neutral 
point for both provinces. For instance, hospital health professionals in Gauteng reported a 
mean score of 14.8 (SD=6.9) while their North West counterparts had a high intention to 
leave with a mean score of 15.7 (SD=6.9); however this difference was not statistically 
significant (p=0.228). Similarly, when looking at clinic respondents, lower percentages in 
Gauteng (20.5%) and North West provinces (16.7%) reported changing jobs in the past year. 
This finding is consistent with the ITQ results which found that clinic health professionals in 
both provinces had a lower score for intention to quit with a mean score of 12.9 (SD=6.2) in 
Gauteng and mean score of 12.9 (SD=6.8) in North West province (p=0.967).  
 
As demonstrated in Table 27, the results of the 14-item Organisational Commitment (OC) 
scale were slightly above the midpoint, indicating moderate levels of commitment with mean 
score of 4.2 (SD=0.9) for hospitals and 4.3 (1.1) for clinics. Findings from the ANOVA test 
revealed that there were significant differences for health worker category in hospitals 
(p=0.027) and no significant differences were reported for other groups. In clinics, there were 
significant differences for province (p=0.015) and location (p=0.041). Health professionals 
from North West province reported a slightly higher commitment with a mean score of 4.6 
(SD=1.1) than their Gauteng counterparts with a mean score of 4.2 (SD=1.1).  
 
8.5 The Impact of Study Interventions on Overall Job Satisfaction and 
aJDI-Pay 
Table 28 shows the results of the impact of the study interventions on the overall job 
satisfaction (aJIG) and satisfaction with pay (aJDI). In this table, two-sample t-tests revealed 
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that respondents who benefitted from the interventions investigated in this study did not have 
significantly higher overall job satisfaction in either hospitals or clinic.  
 
However, the rural allowance, scarce skills allowance and OSD all increased satisfaction with 
pay for both hospital and clinic respondents. However, the differences were only statistically 
significant for the rural allowance (t=3.3, p=0.001) and for OSD (t=2.8, p=0.005) among 
health professionals in hospitals. 
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Table 28: The Impact of Interventions on Overall Job Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Pay  
Predictor Variable 
HOSPITALS CLINICS 
aJIG aJDI-Pay aJIG aJDI-Pay 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
P-
value 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
P-
value 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
P-
value 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
P-value 
Rural  
Allowance 
Yes  14.6 1.099 
0.689 
5.5 0.631 
0.001 
15.4 1.744 
0.658 
5.6 1.109 
0.202 
No 15.0 0.357 3.7 0.182 16.1 0.541 4.2 0.376 
              
Scarce 
Skills  
Allowance 
Yes  14.7 1.034 
0.715 
4.4 0.619 
0.295 
16.5 1.756 
0.739 
5.5 0.985 
0.386 
No 15.0 0.360 3.8 0.185 15.9 0.545 4.3 0.352 
              
OSD 
Yes  15.3 0.623 
0.567 
4.7 0.364 
0.005 
16.1 0.870 
0.925 
5.2 0.587 
0.076 
No 14.9 0.406 3.6 0.201 15.9 0.647 3.9 0.445 
              
Facility 
Status 
Revitalised 15.7 0.597 
0.161 
4.5 0.355 
0.209 
      
Non-revitalised 14.7 0.413 3.6 0.208       
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8.6 The Impact of Interventions on Intention to Quit and Organisational 
Commitment  
Table 29 reports on the impact of interventions on the intention to quit and organisational 
commitment of health professionals. In hospitals, rural allowance (t=-0.1, p=0.967) and scarce 
skills allowance (t=-0.2, p=0.840) increased the respondent’s intention to quit, although the 
differences were not statistically significant. However, the occupation specific dispensation 
significantly decreased the intention to quit of hospital health professionals (t=-2.2, p<0.05). 
In clinics, all the financial incentive strategies decreased the respondents’ intention to quit; 
however, there were no significant differences. Table 29 also illustrates that all interventions 
under investigation in this study moderately increased the organisational commitment of 
hospital and clinic respondents.  
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Table 29: The Impact of Interventions on Intention to Quit and Organisational Commitment 
Predictor Variable 
HOSPITALS CLINICS 
Intention to Quit (ITQ) 
Organisational Comm. 
(OC) 
Intention to Quit (ITQ) 
Organisational Comm. 
(OC) 
Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
P-
value 
Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
P-value Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
P-
value 
Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
P-value 
Rural  
Allowance 
Yes  15.1 1.097 
0.967 
4.2 0.115 
0.673 
13.1 1.793 
0.988 
4.8 0.135 
0.068 
No 15.2 0.354 4.2 0.049 13.1 0.566 4.3 0.099 
              
Scarce 
Skills  
Allowance 
Yes  15.0 1.074 
0.840 
4.2 0.103 
0.539 
13.1 1.627 
0.993 
4.9 0.221 
0.054 
No 15.2 0.355 4.2 0.049 13.1 0.575 4.3 0.094 
              
OSD 
Yes  13.9 0.607 
0.016 
4.3 0.073 
0.078 
12.6 0.896 
0.492 
4.5 0.089 
0.199 
No 15.7 0.401 4.1 0.056 13.4 0.679 4.2 0.132 
              
Facility 
Status 
Revitalised 14.7 0.589 
0.307 
4.3 0.086 
0.121 
      
Non-revitalised 15.2 0.411 4.2 0.053       
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8.7 Multiple Regression Analysis of the aJIG and Pay Subscale 
The results of the multiple regression analysis to determine the factors influencing the 
respondents’ overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with pay for respondents in hospitals and 
in clinics are reported separately in Table 30. The analysis focused on whether health 
professionals who received allowances or benefitted from the hospital revitalisation 
programme were more satisfied than those who did not while adjusting for other confounding 
factors such as gender, marital status, age, health worker category and province. Although the 
model was statistically significant for overall job satisfaction in hospitals (p<0.05), it only 
explained 5.9% of the total variation in job satisfaction. Similarly, the model was statistically 
significant for satisfaction with pay in hospital (p<0.001) explaining 10.1% of the total 
variation.   
 
The regression results illustrate that receiving allowances did not significantly improve the 
overall job satisfaction of respondents in both clinics and hospitals. The revitalisation of 
hospitals also did not significantly increase health professionals overall job satisfaction. 
Gender, marital status, health worker category and province were also insignificant 
determinants of the overall job satisfaction in both hospitals and clinics. However, this study 
found that age was a positive significant predictor of overall job satisfaction in hospitals 
(p=0.045); implying that the older health professionals had significantly higher job 
satisfaction than their younger counterparts.  
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Table 30: Multiple Regression Analysis for aJIG and aJDI-Pay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aJIG Hospitals: n=374, F=1.91, p<0.05, R
2
=0.059;      aJIG Clinics: n=134, F=0.74, p=0.699, R
2
=0.063 
aJDI-Pay Hospital: n=377, F=3.41, p<0.001, R
2
=0.101;      aJDI-Pay Clinics: n=135, F=1.57, p=0.117, R
2
=0.123 
 
 Variable 
 HOSPITAL CLINICS 
aJIG aJDI-Pay aJIG aJDI-Pay 
 Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P-
Value 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P- 
Value 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P-
Value 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P-
Value 
Rural 
Allowance 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Yes -1.227 1.394 0.379 -1.635 0.706 0.021 1.318 2.008 0.513 0.116 1.330 0.931 
Scarce skills 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Yes -0.646 1.624 0.691 -2.259 0.821 0.006 -1.527 1.978 0.442 -1.073 1.316 0.416 
OSD 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Yes -0.505 0.845 0.551 -0.928 0.433 0.033 -1.732 1.324 0.193 -1.296 0.871 0.139 
Facility status 
Revitalised - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Non-revitalised -0.834 0.881 0.345 0.026 0.454 0.954 - - - - - - 
Gender 
Male  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Female 0.045 1.168 0.969 0.387 0.597 0.517 0.198 1.976 0.920 1.202 1.314 0.362 
Marital status Single - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Married -0.337 0.787 0.669 -0.247 0.401 0.538 0.938 1.359 0.492 0.094 0.904 0.917 
Divorced/ 
Separated/ 
-1.077 1.176 0.360 -0.381 0.608 0.532 3.559 1.791 0.049 -0.416 1.191 0.728 
Age  0.083 0.041 0.045 0.021 0.360 0.360 -0.091 0.071 0.202 0.041 0.047 0.382 
Health worker 
category 
Doctor - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Profession Nurse -0.468 1.963 0.812 1.681 0.974 0.085 -1.536 6.512 0.814 -2.362 3.081 0.445 
Staff Nurse 1.115 2.068 0.590 1.734 1.029 0.093 0.946 6.724 0.888 -2.696 3.218 0.404 
Assistant Nurse 3.174 2.048 0.122 2.657 1.016 0.007 0.533 6.602 0.936 -1.393 3.124 0.656 
Province 
Gauteng  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
North West -1.565 0.863 0.071 -0.877 0.440 0.047 0.487 1.298 0.708 2.358 0.854 0.007 
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In relation to satisfaction with pay, Table 30 also demonstrates that all the three financial 
incentives strategies significantly increased health professionals’ satisfaction with pay in 
hospitals. For instance, satisfaction with pay was higher for hospital health professionals who 
received rural allowance (p=0.021), scarce skills allowance (p=0.006) and OSD (p=0.033). 
However, these allowances did not significantly increase satisfaction with pay for health 
professionals from clinics and health centres. This study also found that assistant nurses in 
hospitals were significantly satisfied with pay than doctors (p=0.007). In addition, differences 
between provinces were noted, with North West health professionals in clinics and health 
centres significantly satisfied with pay than their Gauteng counterparts (p=0.007). However, 
no significant association was found between satisfaction with pay and gender, marital status, 
and age for either hospital or clinics health professionals.  
 
8.8 Multiple Regression Analysis of the Intention to Quit and 
Organisational Commitment 
In Table 31, the key findings of a multiple regression analysis determining the factors 
influencing the respondents’ intention to quit their current jobs and their commitment to 
remain in their current facilities are reported. The model for the intention to leave the current 
job was statistically significant in hospitals (p<0.001) but it only explained 10.9% of the total 
variation. Likewise, the model was statistically significant for organisational commitment in 
both hospitals (p<0.005) and clinics (p<0.05) explaining 10.1% and 16.3% of the total 
variation respectively. However, the model for intention to quit was not significant in clinics 
(p=0.537). 
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Table 31: Multiple Regression Analysis for Intention to Quit and Organisational Commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ITQ Hospitals: n=391, F=3.85, p<0.001, R
2
=0.109;      ITQ Clinics: n=130, F=0.91, p=0.537, R
2
=0.074 
OC Hospital: n=395, F=2.56, p<0.005, R
2
=0.074;      OC Clinics: n=141, F=2.28, p<0.05, R
2
=0.163 
 
Variable 
 HOSPITAL CLINICS 
Intention to Quit (ITQ) Organisation Com (OC) Intention to Quit (ITQ) Organisation Com (OC) 
 Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P-
Value 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P- 
Value 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P-
Value 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
P-
Value 
Rural 
Allowance 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Yes 2.135 1.329 0.109 -0118 0.179 0.510 0.634 2.035 0.756 -0.125 0.314 0.690 
Scarce skills 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Yes 0.449 1.551 0.772 -0.229 0.209 0.275 -0.076 2.014 0.970 -0.488 0.311 0.119 
OSD 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Yes 1.824 0.809 0.025 -0.153 0.109 0.163 1.673 1.346 0.216 -0.274 0.204 0.181 
Facility status 
Revitalised - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Non-revitalised 0.422 0.841 0.617 -0.182 0.113 0.109 - - - - - - 
Gender 
Male  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Female -1.104 1.103 0.317 0.074 0.148 0.616 -3.056 2.009 0.131 -0.124 0.310 0.689 
Marital status Single - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Married 0612 0.751 0.416 0.064 0.101 0.525 -1.586 1.376 0.251 0.125 0.207 0.547 
Divorced/ 
Separated/ 
-0.169 1.123 0.880 -0.037 0.152 0.807 -1.842 1.787 0.305 0.081 0.274 0.767 
Age  -0.164 0.039 0.001 0.011 0.005 0.037 -0.011 0.072 0.885 0.209 0.011 0.055 
Health worker 
category 
Doctor - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Profession Nurse 1.765 1.833 0.336 0.035 0.248 0.190 6.545 4.709 0.167 -0.332 0.729 0.650 
Staff Nurse 0.236 1.934 0.903 0.586 0.261 0.025 5.249 4.913 0.287 0.296 0.759 0.697 
Assistant Nurse -2.423 1.904 0.204 0.598 0.257 0.020 4.184 4.780 0.383 -0.036  0.961 
Province 
Gauteng  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
North West 1.266 0.817 0.122 -0.213 0.110 0.054 0.465 1.308 0.723 0.555 0.200 0.006 
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The results in Table 31 above indicate that receiving the rural or scare skills allowance did not 
have a significant impact on intention to leave or organisational commitment in either 
hospitals or clinics. However, after adjusting for other factors, OSD appeared to increase the 
intention to quit of hospital respondents who received it (p=0.025) compared to those who did 
not.  
 
With regard to other predictors, the analysis did indicate that increasing age was significantly 
associated with increasing organisational commitment (p=0.037) and lower intention to leave 
(p=0.001) among health professionals in hospitals. There were significant differences in the 
organisation commitment of different staff categories from hospitals, and North West health 
professionals from clinics had higher organisational commitment than those from Gauteng 
(p=0.006). However, gender and marital status did not seem to be significant predictors of 
organisational commitment or intention to leave in either hospitals or clinics.  
 
8.9 Conclusion  
In this Chapter, the quantitative analysis of the survey findings on job satisfaction, 
organisational commitment and intention to leave were presented. These findings highlighted 
that in general, health workers were satisfied with their job in general, aspects of their work 
and with their co-workers, but they were less satisfied with pay, promotion and supervision. I 
attempted to investigate the impact of the study interventions on the respondents overall job 
satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, intention to quit and organisational commitment. The 
chapter showed that health workers receiving allowances were significantly more satisfied 
with pay than those who were not getting allowances. However, receiving allowances did not 
significantly improve the overall job satisfaction or decrease the health workers’ intention to 
quit. The final results chapter that follows will provide a comparative analysis of the design 
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and implementation of the interventions as well as their influence on the motivation and 
retention health workers.  
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CHAPTER 9: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND INFLUENCE OF 
THE HRH INTERVENTIONS ON THE 
MOTIVATION AND RETENTION OF HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter draws from the previous five results chapters (Chapters 4 to 8) to provide a 
critical analysis of the commonalities and differences with regard to the design and 
implementation processes of the four incentives strategies under investigation in this study. 
The overall commonalities and differences in relation to the influence of these strategies on 
the motivation and retention of health professionals will also be discussed and qualitative and 
quantitative findings will be contrasted. The findings will be organised according to three 
main broad sections: a) the design and implementation processes of the incentive strategies; b) 
comparative analysis of the influence of incentive strategies on the motivation and retention 
of health workers and c) a revised integrated conceptual framework. Within each section, key 
thematic areas are discussed.   
 
9.2 The Design and Implementation Processes of the Incentive Strategies  
In Chapters 5 to 7, the Walt and Gilson framework was used to demonstrate the complex 
interactions between the policy contents, processes and contextual factors related to the design 
and implementation of the four interventions of interest in this research as well as mapping 
out the key actors and their roles. While this framework was useful particularly in 
conceptualising and organising thinking around the key policy design and implementation 
features, it is limited with regards to explaining why implementation weaknesses happened. 
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For this reason, in this section, the latter framework will be complemented with Hogwood and 
Gunn [199, 200] who took implementation analysis further by identifying 10 preconditions 
necessary for ‘perfect implementation’. Although these 10 preconditions are not realistically 
attainable, they are still helpful in challenging us to think more systematically about the 
reasons for implementation failures and about approaches to improving the implementation 
processes [277]. Therefore, this section will provide comprehensive cross-cutting findings 
discussing the extent to which the implementation of the four interventions of interest in this 
research met the Hogwood and Gunn’s preconditions. A detailed explanation of each 
precondition is provided in the sections to follow.  
  
9.2.1 Precondition 1: Circumstances External to the Implementing Agency should not 
Impose Crippling Constraints 
Hogwood and Gunn [199] assert that external obstacles “may be political in that either policy 
or the measures needed to achieve it are unacceptable to interests (such as party activists, 
trade unions or in some societies the military) which have the power to veto them” (p199). 
The findings show that a key external constraint that was threatening the implementation of 
the three financial incentives of interest in this study was varying forms of contestations 
(Table 32). For instance, with regards to the rural and scarce skills allowances, contestations 
were between the nursing labour unions and the national Department of Health. Firstly, the 
unions objected to the National Department of Health unilateral decision of determining the 
criteria for selecting the health professionals that were targeted to benefit from the rural and 
scarce skills allowances.  
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 Table 32: Brief Summary of Hogwood and Gunn’s [199, 200] Implementation Model 
 
 Rural Allowance Scarce Skills Allowance OSD Hospital Revitalisation 
External constraints  Contestations between labour unions & NDOH regarding exclusion 
of junior nurses. 
 Unions initially refused to sign – arguing lack of government 
consultation in determining beneficiaries and disparities in amounts 
for doctors and nurses. 
 Unions succumbed to pressure – R500 million was at stake of being 
withdrawn by the National Treasury.  
 Contestations within and outside the 
unions over prioritisation of nurses 
as the first category to benefit from 
OSD. 
 
 
 International migration of doctors and nurses.  
 
 Timing coincided with the global 
economic crisis. 
Adequate time & 
resources 
 Delayed implementation because of contestations. 
 
 Rushed implementation: 
widespread public sector strike 
accelerated implementation. 
 Delayed implementation due to 
inefficiencies in tendering and 
procurement. 
 Retrospective payment of incentives, led to an increase in taxation  
  Suboptimal human resource 
information system. 
 Insufficient financial resources: due 
to undercount of 10,000 nurses 
 Under-expenditure: due to limited 
technical capacity 
Required 
combination of 
resources 
 Policies and frameworks available. 
 Substantial committed financial resources allocated by the National Treasury to implement these interventions (implying political will). But: 
  Financial resources not immediately 
available at hospital level 
 No additional resources for career 
path activities 
 Insufficient personnel to manage 
the different components  
 Lack of technical capacity of implementers. 
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 Rural Allowance Scarce Skills Allowance OSD Hospital Revitalisation 
Policy based on valid 
theory of cause & 
effect   
 Interventions were based on theories explaining individual’s behavioural responses to financial and non-financial incentives: 
 With regards to financial incentives, it was anticipated that an increase in salary would improve recruitment, motivation and retention. 
 In relation to hospital revitalisation, it was thought that an improvement in the working conditions would improve recruitment, motivation 
and retention.  
 Limited use of evidence to guide policy formulation.  Informed by findings of the 
national hospital infrastructure 
audit and pilot. 
Clear cause & effect 
relationship 
 Rural allowance would entice 
health workers to rural and 
underserved areas. 
 Scarce skills allowance would 
attract & retain critical or 
specialised skills in the public 
sector. 
 OSD would provide clear career 
paths & salary progression of 
nurses to discourage them from 
searching for new opportunities 
outside nursing.  
 Improved working conditions 
would attract and retain staff. 
Dependency 
relationships to be 
minimal 
 Accurate list of rural hospitals, 
clinics and community health 
centres.  
 Depended on nurses submitting 
proof of Nursing Council 
qualifications. 
 Accurate register of specialised 
nurses from Nursing Council. 
 Submission of Business Cases.  
 Submission of Project 
Implementation Plans (PIP). 
  Available and accurate human 
resource information system. 
 
 Proof of length of service record – 
no computerised system 
 
 Adequate management capacity of implementers. 
 Implementation decentralised across all the four incentive strategies. 
 Availability of financial resources. 
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 Rural Allowance Scarce Skills Allowance OSD Hospital Revitalisation 
Agreement of 
Objectives 
 Disagreement because lower 
category of nurses were excluded. 
 Disagreement because of the 
discrepancy in the amount given 
to doctors and nurses. 
 Disagreement because it favoured 
professional nurses than junior 
nurses.  
 Agreement that those with 
critical skills should be 
incentivised.  
 But disagreement that only three 
nursing specialities benefited. 
 Disagreement because it was 
perceived to favour professional 
nurses than lower categories of 
nurses. 
 Consensus that improved working 
conditions was essential to attract 
health professionals into the 
public sector. 
 Financial incentives not linked to performance.  
Sequencing of events   Limited clarification of roles.  
 Inadequate time for planning.  
 No project implementation plans detailing the sequence of implementation activities.    Project Implementation Plan 
(PIP) available - but did not 
conform to standards set out in 
Project Implementation Manual  
Communication & 
coordination 
 Suboptimal communication strategy: 
 With rural allowance, it resulted in observed disagreements & misunderstandings esp. to those excluded.  
 With OSD, it created a high degree of anticipation which led to great disappointments and dissatisfaction when expectations were not met.  
 Weak coordination & oversight from national government. 
Total compliance  Poor implementation “fidelity”: the interventions were not implemented as prescribed by the policies. 
 “Rural” definition left at the 
discretion of provinces. 
  Complexity of nursing specialities  
 Variations and interpretation of 
policy within and between 
provinces. 
  Variations and interpretation of 
policy within and between 
provinces. 
 Multipronged strategy with too 
much to cover in a new 
democratic government still 
finding its feet into leadership. 
  Complex series of events. 
 The enormity of implementation was not taken into consideration. 
  No systems for monitoring, supervision and evaluation. 
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Secondly, the nursing union in particular, was dissatisfied with the exclusion of the junior 
categories of nurses from benefiting specifically from rural allowance. Lastly, the unions were 
unhappy with the low percentage offered to professional nurses comparable to doctors 
especially in relation to the rural allowance (12% for professional nurses as opposed to 22% 
for doctors). As such, these unions were initially refusing to sign the agreement until their 
concerns were addressed. However, the unions ultimately had to succumb to pressure to sign 
the agreement because failure to do so would have resulted in the National Treasury 
withholding the R500 million funds already earmarked for payment of these incentives (Table 
32).   
 
Table 32 also illustrates that regarding the OSD, contestations were among the recognised 
labour unions in the central bargaining chamber and this was in relation to the prioritisation of 
nurses as the first health provider category to benefit from the OSD over other health 
professionals. Outside the unions, the results showed that the National Department of Health 
initially faced resistance from the National Treasury which was pushing for the prioritisation 
of doctors basing their argument on the costs because there are more nurses than doctors 
(Table 32). However, the National Department of Health held the decision-making power 
over which health category should be prioritised first in the OSD implementation and stuck to 
their choice of the nursing profession.  
Another external constraint at the time when the rural and scarce skills allowances were 
introduced was the international migration of doctors and nurses from South Africa to abroad 
(Table 32); it was then at its highest peak and outside the control of policymakers. With 
regards to the OSD policy, the timing of its implementation coincided with the global 
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economic crises. Although this did not affect implementation in any way, its direct or indirect 
effects on the health professionals were beyond the control of the key policymakers.  
 
9.2.2 Precondition 2: Adequate Time and Sufficient Resources should be made available 
to the Programme 
While the implementation of the OSD was rushed as a result of the protracted public sector 
strike in 2007, the implementation of the rural allowance, scarce skills allowance and hospital 
revitalisation was delayed for different reasons. The delay with regards to the rural and scarce 
skills allowances was because of the contestations that led to the last minute signing of the 
agreement (Table 32). In relation to the hospital revitalisation program, the delay was due to 
inefficiencies in the tendering and procurement processes. Another common feature of the 
financial incentives was that pay-outs for all three of them was made retrospectively (Table 
32), leading to an increase in taxation and lower  nett amounts ultimately received by the 
health professionals.   
 
In terms of the adequacy of resources, the findings showed that there was over-expenditure 
with the OSD implementation while there were problems of under-expenditure in relation to 
the hospital revitalisation programme (Table 32). For example, although around ZAR1,5 
billion was allocated for the implementation of the OSD for the 2007 financial year, this 
amount proved to be insufficient for several reasons. Firstly, a sub-optimal human resource 
information system resulted in an under-count of the total number of nurses in the public 
health sector by 10,000 individuals (Table 32). Although this was a policy design problem, it 
had ramifications during implementation. As a result, the implementation of the OSD proved 
to be more expensive than previously planned.  
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With regards to the hospital revitalisation programme, the results revealed that there was 
under-expenditure (Table 32). For instance, the document review showed that for the 2008/09 
financial year, the Auditor-General reported an under-spending of R35-million in Gauteng 
province alone. One of the reasons mentioned for this challenge was that the Department of 
Public Works in Gauteng appointed contractors who lacked capacity to deal with huge 
budgets.  
  
9.2.3 Precondition 3: The Required Combination of Resources should be Available 
Table 32 also illustrates that across all the interventions (financial and non-financial), policy 
guidelines and frameworks were developed by the national Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) in collaboration with the National Department of Health. This may be 
interpreted as an indication of some level of leadership. Encouragingly, across all the four 
incentive strategies under investigation in this study, substantial financial resources were 
allocated by the National Treasury for their implementation; suggesting political will and 
commitment to addressing the health human resource challenges in the country (Table 32).  
 
However, with regards to the OSD implementation, financial resources were not immediately 
made available at hospital level, resulting in problems for individual hospital managers. For 
instance, the announcement on the OSD was made by the then Minister of Health, Dr. Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang prior to ensuring that sufficient financial resources were in place for 
immediate implementation. In addition, although it was clear from the OSD policy and 
interviews with policymakers that the OSD intended to create career paths and career 
progression for nurses within the health system, the funds allocated were only for 
remuneration; no additional resources were made available for career path activities and for 
managing career progression (Table 32).   
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The technical capacity of the implementers was also raised by the respondents with regards to 
the implementation of the OSD and the hospital revitalisation programme (Table 32). Specific 
to the OSD policy, its implementation was the responsibility of the Human Resource divisions 
of the provincial health department who were unfamiliar with nursing training and 
specialities. This challenge was exacerbated by the unavailability of uniform instructions and 
inadequate training to support these managers.  
 
Similarly, regarding the hospital revitalisation programme, this research found that the 
Department of Public Works, which was leading implementation, lacked technical capacity to 
implement the programme and they lacked personnel to manage the different components of 
the hospital revitalisation (Table 32). This led to poor management of the revitalisation 
programme, weaknesses in the awarding of contracts and lack of adherence to procurement 
protocols.  
 
9.2.4 Precondition 4: The Policy to be implemented should be based on a Valid Theory 
of Cause and Effect  
In essence, there was a unanimous view amongst respondents that all the four incentive 
strategies were in theory good interventions that were based on the theories explaining 
individual’s behavioural responses to financial and non-financial incentives (Table 32). For 
example, several scientific studies as demonstrated in the literature review chapter have 
established a causal link between the use of financial and non-financial incentives to improve 
the recruitment, motivation and retention of health professionals. In addition, all the four 
incentive strategies were responding to the contextual, historic, political, and socio-economic 
challenges related to the times when they were introduced.  
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The results also showed that across all the three financial incentive strategies, limited 
evidence was used to inform the design of these strategies. However, the design of the 
hospital revitalisation programme was informed by the findings of the national hospital 
infrastructure audit as well as a pilot in one hospital across the nine provinces in the country 
during the early years of its implementation. In spite of this, it appears that the policymakers 
neglected to use the lessons learnt from piloting to avoid ongoing implementation challenges.  
 
9.2.5 Precondition 5: The Relationship between Cause and Effect should be Direct and 
there should be few if any Intervening Links  
When looking at the implementation of the interventions being investigated, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the causal chain for all these interventions was direct. For instance, 
with regard to all the financial incentives, there was an expectation from the policymakers that 
an increase in salary would improve the recruitment, motivation and retention of health 
workers (Table 32). Likewise, policymakers anticipated that improvements in the working 
conditions of health workers and management of hospitals through the hospital revitalisation 
programme would increase their recruitment and retention in the public sector (Table 32). The 
results also showed that across all the incentive strategies, some form of evidence informed 
the design to a certain extent regardless of whether this evidence was considered sufficient or 
not by the respondents in this study.  
 
9.2.6 Precondition 6: The Dependency Relationships should be Minimal 
Minimal dependency relationships imply that there should be a single implementing agency 
or if other agencies are involved, that the dependency relationships are minimal both in 
number and importance [200]. The Provincial Department of Health (PDoH) had the primary 
responsibility to ensure that the incentive strategies under study were implemented. Because 
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implementation was decentralised for all the four strategies, there was high dependency 
relationships (Table 32). The results showed that except for the scarce skills allowance, 
implementation across the other three incentive strategies was dependent on one or several 
agencies. For example, the “perfect implementation” of the rural allowance depended on the 
availability and accurate list of rural facilities to ensure that no facilities were excluded from 
benefiting from this incentive strategy. Similarly, the “smooth” implementation of the OSD 
relied on the availability and accurate list of nursing specialities and accurate human resources 
for health information system (Table 32).  
 
In addition, the first step to enable nurses to benefit from the OSD was depended on them 
submitting proof of their qualifications obtainable from the South African Nursing Council 
(SANC) (Table 32). The complexity of this task was taken for granted by the policymakers 
because SANC did not have the staffing capacity to deal with high volumes of requests from 
nurses across the country. Nurses were also required to produce their length of service record 
which was not readily available through a computerised system (Table 32). They had to 
physically acquire this information from health institutions where they previously worked and 
in some instances, these were outside the provinces where they were presently located.   
 
Regarding the hospital revitalisation programme, a document analysis established that one of 
the critical phases of this incentive strategy was for the Provincial Departments of Health to 
submit Business Cases and Project Implementation Plans (PIP) to the National Department of 
Health [226]. However, a number of the Business Cases that were submitted often lacked 
standardisation even though a format was provided. This led to provinces being required to 
redraft and resubmit these Business Cases with the support of the National Department of 
Health Hospital Revitalisation Unit. In addition, the Project Implementation Plans (PIPs) did 
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not conform to the standards as set out in the Project Implementation Manual. The quality and 
depth of the information submitted was also reported to be weak. All these in part contributed 
to the delays in implementation.  
 
Finally, all the four incentive strategies were government-funded, thus there was no 
dependency relationship with external donors in terms of financial resources (Table 32). 
However, this meant that the National Treasury was the most powerful agent as the decision 
to fund all these interventions rested within this office in order for implementation to be 
realised.  
 
9.2.7 Precondition 7: Agreement of Objectives 
According to Hogwood and Gunn [199], under this precondition, a complete understanding 
of, and agreement on, the objectives to be achieved should carry on throughout the 
implementation process. The findings revealed that there were ambivalent views in relation to 
the agreement of objectives across all the financial incentives under investigation in this study 
(Table 32). For example, regarding the rural allowance, while its primary intention of enticing 
health workers to rural and underserved areas was acceptable amongst respondents, there 
were disagreements about the exclusion of the lower cadres of nurses and the discrepancies in 
the amounts between doctors and nurses (Table 32). In addition, both the rural allowance and 
the OSD were perceived to have favoured professional nurses more than the lower categories 
of nurses during implementation. With regards to the scarce skills allowance, there was 
disagreement about the exclusion of other nursing specialities, especially midwifery, from 
benefiting from this incentive strategy. These gaps in the policy design phase resulted in 
implementation failures. A common feature across all the financial incentives was that they 
were not linked to performance (Table 32).  
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9.2.8 Precondition 8: The Tasks should be fully specified in Correct Sequence  
According to Hogwood and Gunn [199], an important element of sequencing is that the role 
of each stakeholder involved in the implementation process should be made explicit. 
Hogwood and Gunn [199] have also acknowledged that although room for discretion and 
improvisation is allowed during implementation, permitting too much room may lead to 
confusion and uncertainty. This study found that the roles of the different stakeholders were 
rarely clarified particularly in the case of the OSD and the hospital revitalisation programme 
(Table 32). For instance, with regards to the implementation of the OSD, it was left to the 
human resource managers to define their role, liaise with the hospital or provincial managers, 
and to fulfil these undefined roles to the best of their abilities. In the case of the hospital 
revitalisation programme, the results of this study found that although the Department of 
Public Works was the primary implementer, multiple stakeholders participating in multiple 
task teams and committees also played a critical role in the initiation and implementation 
processes of this programme. While on paper it seemed like the roles of each stakeholder is 
clear, in reality it was challenging to manage all these multiple teams working on the different 
elements of the revitalisation. This was in part because the Department of Public Works itself 
lacked technical capacity, thus making it challenging to manage others.   
 The results further demonstrated that there was inadequate time for planning the 
implementation of all the financial incentives of interest (Table 32). Planning for the rural and 
scarce skills allowances was affected by the delay in signing the agreement, which led to 
pressure to spend the money allocated for implementation within a specific financial year 
period. Regarding the OSD, the month-long protracted public servants strike influenced the 
ability of government to plan adequately.  
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In addition, except for the hospital revitalisation programme, all three financial incentive 
strategies did not have an implementation plan detailing the sequence of the implementation 
activities to ensure “perfect implementation”. With regards to the hospital revitalisation 
programme, it was expected that the Project Implementation Plans (PIP) should conform to 
the standards set out in the Project Implementation Manual. However, in most instances, this 
was not found to be the case; the quality, standard and depth of the PIPs submitted by the 
provincial Department of Health to the National Department of Health were reported to be 
weak. Specific to the OSD, not all provinces implemented at the same time. The challenge 
with this was that nurses in the different provinces started sharing information with each other 
about the inconsistencies in the benefits received among the different provinces and 
institutions.  
 
9.2.9 Precondition 9: There should be Perfect Communication and Coordination 
Across all the incentive strategies, weak communication was mentioned as a key challenge 
(Table 32). In relation to the three financial incentives, participants reported that 
communication weaknesses were from the policymaker’s side. This was expressed in 
reference to the exclusion of certain categories of health professionals from benefiting from 
these interventions. The provincial Department of Health was also blamed for their inability 
to clearly communicate with hospital managers messages that would enable them to provide 
reliable information to the nurses that were considered ineligible to benefit from the rural and 
scarce skills allowances. Even though these incentives were considered to be clear, minimal 
thought was given to what the implications of these incentives would be for those that were 
ineligible. At the same time, hospital managers also poorly communicated with the HR 
managers that were responsible for the implementation of the OSD at hospital level who in 
turn poorly communicated with the nurses that did not benefit. 
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Additionally, the introduction of all the three financial incentives was announced in the media 
by the then Minister of Health. In the absence of a clear communication strategy (Table 32), 
there were many mixed messages sent out, particularly to the nurses who mostly received 
information from the media and or their labour organisations. This proved to be problematic 
particularly in the case of the OSD where the media, in their interpretation of the Minister of 
Health announcements, emphasised the remuneration component of the OSD and neglecting 
other fundamental principles which are stipulated in the policy as ‘career pathing’, ‘pay and 
grade progression’, ‘speciality’, ‘competencies’ and ‘performance’.  
 
Problems of weak coordination were highlighted across all four incentive strategies, but more 
especially in relation to the OSD and the hospital revitalisation programme (Table 32). For 
example, with regards to the implementation of the OSD, coordination between the National 
Department of Health and provinces were reported to be inadequate by several respondents; 
and it was not clear what support was given to provinces during implementation or how the 
provinces in turn supported the districts, hospitals and clinics. It was also unclear whether and 
how coordination happened between the National Department of Health, SANC, the 
provinces and health facilities. Regarding the hospital revitalisation programme, 
communication and coordination weaknesses were mainly due to the multiplicity of 
stakeholders that were involved in the implementation process and this was reflected by the 
contradictory reports on fundamental issues such as what has been achieved at what time and 
at what costs between the Department of Health, Department of Public Works and the 
National Treasury.  
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9.2.10 Precondition 10: Those in Authority can Demand and Obtain Total Compliance 
Overall, the findings demonstrated that across all the four incentive strategies of interest in 
this study, there was poor implementation fidelity; the interventions were not implemented as 
prescribed by the policies (Table 32). As a result of weak communication and coordination 
between the different levels of government, there was varied interpretation and 
implementation of the rural allowance and the OSD. With regards to the rural allowance, the 
variations were primarily caused by lack of uniformity in the definition of “rural”. The 
provincial health departments were given full autonomy to designate ‘rural areas’ without 
oversight from the National Department of Health, thus creating room for subjective policy 
interpretation and implementation (Table 32).  
 
In relation to the OSD, lack of consensus about nursing specialities contributed to the varied 
interpretations of the policy during implementation. The interviews with key informants 
suggested that the policymakers did not take into account that there were more nursing 
specialities than they had ever anticipated; leading to a number of specialities unintentionally 
excluded from benefiting from the OSD. In addition to this, the OSD policy lacked clarity on 
how nurses with more than one speciality were to be rewarded. Furthermore, clarity was also 
limited on the grandfather clause, which was introduced to allow nurses who worked in a 
speciality area, but without the formal qualification to benefit from the OSD. On the other 
hand, those with the formal qualification, but not working in the specialised area did not 
benefit. All these variations and interpretations led to the inability of the rural allowance and 
the OSD to achieve “total compliance”.  
 
Specific to the OSD, when “total compliance” was not fully achieved during implementation, 
accountability was also diffused, and no-one took responsibility for the weaknesses in 
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implementation. Instead, it became a vicious cycle of blaming: the National Department of 
Health blamed the provinces, the provinces blamed the hospital management, the hospital 
management blamed the unions, and the unions blamed the SANC - that ironically does not 
have a mandate for any implementation or participation in financial incentives.  
 
 The findings also demonstrated that policymakers underestimated the enormity and the 
complexity of implementing both the OSD policy and the hospital revitalisation programme 
(Table 32). Regarding the hospital revitalisation programme, because of its multi-pronged 
nature, there were imbalances with regards to effectively dealing with all its elements during 
implementation. As a result, significant attention was focused on infrastructure improvement, 
and neglecting the other components which included health technology and equipment, and 
improvement of the management of the hospitals. This clearly indicates that while the 
intensions were good, too much was expected too soon for a new democratic government 
which was still finding its feet into leadership.  
 
The findings of this study further demonstrated that once implemented, there were also no 
monitoring, supervision and evaluation systems put in place across all the four incentive 
strategies (Table 32);  thus making it impossible for policymakers and implementers to 
identify potential implementation challenges in a timely manner. Although both the rural and 
scarce skills allowance policies mentioned that annual reviews would take place [243, 244], 
this did not happened. The Department of Health has neither conducted a review nor has it 
evaluated the effectiveness of these allowances since their inception.  
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9.2.11 Summary of the Findings Using Hogwood and Gunn Implementation Model 
This study found that across all the four interventions under investigation, only few of the 
Hogwood and Gunn’s preconditions were met namely that the policies were based upon a 
valid theory and that the relationship between cause and effect was direct (Table 32). 
However, the results showed that a number of implementation preconditions were not met and 
this led to sub-optimal implementation of the four interventions. The specific weaknesses 
included inadequate time, insufficient combination of resources, high dependency 
relationships, suboptimal communication and coordination, and inadequate compliance (Table 
32).  
 
9.3 Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Incentive Strategies on the 
Motivation and Retention of Health Workers 
This section will discuss the commonalities and differences between the influence of 
incentive strategies on the motivation and retention of health workers based on the findings 
from Chapters 4 to 7. The section will also draw from the findings in Chapter 8 reporting on 
the attitudinal responses to incentive strategies such as job satisfaction, intention to quit and 
organisational commitment. In these Chapters, the findings were reported to depict the 
conceptual framework in Figure 2 on Hertzberg two-factor theory highlighting intrinsic and 
extrinsic job attributes that motivated health workers. However, during analysis of data and 
theme identification, it became clear that Hertzberg theory was not sufficient to explain some 
of the key themes that were emerging out of the study related to health workers’ expectancies 
and perceptions of inequities.  
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Although these additional themes were reported in the findings without necessarily locating 
them into any theoretical approach, in this section, Hertzberg theory will be integrated with 
Expectancy and Equity theories to provide an improved cross-cutting analysis and 
interpretation of health workers’ behaviour in relation to financial and non-financial 
incentives of interest in this study. The findings will thus be divided into two thematic areas 
which are: a) the effects of financial and non-financial incentive strategies; and b) the effects 
of targeted and non-targeted incentive strategies. 
 
9.3.1 The Effects of Financial and Non-Financial Incentive Strategies   
In the survey, health workers in hospitals and clinics were asked whether the incentive 
strategies influenced their attraction, motivation and retention. Figure 9 illustrates percentages 
of those agreeing that the incentive strategies improved their attraction, motivation and 
retention. Interestingly, all the three financial incentives appeared to have had reasonably high 
impact in clinics than in hospitals. For example, scarce skills allowance was reported to have 
the most impact on retention in clinics (69%) followed by rural allowance (61%) and OSD 
(46%) than in hospitals (Figure 9). However, these findings were in contrast with the results 
of the multiple regression analysis measuring the impact of financial and non-financial 
incentives on the respondents’ intention to quit their current jobs and their commitment to 
remain in their current facilities. After adjusting for other factors (gender, marital status, age, 
health worker category, and province), the results illustrated that receiving the rural or scarce 
skills allowance did not have a significant impact on intention to leave or organisational 
commitment in either clinics or hospitals. Instead, the OSD appeared to increase the intention 
to quit of hospital respondents who received it (p<0.05) compared to those who did not. 
Possibly this was due to the manner in which it was implemented and tended to benefit 
professional nurses more than other categories of nurses. 
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Figure 9: Perceived Influence of Incentive Strategies in Hospitals and Clinics 
 
Figure 9 also shows that the OSD was the most motivating incentive for health workers in 
both clinics (63%) and hospital (50%) settings. However, all incentive strategies had low 
effect on attraction in both clinic and hospital settings, with scarce skills allowance slightly 
better effective as it attracted 31% of the respondents (Figure 9). This finding is supported by 
the results of the qualitative interviews which reported that financial incentives were partially 
effective in enticing health workers. The impact of hospital revitalisation, the only non-
financial incentive, was rather moderate of all the interventions. 
 
The qualitative findings further showed that financial incentives boosted the salaries of health 
professionals that benefited from them and this was consistent with the quantitative results. 
For instance, the multiple regression analysis measuring the impact of financial incentives on 
satisfaction with pay and overall job satisfaction showed that people who received allowances 
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were significantly more satisfied with their pay than those who did not. The results showed 
that satisfaction with pay was higher for hospital than clinic health professionals who received 
the rural allowance (p<0.05), the scarce skills allowance (p<0.05) and the OSD (p<0.05).  
 
In terms of provincial differences, North West health professionals in clinics were 
significantly satisfied with pay than their Gauteng counterparts. This might possibly be 
because Gauteng health professionals were not benefitting from the rural allowance as it is an 
urban province. However, all three financial incentives did not increase health workers’ 
overall job satisfaction in hospitals and clinics. This finding is in support of Hertzberg theory 
that salary, as a hygiene factor does not produce job satisfaction. Instead, this study found that 
age was a positive significant predictor of overall job satisfaction in hospital; suggesting that 
the older health professionals had significantly higher satisfaction than their younger 
counterparts.  
 
While the respondents were generally satisfied with pay, the results of the qualitative 
component showed that financial incentives had only a temporary effect. These results 
indicated that after a short period of time, health professionals’ expectations adjusted and they 
got used to the amounts received. This was confirmed by the observation that although the 
OSD for nurses was implemented in 2008, in 2010, nurses were again on strike protesting for 
more money. The results of the qualitative component further showed that health 
professionals that qualified for the financial incentive strategies developed the desire to gain 
more and some resorted to ‘abusing’ the provision of allowances by continuously ‘bargaining’ 
for higher salaries and senior positions. This, according to hospital managers was done by 
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moving from one facility to the other, staying there for a short space of time and then moving 
on to another one with the intention of continuously negotiating for better salaries.     
 
The qualitative results further demonstrated that because all the financial incentives were 
implemented retrospectively, the financial gains were eroded by the unexpected high taxation. 
Therefore several respondents perceived the amounts to be low and not keeping pace with the 
cost of living. This as a result undermined the morale of the health professionals that 
benefited from these incentives, especially in the case of the OSD which was implemented 
during the global economic crisis. The participants were also unhappy with the rural and 
scarce skills allowances because they were non-pensionable.  
 
According to Hertzberg theory [114, 116], “work itself” involves employees’ perception of 
whether the work is too difficult or challenging, too easy, boring or interesting. The results 
based on the job satisfaction scale found that health professionals in clinics were moderately 
satisfied with their work and that in hospitals, males’ satisfaction levels with their work was 
slightly higher than females. However, the qualitative results showed that the respondents 
were dissatisfied with the working conditions such as staff shortages, lack of equipment, 
increased workload, challenging lifestyle in rural areas amongst others. These findings concur 
with Hertzberg theory that “work itself” served as a motivator while “working conditions” 
served as a dissatisfier. 
 
Hertzberg treated “interpersonal relations” as a hygiene factor and explained it as interactions 
and relationships that takes place within the working environment between supervisors, peers, 
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and subordinates [114, 116]. In this study, supervision and relationship with co-workers were 
found to be determinants of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. For example, the survey 
results illustrated that supervision and relationship with co-workers were positive 
determinants of job satisfaction amongst hospital and clinic respondents. In contrast, the 
findings of the qualitative component reported serious weaknesses in supervision and poor 
relationship between managers and frontline staff at both hospitals and clinics and these were 
considered by respondents as dissatisfiers. These were in the form of poor communication; 
sub-optimal supervision of clinic staff; lack of consultation when compiling duty roasters; and 
limited interaction and negotiation on issues affecting staff. These issues mainly affected 
nurses than doctors.  
 
Hertzberg [114, 116] believed that the provision of motivators such as recognition and 
advancement would generate job satisfaction and higher productivity while their absence 
would lead to no satisfaction rather than job dissatisfaction. This study found that recognition 
and advancement were contributors of job dissatisfaction which refuted Hertzberg claim that 
these intrinsic job factors are satisfiers. For instance, the qualitative results showed that nurses 
of all categories, felt unappreciated by their managers. With regards to advancement, the 
quantitative findings reported that health professionals in hospitals and clinics were generally 
dissatisfied with promotion opportunities and that Gauteng health professionals were 
significantly more dissatisfied with promotion (p<0.05). This finding was supported by the 
qualitative results which found that a large number of the lower cadre of nurses were highly 
de-motivated and dissatisfied because of limited opportunities available to them for growth. 
However, the majority of them reported that they grabbed every opportunity for internal 
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migration between public and private sectors and between hospital and clinic settings to 
compensate for their professional growth.    
 
The findings of this study also suggest that overlapping financial interventions, which are 
implemented almost at the same time, may dilute the impact of such interventions. For 
instance, the rural and scarce skills allowances were implemented in 2004, and three years 
later the OSD was introduced. This did not make provision for consolidation of what was 
currently in existence and expanding on it beyond monetary benefit; thus suggesting possible 
multiple incentive effects. 
 
In general, the findings reported in Chapters 6 to 8 consistently demonstrated that financial 
incentives were considered insufficient if implemented alone. Taking rural allowance as an 
example, health professionals felt that even when this allowance was provided, the issues 
related to lack of amenities, schools for children, and lack of resources amongst others would 
not make them to move to deeply remote areas; this is worrying considering that these are 
underserved areas affected by problems of access to health workers.   
 
9.3.2 The Effects of Targeted and Non-Targeted Incentive Strategies 
The results in Chapter 5 have shown that the rural and scarce skills allowances were targeted 
interventions because they were intended to benefit specific categories of health professionals. 
The OSD was categorised as a non-targeted financial incentive because in theory, it was 
intended to benefit all categories of nurses although during implementation it was reported 
that it benefited professional nurses more than the lower cadres (Chapter 6). Likewise, the 
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hospital revitalisation was also considered a non-targeted intervention because it was intended 
to benefit all the health professionals in the revitalised facilities (Chapter 7).  
 
Interestingly, the qualitative findings found that both the scarce skills allowance and the OSD 
had unintentional positive benefits for professional nurses in particular. Since both of these 
interventions had strong emphasis on nursing specialities, the majority of the respondents 
reported that the implementation of these interventions encouraged professional nurses to 
specialise. However, this was a “double-edged sword”  especially in hospitals because once 
specialised, the unintentional consequences were that these professional nurses opted to move 
from units where they are needed the most to units where their specialities would be 
recognised and rewarded.  
 
A key finding in this study is that because of the weaknesses in their design and 
implementation, all the financial incentive strategies excluded the junior cadre of nurses and 
other nursing specialities that should have benefitted. Drawing from expectancy theory [124], 
employees exert effort in their work with the expectation that this will lead to certain level of 
performance (expectancy), and that if they perform at a certain level this will lead to attractive 
organisational rewards (instrumentality). While taking individual goals and needs into 
cognisance, employees further place significant importance on the potential outcome or 
rewards that can be achieved on the job (valence) [124].  
 
The qualitative findings found that none of these incentive strategies was linked to 
performance. Although the OSD policy made reference to performance, the criteria for 
determining the above average performance, which would potentially lead to increased 
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rewards, was vague. It was also unclear how these criteria will be operationalised. 
Nonetheless, health workers in this study reported that despite working under strenuous 
conditions mentioned earlier, they always exerted effort into their work. For instance, due to 
problems of staff shortages, the results of this study found that junior categories of nurses 
worked beyond their scope of practice while some professional nurses indicated that there are 
instances where they performed some of the duties of the doctors.  
 
This, according to the respondents, implied that on a number of occasions, nurses, especially 
the lower cadre of nurses, provided care beyond their scope of practice because of shortages. 
As they did this, they reported that they risked facing legal consequences and disciplinary 
action should adverse events happen while working outside their scope of practice. Therefore, 
from a perspective of expectancy theory, these nurses would still expect that their efforts 
should lead to organisational rewards considering that all the incentive strategies were not 
performance based.  
 
With reference to the OSD, although this strategy was intended to deal with grade progression 
opportunities, career pathing, pay progression and recognition of appropriate experience, 
communication weaknesses during its implementation led to more emphasis being placed 
primarily on the remuneration structure and neglecting other components. This raised high 
expectations amongst nurses of all categories that their efforts were finally being recognised 
and that they will be rewarded accordingly. When their expectations were not met, this led to 
feelings of demotivation and dissatisfaction.    
 
Through the lens of expectancy theory, this study also found that the implementation of the 
incentive strategies did not maximise on increasing the motivation of the lower category of 
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nurses by creating opportunities for continuous learning as a non-financial reward. Instead, 
the lower category of nurses reported that in many instances, it took approximately 15 years 
before they were considered for further learning. Some even reported that they were 
approaching retirement yet they were still waiting to be considered to further their training. 
Addition to this, they also indicated that there was no transparency about how individuals 
were considered for further training. At times, those that had been waiting for years for their 
turn to come were overlooked and preference was given to the young and newer cadres. This 
according to the lower cadre of nurses was perceived as unfair and caused lasting grievances.  
 
When asked about the reasons for the delay in being considered for further training, staff 
shortages was mentioned as a major reason. This reflects failure of the system to capitalise on 
training because if more of these nurses became professional nurses, they would have created 
spaces for new entrants to enter the system. The longer term goal of this would have been to 
address problems of staff shortages. In addition, this might have created room for other 
components of the OSD such as career progression to be achieved. This study found that the 
lower category of nurses highly valued the opportunities for growth; therefore in this instance, 
it appears like the attractiveness of the rewards did not consider their individual needs and 
goals. Instead, the outcomes (rewards) were viewed as negative because they led to feelings 
of frustration and disgruntlement.  
 
Equity theory [130, 131] denotes that employees compare the effort they put in their work 
(inputs) with the rewards they receive (outcomes) with those of their fellow workers. 
Perceptions of inequity arise when they view the ratio of inputs and outcomes as unequal to 
those of the “comparison other” [130]. Using the equity theory lens, this study found that 
across all the financial incentive strategies, there was differentiation in the amounts that were 
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paid to the different categories of health workers, thus leading to perceptions of inequities 
among health professionals. For example, with regards to the rural allowance, doctors were 
paid allowances of 18-22 percent of their annual salaries; professional nurses were only paid 
8-12 percent while the junior cadre of nurses were excluded from benefiting.  
 
There were thus contradictory views amongst respondents regarding whether uniform 
incentives should have been considered as opposed to differential financial incentives. One 
view was that uniform incentives would have assisted to avoid potential pay inequities and 
remove perceptions that certain professional group was more prestigious than others. An 
alternative view was that differential incentives were preferable options because they 
incentivised exclusive expertise and experience, thus increasing the motivation and 
satisfaction of the health workers.     
 
In addition, because of variations in the interpretation and implementation of the incentive 
strategies, both targeted and non-targeted strategies were considered to be divisive. This 
caused a lot of disgruntlement amongst some nursing specialities and the lower category of 
nurses. In dealing with these inequities, the lower cadre of nurses, who were mostly affected, 
reported that they responded by reducing their work effort, by withholding assistance to the 
referent (professional nurses), and by withdrawing from work obligations beyond their scope 
of practice. By withholding assistance, these junior cadres reported that when professional 
nurses needed their assistance, they would tell them to do the job on their own because they 
benefited from the rewards. In borrowing from Frey and Jegen’s motivation crowding-out 
theory [103], this study found that targeted financial incentives crowded-out intrinsic 
motivation as they hugely undermined team effort and unintentionally eroded professional 
ethos.  
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This study also found that because of inconsistencies in the interpretation and implementation 
of targeted and non-targeted financial strategies, further perceived inequities happened in 
relation to the OSD whereby some nurses were under-rewarded while others were incorrectly 
over-rewarded. Those that were under-rewarded indicated that when comparing their rewards 
to their co-workers, with comparable qualifications and work experience, they perceived their 
situations as unfair. In all cases of inequities, which mainly affected the lower cadre of nurses, 
they resorted to distorting their inputs. Without having a qualification as professional nurses, 
it was pointless for these junior nurses to respond by quitting their jobs because if they were 
to move to a similar job in another facility, they would still be faced with the same issues. The 
lower cadre of nurses also had to weigh the number of years they had been working in the 
same facility because this increased their chances of being considered for continuous learning.  
 
Contrary to equity theory’s predictions that those that were over-rewarded would produce 
more inputs, this study found that the over-rewarded instead lowered their inputs because they 
were accidentally over-rewarded due to the implementation failures. As such, out of 
excitement, these nurses had already used the monies paid out to them and were then under 
immense stress and pressure because they were expected to repay it. What made the situation 
even more frustrating for them was that they were expected to reimburse the monies without 
being given options to decide on the amount they could afford to pay back on a monthly basis 
until they settle what they owed the government. Their reaction to this was anger and they 
blamed the health system for this failure in implementation which costed them greatly 
emotionally and financially. This led to a lot of dissatisfaction and high levels of de-
motivation. However, after the unions intervened, the nurses were no longer expected to repay 
back the monies; but at that point the impact of the OSD incentive had already diminished 
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amongst these nurses. In general, this study found that not many respondents reported being 
equitably rewarded.  
 
9.3.3 Summary of the Findings on Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Incentive 
Strategies 
Notwithstanding some of the positive impact of the allowances, the results of this study have 
demonstrated that across all the three financial incentive strategies, there were several 
unintended consequences mainly cause by implementation design and weaknesses. The 
findings further demonstrated that targeted incentives can be double-edged swords. They 
produced both losers and winners; suggesting that incentives aimed at one professional group 
will have an impact on the other groups as well as on the entire health system. Contrary to 
Hertzberg theory, this study found that motivation and hygiene factors impacted both 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction. However, the use of financial incentives may to a certain 
extent crowd-out intrinsic motivation. The study further found that hospital revitalisation, the 
only non-financial incentive strategy, had limited impact.  
 
Interestingly, although the junior cadre of nurses were excluded from benefiting from the two 
targeted financial incentives (rural and scarce skills allowances), the results of the multiple 
regression analysis showed that assistant nurses in hospitals were significantly satisfied with 
pay than doctors (p<0.05). 
 
This in essence, implies that the reverse side of targeted incentives is that what was initially 
intended as an incentive for specialty has then become a disincentive. The other downside of 
targeted financial incentives found in this study was that they caused disgruntlement if other 
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factors are not taken into consideration when decisions on which health professionals should 
benefit are made. For example, contextual factors such as staff shortages were reported as 
hindering opportunities of the junior nursing categories from being released off their duties to 
further their studies to become professional nurses so that they could also benefit from these 
targeted incentives.  
 
9.4 A Revised Integrated Conceptual Framework  
In section 9.2, an integrative analysis of the process of the design and implementation of the 
four incentive strategies of interest in this study was presented using Hogwood and Gunn 
theory [199, 200]. On the positive side, policies or some form of framework related to all the 
four incentive strategies were developed and fully implemented for the three financial 
incentive strategies. The hospital revitalisation was implemented to a certain degree. These 
policies were also considered to be good and attempting to address the contextual factors 
related to the human resource challenges for which they were targeted. However, the results 
highlighted some process-related weaknesses. With regards to the design, hospital 
revitalisation appeared to be the only strategy in which there was agreement of objectives. 
There were disagreement of objectives for both the rural allowance and the OSD because the 
junior cadre of nurses were excluded from benefitting.  
 
The scarce skills allowance had however mixed reactions in relation to agreement of 
objectives. While on the one hand it was acceptable that those that have specialised needed to 
be incentivised, there was disagreement that other nursing specialities (that should have been 
considered) were excluded from benefiting from this incentive strategy. Across all the three 
financial incentives, there were also concerns about lack of transparency in the criteria that 
252 
 
was used to decide on which category was to benefit and the differences in the percentages of 
the allowances. In addition, there were weaknesses in the management of perceptions that 
doctors were favoured more than nurses and that professional nurses were favoured more than 
the junior category of nurses. Another design weakness was that all the financial incentive 
strategies were not linked to performance. 
 
Regarding the implementation weaknesses, this study found that policies were available to 
guide the implementation and that substantial financial resources were allocated to implement 
the incentive strategies thus suggesting strong political will. However, there were problems of 
inadequate time allocated for planning, sub-optimal human resource information systems, 
lack of technical capacity, high dependency relationships, unavailability of an implementation 
plan, no communication strategy, poor coordination as well as lack of monitoring and 
evaluation systems.  
 
Section 9.3 discussed the cross-cutting results of the influence of the incentive strategies on 
the motivation and retention of health workers drawing from a combination of three 
motivation theories namely Hertzberg two-factor theory, expectancy and equity theories. The 
results demonstrated that motivation factors that needed to be satisfied to improve health 
workers satisfaction included work itself, opportunities for continuous learning, opportunities 
for promotion and recognition. However, there were some hygiene factors that needed to be 
prevented to avoid dissatisfaction and these were suboptimal supervision, lack of resources, 
inadequate staff, poor working conditions and weak interpersonal relationships.  
 
The findings also found that there were perceptions of inequities in relation to how financial 
rewards benefitted some and not others. There were also problems of under-rewarding others 
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while some were over-rewarded. The response to these inequities were in the form of 
reducing work effort, withholding assistance to the referent (in this case professional nurses), 
and withdrawing from work obligations beyond their scope of practice. It was also found that 
employees worked under difficult conditions but still exerted effort in their work with the 
expectation that the effort would lead to organisational rewards. However, they felt that the 
organisational rewards were not sufficiently attractive to satisfy their values and individual 
goals. This ultimately led to feelings of low motivation and dissatisfaction. In terms of 
individual factors, age was found to decrease intention to quit and the doctors were the least 
satisfied with their pay.     
 
Based on the findings presented above, in Figure 10, I propose an integrated framework 
combining motivation theories and policy analysis frameworks to improve understanding on 
how the process of the design and implementation of incentive strategies influence the 
motivation and retention of health workers. I propose that this integrated framework can assist 
the designers and implementers of incentive strategies to take cognisance of the complexity of 
human behaviour in relation to their response to financial and non-financial incentive 
strategies in the health sector. The numbering within the boxes in the framework is for visual 
purposes, they do not necessarily reflect the order or the flow of the framework.  
 
In this framework (Figure 10), I draw from three motivation theories (expectancy[124], equity 
[130] and Hertzberg theory [114]) and two policy analysis frameworks (Walt and Gilson 
[198] and Hogwood and Gunn [199]). I propose starting with the expectancy theory [124] 
(reflected by boxes 1-4) because it suggests that motivation is a dynamic process aligning 
connections between expected behaviours, rewards and individual goals. Box 1 suggests that 
individuals increase effort in their work anticipating that this effort will lead into increased 
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performance (Box 2). However, I am proposing that for performance to be achieved, a 
number of Hertzberg hygiene factors (box 5) needs to first be addressed. These include having 
the right skills and experience to do the job; relevant training; good interpersonal relationships 
to facilitate team effort; availability of resources (e.g. equipment and adequate staff); 
improved working conditions (e.g. reduced workload); and supportive supervision.      
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Figure 10: A Revised Integrated Conceptual Framework  
1 
Individual 
Effort 
10b 
Inequity 
 (Over-rewarded) 
8 
Equity 
– Fairness 
– Transparency 
 
2  
Individual 
Performance  
3 
Organisational 
Rewards 
 
4 
Individual 
Goals 
10a 
Inequity  
(Under-rewarded) 
7 
Implementation 
- Policy availability 
- Financial resources 
- HR information systems 
- Technical capacity 
- Minimal dependency 
- Implementation plan 
- Communication strategy 
- Good coordination 
- Monitoring & evaluation 
- Process management 
 
6 
Design 
- Context-specific 
- Theory-based policy 
- Agreement of objectives 
- Performance-linked 
- Consider cost of living 
- Perception  management  
- Process management 
 
IMPACT 
13 
Outcomes: 
 Motivation 
 Job Satisfaction 
 Organisational Commitment 
 Intention to Quit  
 Retention  
11 
Motivation Factors  
- Work itself  
- Career advancement 
- Promotion 
- Personal growth  
- Recognition  
- Pay increase  
 
5 
Hygiene Factors 
- Experience & skills 
- Training 
- Good interpersonal 
relationships  
- Resources availability  
- Improved working 
conditions 
- Supportive supervision 
 
12 
Individual Factors 
for example, age, 
marital status, 
health worker 
category, length of 
service     
Outputs 9b 
- Pay increase, recognition, 
appreciation, promotion, 
advancement, job enrichment 
 
Valence Instrumentality  Expectancy 
Inputs 9a 
- Skills, effort, hard work, 
tolerance, personal sacrifice 
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Going back to expectancy theory, the linkage between performance (Box 2) and 
organisational rewards (Box 3) is termed instrumentality by Vroom [124] and argues that 
employees belief that increased performance will lead to organisational rewards. I propose 
that this linkage is affected by a number of factors. Firstly, it depends on the process of the 
design (Box 6) and implementation (Box 7) of the organisational rewards. In terms of the 
design, drawing from Walt and Gilson and Hogwood and Gunn, it might be useful if 
policymakers do their utmost best to develop context-specific interventions that would 
address the problems in specific settings (e.g. hospital, clinic, rural and urban). It would also 
be ideal if the interventions are theory drive and performance based. In addition, care should 
also be taken to manage perception (such as those of fairness or unfairness) because they can 
get out of hand and management of the process is also essential (e.g. transparency related to 
who gets what rewards). 
 
Regarding implementation (Box 7), a key factor drawing from Hogwood and Gunn is to 
ensure that combinations of resources are available prior to implementation. These includes 
availability of policies to guide implementation; financial resource; accurate human resource 
information system; technical capacity; implementation plan; communication strategy and 
monitoring and evaluation systems. In addition, caution must be taken to minimise 
relationships, to improve coordination and to manage the process such as ensuring timely 
implementation.    
 
The linkage between performance (Box 2) and organisational rewards (Box 3) also brings 
together expectancy theory and equity theory (Box 8). Equity theory contributes a crucial 
additional perspective of comparison with ‘referent’ other, it argues that people form 
perceptions about what constitutes a fair ration of inputs (Box 9a) and outputs (Box 9b) by 
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comparing their own situation with others. Therefore, careful consideration should be taken to 
address issues of inequities to avoid under-rewarding (Box 10a) some and over-rewarding 
(Box 10b) others.    
 
The final linkage in expectancy theory on organisational rewards (Box 3) and individual goals 
(Box 4) is about the importance that individuals places upon the expected outcomes or 
rewards. In Figure 10, I’m proposing that the probability that successful performance will lead 
to certain outcomes depends on Hertzberg motivation factors (Box 12) which are ensuring 
that the work is challenging and stimulating; creating career advancement and promotion 
opportunities; personal growth; and pay increase. Finally, I’m suggesting that individual 
factors should always be taken into consideration to allow for individuality between people. I 
believe that if all these factors are addressed, the outcome would be improved motivation, 
increased job satisfaction, improved organisational commitment, reduced intention to quit and 
improved retention.   
 
This integrated framework is useful in conceptualising the importance of process issues in the 
design and implementation of incentive strategies for health workers. It is also contributing to 
establish new knowledge on the relationship between policy analysis and motivation theories; 
to the best of my knowledge this has not yet been investigated.  Available integrated theories 
that I could find have either showed relationships between a combination of selected 
motivation theories only [92, 120, 278-280] or policy analysis frameworks [281-284] in 
isolation. Only two studies that I could identify integrated theories beyond motivation theories 
and policy analysis; one study integrated motivation theories, structural theories and systems 
theories [285] while another one showed relationships between policy streams theory and the 
anthropology of development [282]. In addition, only limited number of these studies focused 
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in the health sector [281, 283, 284] and only one that I could find focused on HRH, 
specifically on nursing [281].    
 
9.5 Conclusion  
Using an integrated model comprising of policy analysis and motivation frameworks, this 
chapter identified cross-cutting implementation successes and weaknesses across both 
financial and non-financial incentives. For example, common implementation challenges 
across all the four incentive strategies were poor communication and weaknesses in policy 
monitoring and evaluation systems. This chapter also demonstrated the complexity of 
implementing financial incentives and made an argument that the success of these incentives 
depends heavily on the manner and process of implementation. An important lesson deriving 
from this chapter is that better planning and management of the implementation process is 
critical if incentive strategies in this study were to achieve their intended purpose. With these 
current implementation problems, this chapter illustrated that all the four incentive strategies 
had limited impact mainly due to poor design and implementation.   
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CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS  
10.1 Introduction  
This chapter will critically discuss the key findings reported in Chapters 4 to 9 with reference 
to the wider literature on incentives, motivation and implementation of health policy in South 
Africa and other low- and middle-income countries. Drawing from the different perspectives 
by respondents, the chapter will commence with a section summarising the key findings 
which integrates the core argument of this thesis on how the process of the design and 
implementation of financial and non-financial incentives influenced the motivation and 
retention of health workers in the public health sector in Gauteng and North West provinces. I 
will then reflect on the key strengths and limitations of this study, conceptually and 
methodologically; as well as the contribution of this study to existing knowledge. The chapter 
will end with discussing the recommendations of the study and ideas for future research in 
this area of work.  
 
10.2 Summary of the Results 
Using an exploratory multiple-case study design, this study sought to provide evidence on 
whether the process of the design and implementation of the four HRH interventions of 
interest in this study affected the motivation and retention of doctors and nurses in two 
provinces in South Africa. A case study design was used because it allowed for complex 
unfolding of events [286] through a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies including a document review, in-depth interviews with different groups of 
participants, and a health worker survey.  
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The study drew from policy analysis and motivation theories to highlight how the process of 
the design and implementation of financial and non-financial incentives influenced the 
motivation and retention of health workers. The implementation of these incentives strategies 
and their influence on the motivation and retention of health workers was also explored in 
different settings namely hospitals and primary health care (clinics and community health 
centres), urban and rural as well as revitalised and non-revitalised hospitals.  
 
Three broad themes emerge from the findings namely: a) the complexities of implementing 
financial and non-financial incentives, b) perceived influence of financial and non-financial 
incentives on the motivation and retention of health workers, and c) a proposed integrated 
conceptual framework combining policy analysis and motivation theories.  
 
10.2.1 The Complexities of Implementing Financial and Non-Financial Incentives  
In agreement with available evidence [198, 283, 287, 288], this study confirmed the 
importance of contextual factors in the design and implementation processes of interventions 
to motivate and retain health workers. The analysis of context in this study was investigated at 
the national health sector level and local or facility level and the findings indicated that the 
incentive environment cannot be fully understood without considering the contextual factors. 
For instance, the findings demonstrated that the meso-level factors such as migration, 
maldistribution of health workers and shortage of scarce skills have had some influence in the 
design of the financial incentive strategies of interest in this study. Araujo and Maciel [289] 
best summarised this by noting that policies are expected to interact with the context in which 
they are developed and also produce some effect in it.   
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In terms of the actors, the finding that central level policymakers were the key actors driving 
the overall policy design processes across all the four incentive strategies of interest, suggests 
a top-down approach. From a top-down perspective, the discretion of lower-level officials and 
departments are not given prominence yet they are crucial for implementation success [194, 
290]. This was reflected in the rural allowance and the OSD processes where lack of 
involvement and consultation with managers at facility level (who would be directly 
responsible for implementation) and limited representation of health workers during the 
design phase led to marked variations in the interpretation and implementation of these 
incentive strategies. As noted by Brinkerhoff [291], the implementation process is as political 
and technical as is complex and highly interactive. In the case of the incentive strategies of 
interest in this study, perhaps an interactive approach proposed by Grindle and Thomas [195] 
may have afforded an  interactive and on-going process of decision making between policy 
elites and frontline implementers.     
 
The findings also support a view that actors’ interests, positions and power can influence 
policy processes to a great extent [198, 283, 292]. In this study, the results presented in 
Chapters 5 to 7 illustrated that the power of the different actors during the design stages 
varied across the four incentive strategies of interest. For instance, although the nursing 
unions advocated for the interests of the lower category of nurses during the design of the 
rural and scarce allowances, they ultimately succumbed to pressure. Instead, the National 
Treasury, through its power to control the government budget, was the most influential actor 
in the decision to exclude the junior nursing cadres from benefiting from rural allowance 
arguing that this cadre is not difficult to retain. This is akin to Thomas and Gilson [293] who 
noted that “the Treasury was the most powerful government Ministry” (p283). Interestingly, 
during the design of the OSD, the nursing unions emerged as strong and visible actors 
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instrumental in the decision to prioritise nurses as the first health professional group to benefit 
from this incentive strategy.  
 
The present study also demonstrated that the main external constraints which resulted in lack 
of agreement of objectives during the design process of the financial incentive strategies was 
contestations regarding the exclusion of other categories in relation to the rural and scarce 
skills allowances and the prioritisation of nurses with regards to the OSD. However, these 
external constraints did not lead to ‘non-implementation’, a concept coined by Hogwood and 
Gunn [199] to refer to failure to implement policies because those tasked with implementation 
are uncooperative and/or inefficient, or because of obstacles beyond their control which are 
impossible to overcome despite their best efforts. As some authors rightly pointed out, 
resistance by some actors should be anticipated [212, 294].  
 
A notable finding of this study is that policy documents, directives and or frameworks for all 
the four incentive strategies of interest were developed and made available to the 
implementers. Existing evidence have noted that the dissemination of policy documents 
before the implementation stage has been commonly adopted in developing countries [198, 
289]. In line with preconditions 4 and 5 of Hogwood and Gunn [200], this study found that 
the policies for all the four incentive strategies were based on valid theories of cause and 
effect and that the relationship between cause and effect was direct. As demonstrated by the 
qualitative findings with different groups of respondents in this study, the latter implies that 
all the four incentive strategies of interest were in principle, regarded as good policies with 
acceptable objectives for incentivising health workers.  
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The results of this study also showed that except for the hospital revitalisation programme 
which was initiated following a nation-wide hospital infrastructure audit, evidence which 
guided the design of the three financial incentives was considered inadequate. Several 
researchers have recommended that the development of any policy reform should involve an 
initial situation analysis aimed at highlighting the problem faced, its scope and importance 
[199, 283, 294-296]. Hewison [297] also noted that the development and adoption of untested 
policies should be informed by the best available evidence and that policymakers should 
invest in generating such rigorous evidence. This thinking is supported by Behague and 
colleagues [298] who urge policymakers to refrain from politically motivated approaches of 
policy development to those based on scientific facts. 
 
In the case of financial incentives of interest, this study agrees with Dolea et al [31] that the 
evidence that could have been useful in assisting policymakers to develop better informed 
financial incentives strategies was on the factors influencing health workers’ location choices. 
There has however recently been a conceptual shift from evidence-based policymaking to 
what is termed implementation science, which is explained in the literature as an examination 
of methods intended to improve the translation of research findings into routine practices 
[299]. To date, current studies in implementation science has been debating about 
standardisation in the application and quality of measures of the implementation science 
constructs [300] as well as frameworks for advancing this field [299, 301].  
 
The findings also demonstrated that all the financial incentive strategies were fully 
implemented at the time when the study was conducted while hospital revitalisation 
programme, the only non-financial incentive, was implemented to a certain degree. This is 
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contrary to existing evidence noting a disjuncture between health policy development and 
actual implementation in South Africa [208, 302, 303].  
 
The implementation of all the four incentive strategies of interest was decentralised. As 
McIntyre and Klugman [304] noted, the two forms of decentralisation that impacted on the 
health sector in South Africa are devolution and deconcentration. Since South Africa gained 
independence in 1994, and in terms of its rights-based Constitution, health became a 
concurrent function (or joint responsibility) of the national and provincial governments [305]. 
With the adoption of decentralisation, the national government delegated the responsibility for 
implementation, including funding to the provincial health departments and the province 
delegated down to district, sub-district and hospital levels [42, 304].   
 
Consistent with existing policy implementation studies, this decentralisation resulted in 
insufficient coordination among different stakeholders [208, 305] and variations in the 
interpretation and implementation of the rural allowance and the OSD [42, 53, 306, 307]. In 
the absence of coordinated efforts, decisions made at a higher level may not reach the lower 
level as originally intended [308]. The findings also illustrated that fragmentation of 
responsibilities among the different stakeholders resulted in one tier of government blaming 
failure in implementation on another  and this was reported by other studies [42, 309]. Lack of 
role clarity among national, provincial and local government was noted in other studies as one 
of the constraints for achieving a fully functional district health system [310, 311].  
 
Hogwood and Gunn [200] recommends that during the implementation process, there is a 
need for the role of each stakeholder involved to be made explicit in order to avoid these 
challenges with coordination. Some authors have proposed the establishment of a 
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coordination unit with sufficient decision rights, expertise, legitimacy and opportunity to meet 
regularly as a crucial asset for championing implementation [283, 312]. Others have 
suggested that the tasks of this coordination unit could include building consensus among 
stakeholders [283], adapting and revising the strategies used to maintain its direction towards 
its objectives [294] and to act as a conduit between various stakeholders [296].           
 
The results of this study also demonstrated that across all the four incentive strategies in this 
study, communication between the different levels of the health departments was sub-optimal. 
This finding is consistent with several existing policy implementation studies [53, 206, 208, 
313]. Thomas and Gilson [314] noted the scarcity of knowledge on how to manage the 
processes of engaging all stakeholders in reform process. While acknowledging that the 
implementation of effective communication strategies are difficult in most organisations 
[315], particularly timely communication [316], the importance of improved communication 
in any change affecting health workers cannot be underestimated. Limited investment in 
communication processes when bringing about change may result in a wider gap between the 
purpose of the message and an understanding of the message by the recipients [317]. As 
Jeppsson has rightly observed, policy implementation in a decentralised system is complex 
and must be understood in a misdirected translation process [318].     
 
According to Hogwood and Gunn [200], precondition 6 proposes that if other implementing 
agencies are involved, dependency relationships should be minimal in number and 
importance. Except for the scarce skills allowance, the present study found that the 
dependency relationship was high for the other three incentive strategies, making it 
challenging to achieve success (Table 32). The results also demonstrated that securing a 
combination of resources required in the implementation of the OSD and the hospital 
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revitalisation programme was a key challenge. Primary to this with regards to the OSD was 
sub-optimal human resource information systems (HRIS) which resulted in an under-count of 
the total number of nurses in the public sector by 10,000 individuals. Consequent to this, the 
implementation of the OSD proved to be more expensive than previously planned.  
 
This finding resonate with other existing evidence noting that current information systems are 
fragmented and unable to inform health workforce planning and training [319].  Some of the 
challenges noted in the literature for poor HRIS include weaknesses in the institutional 
capacity to collect and use these data for HRH decision-making [320], having multiple 
parallel information systems, and inconsistent data which makes it difficult to standardise 
definitions for data elements collected [320, 321]. Riley [322] thus emphasises the importance 
of strengthening HRIS as a critical element for evidence-based human resource policy and 
practice.  
 
The present study also found that the implementation of the OSD and the hospital 
revitalisation programme involved complex series of events and that the enormity of their 
implementation was not considered by policymakers. However, as was found in other studies 
[283, 319], lack of technical capacity of implementers was reported to be a challenge in the 
implementation of these strategies. Technical leadership is thus proposed by some researchers 
as crucial at the different levels of management [283]. As rightly pointed out by Hogwood 
and Gunn [199], lack of technical leadership creates room for the possibility of a reform to be 
tailored to the implementers’ own preference, sometimes at the expense of the targeted 
beneficiaries.   
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A notable finding of this study is that except for the hospital revitalisation programme, 
implementation plans were not developed for the three financial incentive strategies of 
interest. The findings also illustrated that tasks required to ascertain successful 
implementation of the four incentive strategies were not clearly identified in a sequential 
manner and that the responsibilities for them were not clearly assigned to relevant actors. This 
was in contrast to precondition 8 of Hogwood and Gunn [199, 200] which proposes that tasks 
should be specified in an appropriate sequence. However, the sequencing of the tasks during 
the implementation phase was less supported by some studies [283, 295]. Nonetheless, there 
is consensus among a number of authors that for any reform to succeed, there is a need to plan 
the implementation carefully in a series of logical steps [199, 200, 296, 323] and that 
implementation plans should include a clear outline of roles and responsibilities of different 
levels of government [324]. 
 
Encouragingly, the results showed that significant amounts of money were set aside by the 
National Treasury for the implementation of the four incentive strategies, suggesting strong 
political will to address the HRH crisis affecting the country. This finding is supported by 
other researchers [283, 325] who reported the importance of high-level political commitment 
in the development and implementation of policy reforms in low- and middle-income 
countries. However, the results indicated that all the three financial incentives were not linked 
to performance. A number of countries have adopted performance-related-pay (PRP) for 
government employees [326, 327]. There are ongoing debates in the literature about the 
effects of these provider payment mechanisms on the motivation and performance of public 
sector employees [328, 329].  
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Although mixed results have been reported about their impact [327, 328, 330], some 
researchers have found that PRP have the potential of increasing health worker motivation at 
facility level [330, 331]. However, their long-term effects, scalability and effects across varied 
context still requires further investigation [330]. Other researchers have recommended a need 
for a balance between the involvement of health workers in deciding how their performance 
should be measured as well as the inputs from managers and policymakers in ensuring that 
expectations are realistic and that indicators selected fit its intended purpose [329].  
 
The results of the present study further found that there were no set targets and clearly defined 
measurable outputs for determining the impact of these incentive strategies such as the 
number of people expected to be attracted by the rural allowance in rural and underserved 
areas, or the number of scarce skills expected to be attracted in the public sector. Hercot and 
colleagues [283] recommended that an assessment of the link between the policy change and 
the intended results with measurable outputs is required if sound evaluation is to be achieved.    
The findings also reported that the government neglected to develop clear indicators for 
monitoring potential implementation challenges and for evaluating the impact of these 
strategies; thus losing out on the prospects for learning from setbacks in implementation as 
opportunities for revisions, redesign and self-correction [283, 319, 332]. Monitoring and 
evaluation of the reform across levels can also ensure that implementers on the ground have 
access to feedback loops to inform them on their performance and the overall progress of the 
reform [283]. Witter et al [333] added that process and outcome results are also crucial to 
overcome implementation problems. Overall, this study found that less investment was made 
by policymakers and implementers on the process issues during the design and 
implementation of the four incentive strategies of interest.  
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10.2.2 Perceived Influence of the Financial and Non-Financial Incentives on the 
Motivation and Retention of Health Workers 
In general, this study found that all four incentive strategies were partially effective in the 
motivation and retention of nurses and doctors. A notable effect of the three financial 
incentive strategies derived from the qualitative data in this study was that they boosted 
salaries of the health workers. The results of the multiple regression analysis from the health 
worker survey supports this finding by demonstrating that health workers who received 
allowances (rural allowance, scarce skills allowance, and the OSD) were significantly more 
satisfied with their pay than those who did not. This contradicts results by Ramoo et al [334] 
which reported on Malaysian nurses in their study being dissatisfied with pay, thus creating 
room for a debate among managers designing incentive strategies about how much is enough, 
for how long, and how sustainable it will be?   
 
Enrolled nursing assistants in the present study appeared to be significantly satisfied with pay 
than were other categories of health workers (e.g. professional nurses and doctors). The 
reason for this might be based on an explanation by Sutherland et al [335] that a cash payment 
may represent significant income for people with low incomes but that it might be ineffective 
for relatively well-paid workforce. Similarly, health workers from North West province were 
significantly satisfied with pay than were their Gauteng counterparts. This could be because 
North West is a rural province and that the cost of living in Gauteng province, which is urban, 
is higher. This finding is interesting considering that existing evidence have noted that health 
workers in urban health facilities usually earned higher salaries than their counterparts in rural 
health facilities [336, 337]. 
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Even though some of the respondents who received allowances reported satisfaction with pay, 
the present study found that financial incentives could only improve the motivation and 
retention of health workers in the short-term. This finding is consistent with previous reviews 
on retention strategies [29, 35, 167]. Simply put, after a certain time period, health workers’ 
expectations adjusted then they began a vicious cycle of complaining that the amount was too 
low and continued asking for additional increases in their salaries. This pattern was observed 
across all the three financial incentives of interest in the present study.  
 
For instance, rural and scarce skills allowances were implemented in 2004; in 2007, health 
workers participated in a major public sector strike that led to the introduction and the 
implementation of the OSD in 2008. However, in 2010, nurses were on strike again 
demanding additional increases in their salaries. This culture of health workers wanting more 
even after recent increases in their salaries is consistent with findings from studies in 
Tanzania and Ghana [338, 339]. Therefore, when policymakers use financial incentives to 
improve the motivation and retention of health workers, an important question to ask may 
potentially be how much money is enough and for how long will it be considered enough?  
 
Another important finding of the present study related to the latter was that overlapping 
financial interventions may undermine their individual impact. In this instance, rural and 
scarce skills allowances were implemented at the same time and three years down the line the 
OSD was implemented. None of these interventions were properly evaluated, thus making it 
challenging to directly attribute impact to one intervention. This finding is consistent with 
Sutherland et al’s [335] review which reported that multifaceted interventions makes it 
impossible to isolate the impact of incentives from other factors; especially in instances where 
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no evaluation was conducted and monitoring and evaluation is weak as is the case in the 
present study.  
 
Interestingly, both the scarce skills allowance and the OSD had unintended positive benefits 
for professional nurses; the majority of them reported that these incentives encouraged them 
to specialise. However, these nurses mainly specialised in specialities that enabled them to 
benefit from these allowances, resulting in large numbers of nurses possessing similar 
specialities while neglecting other crucial specialities that were not considered to benefit from 
these interventions such as the trauma speciality that is critical for the casualty department. 
This is not surprising considering that prior to the implementation of the OSD, speciality 
professional nurses starting salary was reported to be R79,407 and post-OSD an 88% increase 
was anticipated leading to an estimated amount of R160,470 [340]. 
 
Because of the need to benefit from the scarce skills allowance and the OSD, the present 
study also found that there was internal migration of professional nurses from units where 
they were needed the most to specialised units that benefited from these strategies, as well as 
from hospitals to clinics and or community health centres and vice versa depending on which 
they perceived to be paying higher salaries. The negative effects of these internal flows of 
health workers included increased workload and an additional strain put on the remaining 
health workforce [336, 341]. As a consequent of health workers’ movement, data from South 
Africa illustrated that the doctor to population ratio was as low as 55 per 100,000 by 2010 
whilst the nurse to population ratio had increased from 107 in 2003 to 383 per 100,000 in 
2010 [342, 343].   
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In addition, although recent studies in South Africa reported that the implementation of the 
OSD contributed significantly to reducing the disparity between the salaries of health workers 
in South Africa and overseas countries [26, 344], health workers in the present study, 
especially nurses, were of the view that their salaries were not in accordance with the volume 
of the workload that they were expected to deal with on a daily basis considering problems of 
staff shortages at their respective facilities. This finding is supported by Prytherch et al’s 
[338] multi-country study which reported that maternal and neonatal providers in Tanzania 
and Ghana considered their salary levels to be low and not matching the responsibilities and 
volume of work. This reinforces the importance of taking into cognisance issues of context if 
financial incentives are to achieve their intended purpose.  
 
Likewise, both doctors and professional nurses in the present study felt that the rural 
allowance amount had to be quite significant for it to make any meaningful difference to the 
recruitment, motivation and retention of health workers in rural health facilities and that it 
should be allocated to all health workers working in rural settings. As noted by Sutherland et 
al [335], the size of the incentive may determine its potential impact. These authors argued 
that if the psychological and economic costs are relatively large, it might be essential for 
policymakers to consider introducing strong financial incentives in order to bring about the 
desired outcomes [335]. However, it may be difficult to determine how large the incentive 
should be to accomplish change [345], especially considering that there is little guidance in 
the available literature to assist policymakers on how to determine  the size of the incentive 
that could yield major effects in retaining the health workforce in the public sector 
particularly doctors in rural areas. For instance, before considering employment in a rural 
setting, a doctor may first assess the potential impact of losing out on locums, comprises due 
to lack of amenities and good schools for their children. For nurses in particular, another 
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critical element for making them feel welcomed in rural settings was community appreciation 
and support and if the community is more receptive of those nurses not originating from such 
settings. 
 
The present study has however also found that getting allowances did not significantly 
improve the overall job satisfaction or even decrease health workers intention to quit. A 
number of studies have reported an association between low job satisfaction with greater 
intention to leave [346-348]. Chan et al [349] and Coomber and Barriball [350] noted that 
triggers of job satisfaction and intention to leave are complex and influenced not only by 
organisational factors such as work environment, organisational culture, work demands and 
social support, but also by individual factors including burnout, and demographic factors.    
 
Similarly, this study also found that age decreased the intention to leave of health workers in 
hospitals; with the older health workers being less likely to quit their jobs than the younger 
ones. Results by Blaauw et al [351] comparing the job satisfaction and intention to leave of 
different categories of health workers in Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa support the latter 
finding. These findings are not surprising considering that other existing studies have also 
noted that the health system is run by the ageing nursing health workforce. The reasoning for 
this suggests that older health workers have fewer options to leave and are preparing for 
retirement.  
 
As noted in the previous section on the process-related factors, this study further found that 
across all the three financial incentive strategies (rural allowance, scarce skills allowance and 
the OSD), there was a problem of awarding payments retrospectively. It is thus reasonable to 
conclude that during the lag-time from when the announcements were made by policymakers 
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about the signing of the agreements of these financial incentives strategies to the actual pay-
outs to health workers, expectations were raised amongst health workers by the idea of the 
anticipated amounts of money to be gained.  
 
Drawing from the expectancy theory [92], this study argues that the idea of anticipated 
monies may have acted as an incentive for health workers in this study to exert individual 
effort into their work which could have led to improved performance. This was reflected by 
findings in Chapter 5 which demonstrated that regardless of the human resource challenges 
such as staff shortages and increased workload, health workers in this study perceived 
themselves to be diligent considering the circumstances under which they work. This finding 
is consistent with Vohs et al [352] study which revealed that participants exposed to money 
displayed an increased desire to take on more work and showed greater persistence in difficult 
tasks. 
 
There are also long standing debates in the literature about the effects of money on human 
behaviour [352-354]. On the one hand, there is a view that the idea of money, even without 
possession, may lead to significant changes in personal performance, interpersonal relations 
and helping behaviour [352] while on the other hand others argued that money is not the sole 
driving force of human behaviour change [354]. The findings in this study appear to concur 
with both debates particularly in relation to the implementation of the OSD. There was a 
group of nurses who indicated that after the lag-time from the announcement of the OSD, 
when the monies were ultimately paid out, the amounts received did not meet their 
expectations. This led to disgruntlement, low morale and reduced effort into their work.  
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However, almost all the respondents were of the view that financial incentives are inadequate 
if implemented on their own. A considerable number of studies have supported this finding 
[30, 39, 165]; suggesting that human behaviour is influenced by complex and diverse factors 
including social amenities, schools for children, safety, and accommodation amongst others. 
Other researchers argued that no matter how well retention strategies are designed and 
implemented, health workers will always move, often as a result of other reasons beyond any 
workforce retention strategy [29]. Therefore, policymakers should recognise that if other 
factors are not taken into consideration, a single strategy is unlikely to improve the motivation 
and retention of health workers.  
 
A noteworthy result of the present study is that both targeted (rural and scarce skills 
allowances) and non-targeted (the OSD) financial incentives excluded other cadres of health 
workers from benefiting, leading to unintended consequences of these incentives. As a result, 
all three financial incentives were reported to be divisive, thus eroding team spirit between 
doctors and nurses, and between professional nurses and the lower cadre of nurses. With 
reference to the expectancy theory [92], and in relation to the rural allowance and the OSD, 
this was reflected by the junior cadre of nurses lessening effort exerted in their duties because 
they believed that their efforts did not lead to attractive organisational rewards. This has 
implications for the quality of care provided. In essence, this study found that both targeted 
and non-targeted financial incentives caused great dissatisfaction and demotivation 
particularly amongst nurses of all categories.  
 
The respondents in the present study also differed in relation to their preferences of uniform 
financial incentives (same percentage increase for all) as opposed to differential incentives 
(different percentage increase for the different cadres). On the one hand, some respondents 
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were of the view that uniform incentives do not discriminate against the different health 
categories and that they reduce problems of inequities. On the other hand, those in favour of 
differential incentives argued that these strategies incentivise expertise and experience, thus 
considered them as increasing the motivation to acquire more skills.  
 
Notably, the findings of this study demonstrated that there were inequities in the 
implementation of the OSD in particular; whereby nurses with the same qualifications and 
experience working in the same facility were rewarded differently. The results of the health 
worker survey further showed that nurses who received the OSD had higher intention to quit 
than those who did not; suggesting that perceived inequities related to how the OSD was 
rewarded led to reduced motivation and dissatisfaction. This finding is supported by equity 
theory which argues that if individuals perceive the rewards they receive from their efforts to 
be inequitable to those of others, individual effort and performance may be negatively 
affected [92].  
 
This study also found that both rural and scarce skills allowances were not linked to 
performance while an attempt was made to link the OSD to performance. However, the 
criterion mentioned in the OSD policy for determining the above average performance, which 
would potentially lead to increased rewards, was vague. Evidence on performance-based 
incentives is still inconclusive particularly on their long-term effects [330], with some authors 
cautioning the uncertainty of the rewards to effort made [330] while others raised concerns 
that about the likelihood of health workers focusing more attention on incentivised activities 
and neglecting non-incentivised activities [355, 356].  
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The organisational commitment of the older health workers was also higher than that of their 
younger counterparts. Although this is good for skills transfer purposes, it is also worrying 
considering that the health system needs a new generation of health workers particularly for 
the successful ongoing implementation of the national health insurance (NHI). Overall, this 
study found that there was overlapping implementation of the three financial incentives, with 
the OSD introduced few years after the implementation of the rural and scarce skills 
allowances; without an evaluation of the latter. This undermined the impact of each of these 
financial incentives.  
 
Not surprisingly, the hospital revitalisation programme, the only non-financial incentive in 
this study, seemed to yield the least effect. This was possibly because its intended purpose 
was not necessarily to improve the motivation and retention of health workers, but rather to 
improve the working conditions and management of hospitals. This finding is in contrast with 
existing studies which reported that non-financial incentives related to working conditions 
had greater potential to influence retention [173, 174]. The hospital revitalisation programme 
was included in this study as a non-financial incentive because it was difficult to identify any 
national non-financial incentives in the public health sector. Available evidence elsewhere 
showed that non-financial incentives such as job autonomy, good clinical supervision, 
providing opportunities for professional growth and promotional opportunities were 
positively associated with job satisfaction and retention [39]. Perhaps South Africa can 
consider implementing more non-financial incentives that have been tested to be effective 
elsewhere in similar contexts.  
 
In general, this study provided additional perspectives to strengthen the available literature on 
incentives, motivation and implementation of financial and non-financial incentives by 
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proposing an integrated framework converging policy analysis and motivation theories. 
Important conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis using this proposed conceptual 
thinking are that the influence of financial and non-financial incentives on the motivation and 
retention of health workers should be understood in the context of the process of their design 
and implementation, and the interrelationships between health worker individual needs, their 
expectancies, their perceptions of equity as well as their intrinsic and extrinsic drivers. 
Originally, this study intended to understand the process of the design and implementation of 
financial and non-financial incentives and their influence on the motivation and retention of 
health workers. It was by no means intended to propose a conceptual framework for thinking 
about incentives, motivation and implementation. However, deeper analysis of data led to the 
proposed integrated framework.  
 
Although this integrated framework has attempted to establish relationships between known 
theories, it is still speculative because the connection between the policy analysis and 
motivation theories has not been empirically established in existing literature. Westbrook 
[285] have critiqued that no single theory is adequate on its own. However, studies that have 
made some effort to develop integrated theories have either showed relationships between a 
combination of selected motivation theories only [92, 278] or policy analysis frameworks 
[281] in isolation. Only two studies that I could identify integrated theories beyond motivation 
theories and policy analysis; one study integrated motivation theories, structural theories and 
systems theories [285] while another one showed relationships between policy streams theory 
and the anthropology of development [282].  
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10.2.3 Summary of the Key Messages 
The data presented in this thesis has demonstrated that as opposed to the assumption that 
financial incentives are easy solutions to addressing problems of health workforce motivation 
and retention, their implementation is complex. Despite the popularity of financial incentives, 
this study found that the impact of their admirable intentions can be reduced because of 
process and implementation weaknesses. The process issues related to decentralisation that 
are raised in this thesis and are likely to affect the design and implementation of financial and 
non-financial incentive strategies are weak coordination, lack of uniformity, sub-optimal 
communication, lack of training of implementers, and weak monitoring and information 
systems. In order to avoid loss of morale and staff grievances, careful planning and 
management of the process of the implementation of financial incentives in particular, is 
essential. These conclusions are of general relevance to public health broadly, as well as to 
literature on incentives, motivation and implementation.  
 
10.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
One of the key strengths of this study is the utilisation of a mixed-methods approach which 
allowed for the integration of qualitative and quantitative methodologies to provide a better 
understanding of how the process of the design and implementation of the four incentive 
strategies of interest influenced the motivation and retention of health workers. The 
justification for using mixed methods was for “significance enhancement”, a terminology 
conceptualised by Collins et al [357] involving the use of qualitative and quantitative methods 
to maximise the interpretation of the findings. However, in terms of the sequencing of the 
qualitative methodological approaches, in retrospect, I should have conducted an in-depth 
document review prior to the interviews to enable me to better clarify issues that were 
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confusing instead of doing it concurrently as I did. It is also worth acknowledging that the 
reliance on newspaper articles as part of the document review might have contributed to bias, 
particularly because this depended on the journalists’ political affiliations, their integrity as 
well as commitment to ethical reporting.  
 
The study also fills a gap in the existing literature by providing a critical analysis of the 
implementation of the financial and non-financial incentives in different settings by exploring 
the views of those formulating policies, those responsible for policy implementation as well 
as the beneficiaries of the policy interventions. However, we recognise the potential bias as 
these accounts were influenced by the respondents’ state of mind at the time of the interview. 
In addition, the sample was more biased to nurses than doctors since I struggled to achieve 
satisfactory participation of doctors due to their shortages in the hospitals that participated in 
this study.  
  
Erasmus et al [221] noted that a number of policy implementation studies in LMIC fail to use 
theory to strengthen analysis of the findings. To address this gap, this study offers an 
integrated conceptual framework combining policy analysis and motivation theories to assist 
us in thinking further about how the manner in which the financial and non-financial incentive 
strategies influenced the motivation and retention of health workers. The usefulness of this 
integrated framework is that each individual framework on its own has limitations, however, 
when combined they complement each other to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
research question.   
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The main limitation of the current study is that all the selected interventions had already been 
implemented prior to the commencement of data collection for this study. As such, there was 
no baseline data to determine and compare the impact before and after the implementation of 
these incentive strategies. In addition, all the four incentive strategies had only been 
implemented for a relatively short period at the time when data was collected for this study, 
especially the OSD. This implies that caution should be taken when considering these results 
as they might be reflecting frustrations caused by implementation teething problems. 
However, this study is still useful as it provides valuable information on the participants’ 
perceptions of their current levels of motivation as well as their perceptions regarding the 
influence of the incentive strategies on their motivation and retention.   
 
Another limitation is that the study only measured respondents’ perceptions about the effects 
of the four incentive strategies of interest. The quantitative effects such as those determining 
trends in vacancy rates, turnover rates and retention rates since the implementation of the 
incentive strategies was not measured. This is mainly because of the sub-optimal human 
resource information system in the health sector. This data could have been useful to 
determine the impact of these interventions over time.  
 
Although when this study was designed we struggled to identify a national non-financial 
incentive strategy to include for investigation, the inclusion of the hospital revitalisation 
programme seemed sub-optimal primarily because its targets were different from those of the 
three financial incentives. In addition, some of the revitalised hospitals that were included in 
this study were still fairly new, thus making it difficult to directly attribute the motivation and 
retention of health workers to its implementation alone.    
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Another notable caveat in this study is that emphasis was more on breadth (the four incentive 
strategies) than depth. For example, in relation to the hospital revitalisation programme, the 
questions asked to key informants were very broad, neglecting to separate according to the 
three elements of hospital revitalisation programme (physical infrastructure, technology and 
management). As a result, evidence gathered is focused on physical infrastructure rather than 
other components. Furthermore, because the study was retrospective, assessing the design and 
implementation after the fact was a bit challenging for all the four incentive strategies, making 
it difficult to determine the changing relative actor status and their positions on particular 
issues. This exploration could have added more value to the role and power of actors over 
time. However, the data presented in this study is still valuable as it represents the views of 
those closely involved.  
 
Although variations between provinces and between the levels of care are mentioned where 
applicable, the differences in the motivation and retention of health workers between rural and 
urban areas and between hospital and clinics are at times diluted across all the chapters. This 
is in part because of the nature of the incentive strategies of interest in this study. For 
example, as shown in Table 3, the OSD is the only incentive strategy that allowed for 
comparison across rural and urban and between hospital and clinic settings. The other three 
remaining incentive strategies were either applicable in rural areas (rural allowance) or 
hospital setting (scarce skills allowance and the hospital revitalisation programme). 
Nonetheless, the data presented is still helpful in depicting perceptions related to how these 
context-specific incentive strategies are viewed by both recipients and non-recipients.        
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10.4 Contribution of this Thesis 
It has been shown in the policy analysis literature that even when policies are generally good, 
their impact is likely to remain minimal if economic and social realities are not sufficiently 
taken into consideration; their success depends heavily on how their design and 
implementation process is conducted [358]. At the same time, motivation theories have 
provided understanding on a wide range of topics including group and individual behaviour, 
job design and goal setting [70, 92]. Several scholars have thus argued that the continued 
segregation of motivational theories is detrimental to scientific progress [280]. In her study on 
nursing turnover, Parasuraman [359] acknowledged that over the years there has been a 
growing research interest investigating the linkages among diverse motivational theories. 
Robbins and Coulter [92] asserted that employers can have a better understanding of how to 
motivate people if motivation theories are integrated especially because many underlying 
aspects of these theories are complementary.  
 
However, in the existing literature, the relationship between policy analysis and motivation 
theories has not been well established in improving knowledge on health worker incentives, 
motivation and retention. Given this background, the main contribution of this study is the 
development of an integrated conceptual framework combining motivation theories and 
policy analysis framework which might be useful to further ongoing debates about the effects 
of financial and non-financial incentive strategies on health worker motivation and retention. 
Through this framework, the study have illustrated that complementary motivation theories 
and policy analysis frameworks may be useful in understanding how the implementation 
processes of incentive strategies may lead to unintended consequences which may dilute their 
impact on the motivation and retention on health workers. A second contribution of the study 
is to the still limited scholarly research on the actual implementation of the “real world” HRH 
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interventions. The contribution to this strand lies in identifying reasons for failure of incentive 
strategies using Hogwood and Gunn 10 preconditions for “successful” implementation and 
these are inadequate time for implementation, inadequate combination of resources, high 
dependency relationships, weak coordination, and sub-optimal communication.  
 
Another contribution is to shed light on the literature on financial and non-financial incentives 
even though hospital revitalisation was not a strong non-financial strategy. The results show 
that a non-monetary incentive in the form of infrastructure improvement had less effect on the 
motivation and retention of health workers that participated in this study. However other non-
financial factors were noted as important to the respondents of this study such as career 
advancement, personal growth, and recognition amongst others. As required by expectancy 
theory, understanding how policymakers can take full advantage of non-monetary incentive 
options seems imperative in this period of budgetary constraints which makes it impossible to 
offer bonuses that are large enough to be effective. Drawing from equity theory, our data 
shows that targeted financial incentives contribute to feelings of inequities leading withdrawal 
of effort in one’s work. These findings suggest caution in using targeted financial incentives 
as they may lead to negative unintended consequences. However, this has been disputed by 
other studies which propose that targeted incentives may increase motivation.   
 
 
This information is particularly critical in cognisance of the major health system reforms 
currently underway in the country of which their success would depend heavily on the skilled 
and motivated health workforce. Improved knowledge on the management of the 
implementation process and consideration of the implementation context could strengthen 
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understanding that could lead to good policies achieving their intended outcomes; and in the 
longer term result in improved service delivery.  
 
Methodologically, this research used a multiple-case study design which allowed for complex 
unfolding of events [222] to provide an in-depth understanding of how the process of the 
design and implementation of financial and non-financial incentives influenced the motivation 
and retention of health workers. The focus on the four interventions of interest in this study 
and on variety of settings provided diversity and rich comparative analysis of the cases across 
contexts.  
 
Some researchers have noted that in qualitative research, appropriateness is ascertained by 
how well the sample can represent the phenomena of interest [228]. In this study, interviews 
were conducted with purposively selected key informants, hospital managers and human 
resource managers on the basis of their influence or knowledge of the incentive strategies of 
interest. Therefore, these respondents could articulate their experiences of the design and 
implementation of these strategies. Similarly, interviews were conducted with nurses and 
doctors because they were the beneficiaries of the incentive strategies. As such, they were 
able to share their views on how these incentive strategies influenced their motivation and 
retention.  
 
10.5 Recommendations 
Three major recommendations can be drawn based on the findings of this study. First, training 
of the implementers of the hospital revitalisation programme needs to be strengthened. This is 
because this intervention is an ongoing multi-pronged long-term strategy anticipated to 
complete around 2024 according to the evidence presented in Chapter 8; but weaknesses 
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related to technical capacity has been highlighted as one of the major cause of the delay of its 
implementation. In cognisance that a significant amount of funds are allocated annually for 
the implementation of the hospital revitalisation programme, and that this strategy involves 
complex series of events, this challenge needs to be urgently addressed as it affects several 
other elements such as the tendering and procurement processes. Therefore, lessons learned 
from the implementation of the hospital revitalisation programme to date could be taken as an 
opportunity for revision, redesign and self-correction [332]. Considering the long-term 
financial implications of this incentive strategy, government should consider prolonging 
training of implementers and incorporating lessons learned from implementation to date into 
training to ensure that important aspects that have potential to cause unintended consequences 
are sufficiently covered.  
 
Secondly, there is a need to develop and strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems. This 
could assist to determine whether the same skills are still important to continue investing on.  
Thirdly, in order to create opportunities for clear career paths for nurses, provision should be 
made for study leave and funds should be made available for nurses to further their studies 
through creating opportunities for hiring replacement staff for the duration of their studies. 
Revisions of OSD policy should address this.  
 
10.6 Scope for Future Research 
Based on the findings of this study, five potential studies could be investigated by future 
research. First, in this thesis, we found that the implementation of the OSD involved complex 
administrative processes but that some of the key actors in its implementation included 
hospital CEOs, human resource managers, human resource clerks and administrative 
managers who in some instances had insufficient skills to deal with the complex nature of this 
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incentive strategy. Similarly, the findings showed that delays in the implementation of the 
hospital revitalisation programme were due to incompetent implementers who lacked the 
technical skills required to manage this programme. Future studies could conduct an in-depth 
analysis of the competencies and roles of implementers of financial and non-financial 
incentive strategies. This should take into consideration the recent reforms aimed at 
strengthening management capacity at hospital level through interventions including the 
introduction of targeted management training, review of job descriptions and competencies of 
chief executive officers of all public hospitals, readvertising of all CEOs positions as well as 
ensuring that individuals in these positions are suitably remunerated 
 
Existing evidence have demonstrated that retention strategies combining financial and non-
financial incentives are likely to be more effective than only increasing remuneration. In this 
study, hospital revitalisation programme, the only non-financial incentive strategy, yielded a 
minimal effect. This was potentially due to the fact that its primary intent was not to motivate 
and retain health workers but rather to improve the working conditions. There is a need to 
more studies to conduct a more comprehensive mapping of existing non-financial strategies in 
the health sector as we as to evaluate their impact on the motivation and retention of health 
workers.  
 
Another conclusion that can drawn from this thesis is that significant amounts of monies were 
spent in the implementation of all the four incentive strategies, yet it is still uncertain whether 
these amounts matches the outputs. A question of relevance for policymakers is that do the 
costs of financial incentives override the cost of non-financial incentives? Therefore, other 
researchers could conduct a costing study to ascertain the sustainability of financial and non-
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financial incentives as well as to determine whether the money invested in these strategies 
matches the outputs.  
 
Although my study proposes an integrated model to assist with understanding how the 
process of the design and implementation of incentive strategies influenced the motivation 
and retention of health workers, this model is still speculative. Locke and Latham [120] argue 
that in order for every connection of the theoretical models to be recognised, they must be 
supported by empirical research. Therefore, future research could test this integrated 
framework to assess its applicability in other settings as well as to identify the strengths of the 
various relationships and connections identified in this study. Furthermore, the use of Walt 
and Gilson [198] framework in identifying the actors responsible for formulating policies and 
implementation was limiting. Future studies could complement this framework by conducting 
in-depth stakeholder analysis to enable improved mapping of those involved in the design and 
implementation of financial and non-financial incentive strategies.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Key Informants Interview Guide 
 
Biographical details of person being interviewed: 
Job title; Institution; Department 
 
Recruitment, motivation and retention:  
1. What are the most important human resource problems or challenges in the country?  
2. What do you think are the reasons for some health professionals to leave the country 
or the public sector?  
a. What do you think is keeping other health care professionals in their job?  
 
Human resource interventions: 
Rural Allowance 
1. Can you tell me about the rationale for initiating this policy / intervention? 
 Explore steps or key elements in the formulation of this policy / intervention 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention 
 Explore the rationale for the targeted cadres? 
2. How was this policy implemented?  
 Explore measures taken by the department to support implementation of this 
intervention in the provinces?  
3. Can u tell me about the implementation of this intervention: 
Probe:  
  What were the successes and challenges in implementation? 
4. Which actors or bodies were involved in the formulation of this policy / intervention? 
Probe: 
 Actors involved in formulation and implementation 
5. In what way would you say that rural allowance was effective in attracting, 
motivating and retaining doctors and nurses in particular?  
6. What do you think could be done to improve the implementation of the rural 
allowance?  
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 Scarce skills 
7. Can you tell me about the rationale for initiating this policy / intervention? 
 Explore steps or key elements in the formulation of this policy / intervention 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention 
 Explore the rationale for the targeted cadres? 
8. How was this policy implemented?  
 Explore measures taken by the department to support implementation of this 
intervention in the provinces?  
9. Can u tell me about the implementation of this intervention: 
Probe:  
  What were the successes and challenges in implementation? 
10. Which actors or bodies were involved in the formulation of this policy / intervention? 
Probe: 
 Actors involved in formulation and implementation 
11. In what way would you say that scarce skills allowance was effective in attracting, 
motivating and retaining doctors and nurses in particular?  
12. What do you think could be done to improve the implementation of the scarce skills 
allowance?  
 
OSD for Nurses 
13. Can you tell me about the rationale for initiating this policy / intervention? 
 Explore steps or key elements in the formulation of this policy / intervention 
 Explore which bodies were involved in the formulation of this policy / 
intervention? 
 Explore the rationale for the targeted cadres? 
 Explore whether OSD is replacing scarce skills allowance 
14. How was this policy implemented?  
 Explore measures taken by the department to support implementation of this 
intervention in the provinces?  
15. Can u tell me about the implementation of this intervention: 
Probe:  
  What were the successes and challenges in implementation? 
16. Which actors or bodies were involved in the formulation of this policy / intervention? 
Probe: 
 Actors involved in formulation and implementation 
17. In what way would you say that OSD was effective in attracting, motivating and 
retaining doctors and nurses in particular?  
18. What do you think could be done to improve the implementation of the scarce skills 
allowance?  
 
Closure  
19. Are there any other interventions or strategies in place or planned by your department 
to improve the attraction, motivation and retention of doctors and nurses?  
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Appendix 2: Hospital Manager / CEO Interview Guide 
 
  
Human resource challenges: 
1. What are the most important human resource problems or challenges facing your facility?  
2. What mechanisms do you use in your facility to recruit staff? - TO BE CONFIRMED 
WITH HR MANAGER  
a. Probe, how long does it take on average to fill up vacant posts? 
b. Probe for challenges faced in filling up vacant positions. 
 
Absenteeism of staff:  
3. To what extent would you say that absenteeism of staff is a problem in your facility? - TO 
BE CONFIRMED WITH HR MANAGER  
a. Probe for differences in the level of absence between nurses and doctors.  
b. Probe for reasons stated by staff for absenteeism?  
c. What is the impact of absenteeism on other staff?  
d. How do you deal with absenteeism of staff in your facility? 
 
Human resource interventions: 
4. Could you tell me about any strategies / interventions that you are aware of that are used 
to attract and retain health care professionals in the public sector and in the country. 
a. Probe for rural allowance, scarce skills allowance, OSD and hospital revitalisation 
programme).  
b. Probe also for strategies or intervention they use to motivate and retain staff in their 
facility? 
 
5. Can you please tell me more about Rural Allowance: 
 Probe what was the intention of this intervention? 
 How was this intervention implemented in your facility?  
 Reaction of nurses and doctors to this intervention. 
 What were the successes and challenges  
a. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in the 
number and type of health care professionals you attract and retain in your facility?  
 Probe why do they say so. 
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 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
b. In what way would you say this intervention was effective in your facility?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining health care 
professionals in the facility?  
 Probe why was it effective / ineffective? 
c. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
policy in your facility? 
d. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this policy? 
 
6. Let us now discuss Scarce Skills Allowance? 
 What was the intention of this intervention? 
 How was this intervention implemented in your facility?  
 Reaction of nurses and doctors to this intervention. 
 What were the successes and challenges  
a. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in the 
number and type of health care professionals you attract and retain in your facility?  
 Probe why do they say so. 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
b. In what way would you say this intervention was effective in your facility?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining health care 
professionals in the facility?  
 Probe why was it effective / ineffective? 
c. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
policy in your facility? 
d. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this policy? 
 
7. Please tell me about the Occupation Specific Dispensation of Nurses?  
 What was the intention of this intervention? 
 How was this intervention implemented in your facility?  
 Reaction of nurses towards this intervention. 
 What were the successes and challenges  
a. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in the 
number and type of health care professionals you attract and retain in your facility?  
 Probe why do they say so. 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
b. In what way would you say this intervention was effective in your facility?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining health care 
professionals in the facility?  
 Probe why was it effective / ineffective? 
c. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
policy in your facility? 
d. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this policy? 
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8.  What about hospital revitalisation programme: (ONLY ASK IN REVITALISED 
HOSPITALS) 
 Probe what was the intention of this intervention? 
 How was this intervention implemented in your facility?  
 What were the successes and challenges  
 Reaction of nurses and doctors to this intervention. 
b. Since your hospital has been revitalised, have you seen any changes in the number and 
type of health care professionals you attract and retain in your facility?  
 Probe why do they say so. 
 Probe what was the situation before the revitalisation. 
c. In what way would you say this intervention was effective in your facility?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining health care 
professionals in the facility?  
 Probe why was it effective / ineffective? 
d. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
policy in your facility? 
e. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this policy? 
 
9. What else do you think should be done to motivate and retain the remaining health care 
professional in your facility and in your province?  
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Appendix 3: Human Resource Manager Interview Guide 
 
 
Human resource challenges: 
1. What are the most important human resource problems or challenges facing your facility?  
2. What mechanisms do you use in your facility to recruit staff?  
3. How long does it take on average to fill up vacant posts? 
4. What are the challenges faced in filling up vacant positions. 
 
Absenteeism of staff:  
5. To what extent would you say that absenteeism of staff is a problem in your facility?  
6. Does absenteeism differ between nurses and doctors?   
7. What are the main reasons mentioned by staff for being absent?  
8. How do you deal with absenteeism of staff in your facility? 
 
Human resource interventions: 
9. What strategies or interventions do you use in your facility to motivate and retain staff? 
10. How was OSD implemented in your facility? 
11. What were the challenges of implementing OSD in your facility? 
12. What do you think could be done to improve implementation of OSD? 
13. How was scarce skills implemented in your facility? 
14. What were the challenges of implementing scarce skills? 
15. What do you think could be done to improve the implementation of scarce skills? 
  
MOTIVATION AND RETENTION OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGERS  
310 
 
Appendix 4: Health Workers Interview Guide 
 
 
 Recruitment, Motivation and Retention 
1. What are the most important human resource problems or challenges facing your 
facility?  
a. Probe for staff shortage, workload, staff morale, staff retention 
b. Explore the impact of these challenges at the facility  
2. When you started working at this facility, what actually attracted you about this job?  
a. Probe whether the same factors are still attractive 
b. Probe why  
3. Thinking about your current situation, to what extent would you say you are motivated to 
do your job?  
 Probe why 
4. Would you consider leaving this facility in the near future?  
 Probe why 
 
Absenteeism of staff 
5. To what extent would you say that absenteeism of staff is a problem in this facility?  
a. Probe for differences in the level of absence between nurses and doctors.  
b. Probe for reasons for absenteeism?  
c. Probe for the impact of absenteeism for other staff?  
 
Human Resource Interventions 
6. Could you tell me about any strategies / interventions that you are aware of that are used 
to attract and retain health care professionals in the public sector and in the country 
(Probe for rural allowance, scarce skills allowance, OSD and hospital revitalisation 
programme).  
 
7. Can you please tell me more about Rural Allowance: 
a. How do you feel about this intervention? 
 Probe whether respondent is receiving this allowance or not.  
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 Probe for reactions towards this intervention. 
b. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in your level 
of motivation? Why do they say so? 
 Probe whether this intervention contributed to keeping them in this facility. 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
c. In what way would you say this intervention was effective?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining you in this 
facility?  
 Probe why do they say it was effective / ineffective? 
d. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
intervention in your facility? 
e. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this intervention? 
 
8. Let us now discuss Scarce Skills Allowance?  
a. How do you feel about this intervention? 
 Probe whether respondent is receiving this allowance or not.  
 Probe for reactions towards this intervention. 
b. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in your level 
of motivation? Why do they say so? 
 Probe whether this intervention contributed to keeping them in this facility. 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
c. In what way would you say this intervention was effective?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining you in this 
facility?  
 Probe why do they say it was effective / ineffective? 
d. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
intervention in your facility? 
e. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this intervention? 
 
9. Please tell me about the Occupation Specific Dispensation of Nurses (OSD)?  
a. How do you feel about this intervention? 
 Probe whether respondent is receiving this allowance or not.  
 Probe for reactions towards this intervention. 
b. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in your level 
of motivation? Why do they say so? 
 Probe whether this intervention contributed to keeping them in this facility. 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
c. In what way would you say this intervention was effective?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining you in this 
facility?  
 Probe why do they say it was effective / ineffective? 
d. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
intervention in your facility? 
e. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this intervention? 
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10. What about hospital revitalisation programme: (ONLY ASK IN REVITALISED 
HOSPITALS) 
a. How do you feel about this intervention? 
 Probe for reactions towards this intervention. 
b. Since the implementation of this intervention, have you seen any changes in your level 
of motivation? Why do you say so? 
 Probe whether this intervention contributed to keeping them in this facility. 
 Probe what was the situation before the implementation of this intervention. 
c. In what way would you say this intervention was effective?  
 Probe for its effectiveness in attracting, motivating and retaining you in this 
facility?  
 Probe why do they say it was effective / ineffective? 
d. What do you think could have been done to strengthen the implementation of this 
intervention in your facility? 
e. What do you think could be done, in going forward to strengthen the implementation 
of this intervention? 
 
11. What else do you think should be done to motivate and retain the remaining health care 
professional in your facility and in your province?  
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Appendix 5: Health Worker Survey 
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
 
“I have been given an information sheet and I understand the objective of the study. I further 
understand that my responses will be kept confidential and that it is up to me whether or not I 
want to complete this questionnaire. It has been explained to me that even if I choose not to 
complete the questionnaire, I should still return it to the researchers completed at the bottom so 
that they can be able to identify the refusals. My refusal to participate will in no way affect me.” 
 
I voluntarily agree to complete the questionnaire:  Yes   No 
 
Date:_______________ Signature:_______________________________________ 
 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
 
Facility  Code: 
 
 
Province: 
GP = Gauteng                                              
NW = North West 
Urban / Rural: 
U =  Urban 
R = Rural  
District: 
1 = Bophirima                    2 = Bojanala 
3 = Central District            4 = Southern District 
 
Name of Sub-
district: 
 
 
Facility Status: 
1 = Revitalised 
2 = Non-revitalised 
Type of facility: 
DH = District Hospital                             RH = Regional Hospital            
NCH = National Central Hospital           CHC = Community Health Centre      
C = Clinic 
Ward Name 
 
1 = TB / ARV / STEPDOWN         2 = Psychiatry        3 = Paediatric 
4 = Surgical                                   5 = Medical            6 = High care / Burns 
7 = Gynaecologist                         8 = Maternity          9 = Outpatient (OPD)                                           
10 = Theatre                                  11 = Other (specify): 
__________________________  
Respondent code: 
 
 
Start Time: 
 Finish Time: 
 
 
Date: 
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SECTION 1:  
 
 
 
May I ask some questions that provide a descriptive profile of yourself? Please CIRCLE 
your responses. 
 
1.1 Race 
(Indicate by marking a circle 
against the appropriate) 
 
1 = African/Black                                 2 = Coloured 
3 = Indian/Asian                                   4 = White 
5= Other (Specify): 
__________________________________ 
1.2 Nationality 
 
 
1.3 Gender 
 
1 = Male 
2 = Female 
1.4 How old are you?  
In years: ________________________________ 
 
1.5 Describe your marital status? 1 = Single                                            2 = Married 
3 = Divorced                                        4 = Separated 
5 = Other Specify)___________________________ 
1.6 Do you have any children? 1 = Yes 
2 = No  
1.7 Cadre of health worker 1 = Specialist                      2 =  General practitioner 
3 = Professional nurse       4 = Enrolled nurse 
5 = Nursing assistant         6 = Chief Prof. nurse 
7  = Senior Prof. nurse 
8=Other (Specify) _______________________ 
1.8 Where did you train?   
University/College: ________________________ 
 
Country: _____________________________ 
1.9 How long have you been 
working in this facility?  
Number of years: ___________________________ 
Months: __________________________________ 
1.10 Is this your first job since being 
trained as a health professional? 
   
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
1.11 Did you change jobs in the past 
year?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
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SECTION 2:  
 
1. Think of the work you do at present.  How well does each of the following words or phrases 
describe your work?  CIRCLE. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK. 
 
 1 for "Yes" if it describes your work 
 2 for "No" if it does not describe it 
 3 for "?" if you cannot decide 
 
 Yes No ? 
Satisfying 1 2 3 
Gives sense of accomplishment 1 2 3 
Challenging 1 2 3 
Dull 1 2 3 
Uninteresting 1 2 3 
 
2. Think of the pay you get now. How well does each of the following words or phrases describe 
your present pay? CIRCLE. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 Yes No ? 
Income adequate for normal 
expenses 
1 2 3 
Fair 1 2 3 
Insecure 1 2 3 
Well paid 1 2 3 
Underpaid 1 2 3 
 
3. Think of the opportunities for promotion that you have now.  How well does each of the 
following words or phrases describe your opportunities for promotion?  CIRCLE. DO NOT 
LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 Yes No ? 
Good opportunities for promotion 1 2 3 
Promotion on ability 1 2 3 
Dead-end job 1 2 3 
Good chance for promotion 1 2 3 
Unfair promotion policy 1 2 3 
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4. Think of your supervisor and the kind of supervision that you get on your job.  How well does 
each of the following words or phrases describe your supervision?  CIRCLE. DO NOT 
LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 Yes No ? 
Praises good work 1 2 3 
Tactful 1 2 3 
Up-to-date 1 2 3 
Annoying 1 2 3 
Bad 1 2 3 
 
 
5. Think of the majority of people that you work with now or the people you meet in connection 
with your work. How well does each of the following words or phrases describe these people? 
CIRCLE. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 Yes No ? 
Boring 1 2 3 
Helpful 1 2 3 
Responsible 1 2 3 
Intelligent 1 2 3 
Lazy 1 2 3 
 
6. Think of your job in general.  All in all, what is it like most of the time?  For each of the 
following words or phrases, CIRCLE: DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yes No ? 
Good 1 2 3 
Undesirable 1 2 3 
Better than most 1 2 3 
Disagreeable 1 2 3 
Makes me content 1 2 3 
Excellent 1 2 3 
Enjoyable 1 2 3 
Poor 1 2 3 
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SECTION 3: 
 
7. Listed below are a series of statements that represent possible feelings that individuals might have about the 
facility for which  
they work. With respect to your own feelings about working in this particular facility, please indicate the 
degree of your agreement 
or disagreement with each statement by checking one of the SEVEN alternatives below each statement. 
Please CIRCLE the most appropriate response. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK. 
 
 
Statement  
Strongl
y 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightly 
Neithe
r 
disagr
ee nor 
agree 
Agre
e 
slight
ly 
Agr
ee 
Stron
gly 
agree 
1 I am willing to put in a great deal 
of effort beyond that normally 
expected in order to help this 
facility to be successful. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I talk about this facility to my 
friends as a great facility to work 
for. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I feel very little loyalty to this 
facility. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I would accept almost any type 
of job assignment in order to 
keep working for this facility. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I find that my values and this 
facility’s values are very similar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I am proud to tell others that I 
am part of this facility. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I could just as well be working 
for a different facility as long as 
the type of work was similar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 This facility really inspires the 
very best in me in the way of job 
performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 It would take very little change 
in my present circumstances to 
cause me to leave this facility. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 I am extremely glad that I chose 
this facility to work for over 
others I was considering at the 
time I joined. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 There’s not too much to be 
gained by sticking with this 
facility indefinitely. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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12 Often, I find it difficult to agree 
with this facility’s policy on 
important matters relating to its 
employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 I really care about the fate of this 
facility. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 For me this is the best of all 
possible facilities for which to 
work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Deciding to work for this facility 
was a definite mistake on my 
part. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
SECTION 4: 
 
8. Please respond to the following questions about your current job with your current facility. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements by using a 
CIRCLE in all the questions. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK. 
 
 
Statement  
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightly 
Neither 
disagre
e nor 
agree 
Agre
e 
slight
ly 
Agr
ee 
Stron
gly 
agree 
1 I intend to leave this facility 
before too long 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I do not intend to leave my 
present employer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I intend to quit working for 
this facility immediately  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I expect to leave this facility 
soon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. How would you rate your chances of leaving your current employer within these timeframe? 
(“Voluntarily” refers to leaving of your own free will because you choose to, not because you are 
forced to. Being fired is NOT voluntary quitting). Please CIRCLE the most appropriate 
response. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK. 
 
 
Statement  
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightly 
Neither 
disagre
e nor 
agree 
Agre
e 
slight
ly 
Agre
e 
Strongly 
agree 
1 I will voluntarily quit my job 
in the next three months 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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2 I will voluntarily quit my job 
in the next six months 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I will voluntarily quit my job 
in the next year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I will voluntarily quit my job 
in the next two years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
10. If you decide to quit your current job, where would you switch to? Please mark X in the 
appropriate box. DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK. 
 
 Yes No 
In the health sector in South Africa   
In the health sector out of the country   
Out of the health sector   
Other (please specify):   
 
11. Have you been absent / away from work in the past ONE month? IF NO, SKIP TO 
SECTION 5   
Yes No 
12. How many days have you been absent / away from work due to the following reasons in the 
last ONE month? Please indicate the number in the box as per the reason stipulated. 
 
 
 
Total number 
of days absent 
due to the 
following 
reasons in the 
Last ONE 
month 
Sick leave  
Compassionate / family responsibility  
Study leave  
Maternity leave  
Paternity leave  
Other (please specify):  
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SECTION 5: 
 
13. Do you get any the following allowances? Please mark X in the appropriate box. DO NOT 
LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK. IF “NO / DON’T KNOW” SKIP TO Q 16 
 
 
Yes No 
Don’t 
Know 
Rural allowance    
Scarce skills allowance    
Occupational specific dispensation (OSD) for 
nurses / doctors 
   
 
14. If you get to any of the above allowances, could you please indicate your level of satisfaction 
in relation to the following? Only CIRCLE according to the allowance that you receive.  
 
 
Statement  
Very 
dissatisfi
ed 
Dissatisfi
ed  
Slightly 
dissatisfi
ed 
Neither 
satisfied  
nor 
dissatisfi
ed 
Slightl
y 
satisfi
ed  
Satisfi
ed 
Very 
satisfi
ed 
1 
How do you feel about 
rural allowance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 
How do you feel about 
scarce skills allowance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 
How do you feel about 
OSD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
15. Thinking about the allowance(s) you are receiving, please indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with the following statements by marking with a CIRCLE on the most appropriate 
response. Please only mark for the allowance (s) you receive.   ONLY to be answered by those 
who are getting any of the allowances mentioned.  THEN SKIP TO Q 17. 
 Statement  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightly 
Neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree 
Str
ong
ly 
agr
ee 
1 
The provision of rural 
allowance attracted me to 
come and work for this 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 
The provision of rural  
allowance motivates me to 
do my job better 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 
The provision of rural  
allowance encourages me 
to remain working in this 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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16. If you are NOT getting any of the allowance (s) mentioned above, how do you feel about not 
getting any of these allowances? CIRCLE the most appropriate response. THEN GO TO 
SECTION 6 
 
 
Statement  
Very 
dissatisfi
ed 
Dissatisfi
ed  
Slightly 
dissatisfi
ed 
Neither 
satisfied  
nor 
dissatisfi
ed 
Slightl
y 
satisfi
ed  
Satisfi
ed 
Very 
satisfi
ed 
1 
How do you feel about 
not getting rural 
allowance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 
How do you feel about  
not getting scarce skills 
allowance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 
How do you feel about 
not getting OSD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  
 Statement  
Strongl
y 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightly 
Neither 
disagree 
nor 
agree 
Agree 
slightl
y 
Agree 
Stron
gly 
agree 
4 
The provision of scarce skills 
allowance attracted me to 
come and work for this 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 
The provision of scarce skills 
allowance motivates me to do 
my job better 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 
The provision of scarce skills  
allowance encourages me to 
remain working in this 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 
The provision of OSD 
attracted me to come and 
work for this facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
The provision of OSD 
motivates me to do my job 
better 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 
The provision of OSD 
encourages me to remain 
working in this facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
322 
 
SECTION 6: 
 
17. Could you please indicate your level of satisfaction in relation to the following? CIRCLE the 
most appropriate response. Please DO NOT LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 
 
Statement  
Very 
dissatisfi
ed 
Dis-
satisfi
ed  
Slightly 
dissatisfi
ed 
Neither 
satisfied  
nor 
dissatisfi
ed 
Slightl
y 
satisfi
ed  
Satisfi
ed 
Very 
satisfi
ed 
Not 
Applica
ble 
1 
How do you feel 
about the physical 
appearance of your 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 
How do you feel 
about equipment and 
technology  in your 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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18. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about 
your working environment. Please CIRCLE the most appropriate response.  Please DO NOT 
LEAVE ANY SPACE BLANK.  
 
 
Statement  
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightly 
Neither 
disagre
e nor 
agree 
Agree 
slightl
y 
Agree 
Stron
gly 
agree 
Not 
Applica
ble 
1 
It is because of the 
renovation  / 
revitalisation of this 
facility that I was 
attracted to work here 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 
I am motivated to do 
my job better because 
of the renovation or 
revitalisation of this 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
3 
The renovation  / 
revitalisation 
encourages me to 
remain working for this 
facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
  
3 
How do you feel 
about availability of 
essential medicines / 
drugs in your facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4 
 
How do you feel 
about 
accommodation 
provided for staff in 
your facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5 
How do you feel 
about education for 
your children in this 
area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6 
How do you feel 
about entertainment 
in this area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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SECTION 7: 
 
19. What do you think could be done to motivate and retain health care professionals in this 
facility? 
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Appendix 6: Ethics Approval from the University of the Witwatersrand 
Ethics Committee  
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Appendix 7: Requirements for Above Average Performance for Grade 
Progression 
Job Title Above Average Grade Progression/Post 
Promotion Requirements 
Professional Nurse Grade 1 (General 
Nursing) 
 A combination of 5 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration General Nursing experience 
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Professional Nurse Grade 
1 (General Nursing) 
Professional Nurse Grade 2 (General 
Nursing) 
 A combination of 15 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience in General Nursing 
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Professional Nurse Grade 
2 (General Nursing) 
Operational Manager Nursing (General Unit) 
Grade 1 
 5 years actual service as Operational 
Manager: Nursing (General Unit) Grade 1 
Professional Nurse Grade 1 (Speciality Unit)   A combination of 9 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience in General Nursing 
 At least 5 years of this period must be 
appropriate / recognisable experience in 
the specialty after obtaining the relevant 1-
year post-basic qualification required for 
the relevant specialty 
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Professional Nurse Grade 
1 (Specialty Nursing) 
Clinical Nurse Practitioner Grade 1 (Primary 
Health Care) 
 A combination of 9 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience in General Nursing 
 At least 5 years of this period must be 
appropriate / recognisable experience in 
PHC after obtaining the relevant 1-year 
post-basic qualification required for the 
relevant specialty 
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Clinical Nurse 
Practitioner Grade 1 (Primary Health 
Care) 
Staff Nurse Grade 1  A combination of 5 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience  
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Staff Nurse Grade 1 
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Job Title Above Average Grade Progression/Post 
Promotion Requirements 
Staff Nurse Grade 2  A combination of 15 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience  
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Staff Nurse Grade 2 
Nursing Assistant Grade 1  5 years actual service as Nursing Assistant 
Grade 1 OR 
 A combination of 5 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience  
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Nursing Assistant Grade 
1 
Nursing Assistant Grade 2  A combination of 15 years actual service 
and or appropriate / recognisable post-
registration experience  
 At least 4 years of this period must be 
actual service as Nursing Assistant Grade 
2 
c 
